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 II 
Abstract	  
Preventing money laundering is a major international problem. Several attempts, from the 
national to the international level, have been made to address and prevent money laundering. 
These are often frustrated by the dynamic nature of the crime itself. However, regardless of its 
reach and dynamism in illegal or legal transactions, which are often intertwined, individual 
nations need to address the issue of money laundering to signify to an international audience and 
legitimate commercial interests their intent to tackle money laundering and thus illustrate that 
public and private state run organisations in the financial and law enforcement sectors are honest 
and professional, and that their country is a ‘place to do business’. This thesis, therefore, presents 
an evaluation of the strategies and future directions of money laundering in Dubai, as it is a 
‘new’, dynamic place in which to conduct business and the financial centre of the Middle East. It 
examines the various ways in which legislation and law enforcement in Dubai are struggling 
with and tackling the issues and problems of money laundering in the face of organised crime 
and terrorism. In this thesis, the concepts of money laundering and financial crimes in Dubai, 
with a special focus on strategies as well as future direction of control, are explored in some 
depth. This work has established that Dubai has a substantial anti-money laundering framework; 
however, it suffers from some weaknesses. These weaknesses are caused by the poor relationship 
between anti-money laundering units, the Anti-Organised Crime Department of the Dubai police, 
the financial sector and the Central Bank of Dubai. This situation is particularly evident when it 
comes to sharing information on those suspected of money laundering in Dubai.  The ‘lack of a 
relationship’ is illustrated by primary research, as is the fact that other nations have (i.e. the UK) 
developed a more intelligence-led approach and partnerships in their quest to prevent money 
laundering where possible in their jurisdiction. This thesis highlights the progress that is needed 
in Dubai and the UAE to prevent money laundering, and as such is an original contribution to 
knowledge in an under-researched field in the Middle East. 
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 1 
Chapter	  One	  
1.1. Introduction	  
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a country located in the Middle East surrounded by oil 
producing nations, civil war, and political instability1. The UAE is also a major oil producing 
nation, particularly in the emirate of Abu Dhabi, with Dubai is the only major financial centre 
located in the Persian Gulf. Its economic development, political stability, and business 
environment has attracted an influx of people and international capital since the discovery of oil 
in 1966 and independence in 1971. However, due to its geographical location and ‘liberal’ 
business laws and trade ‘relationships’ with other Gulf States, east Africa, and south Asia, and its 
expanding trade with Balkan states, the UAE has the potential to be a major conduit for money 
laundering2. Furthermore, due to its close proximity to Afghanistan, where most of the world's 
opium is produced, the UAE is vulnerable to organised crime and terrorism and the narcotics 
trade. All of these criminal elements are attracted to the UAE liberal business environment3 as a 
place to launder illegal funds. 
 
Furthermore, the UAE has an advanced maritime shipping infrastructure, which includes 
approximately 15 commercial seaports that support international and local trade. The seaports in 
the UAE handle millions of vessels and shipping annually, which have potentially made it a hub 
for money laundering for organised crime and terrorism. There are also extensive international 
air connections within the UAE: approximately 66 airlines (at present) offer passenger services 
between Dubai, Europe and another 150 international destinations; all of these  official ‘ports of 
entry’ rather than illegal entry make Dubai vulnerable to money laundering.  
                                                
1  Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History (Basic Books 2011) 
2  Henry G. Overman, Stephen Redding and Anthony Venables, The economic geography of trade, production and 
income: a survey of empirics (Blackwell Publishing 2003) 
3  Olivier J. Blanchard, The crisis: basic mechanisms and appropriate policies (International Monetary Fund 2009) 
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Moreover, Dubai is still primarily a cash-based economy making it challenging for banks and 
financial institutions to prevent money laundering. It has been indicated that criminal 
organisations, terrorist groups, money launderers and those involved in trafficking illegal 
substances/narcotics and people make use of Dubai’s liberal financial system with the UAE a 
key centre for Hawala networks that are closely linked to Pakistan and India4. 
 
These geographical and concomitant policing ‘issues’ have been known in the UAE for some 
time, but following the September 11 attacks in the United States and amid revelations that 
money had been laundered via the UAE to help fund the attack, the UAE imposed a freeze on the 
known funds of organisations with links to terrorism, including Al-Barakat, which was then 
based in Dubai. Indeed, the United States State Department has directly linked trade based 
money laundering to the drug trade in Afghanistan, and the terrorist entities Hezbollah and Al-
Qaeda.5	  	  
	  
Since 2001, the UAE, at Federal and emirate-level has put in place a comprehensive system to 
prevent and reduce money laundering. Two acts serve as the foundation for anti-money 
laundering (AML) in the UAE; these are the Anti-Money Laundering Law (2002) and Counter 
Terrorism Law (2004). Therefore, since 2002 onwards the UAE has developed procedures, 
processes and laws to combat money laundering in the UAE (IMF, 2009). There has, however, 
been little or no assessment of these laws, procedures and processes effectiveness in preventing 
and reducing money laundering in the UAE. Assessments which have occurred were conducted 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and are not 
                                                
4  Ali Alkaabi and others, 'Money Laundering and FATF Compliance by the International Community', What Kind 
of Information Society? Governance, Virtuality, Surveillance, Sustainability, Resilience (Springer 2010) 86 
5 Delston, R.S. and Walls, S.C. “Terrorism Finance: Strengthening Our Security: A New International Standard on 
Trade Based Money Laundering is Needed Now” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 2012  44 Case 
W. Res. J. Int'l L. 737 
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current past 2008. However, these same assessments are performed more often for OECD 
countries such as the UK. 
 
It is these issues that this thesis primarily addresses. This research is designed as a review of the 
current practices and strategies employed in the UAE to combat money laundering. As Levi 
noted (1996:3), however, finding an effective regulatory regime for the financial world is 
problematic. ‘The trick of regulation is to minimise the illegitimate exploitation without 
wrecking economic dynamism’6. This is applicable to the UAE, Dubai and internationally. 
 
Although the UAE has recognised, and is currently responding to, the continued challenges that 
are posed by increasingly well-resourced and organised international criminal networks7, the rate 
at which its anti-money laundering (AML) systems, and processes are followed remains a 
challenge both at the strategic and implementation levels. During the past decade, the UAE has 
gradually been joining other nations in becoming a member of task forces and collaborations to 
reduce the presence of international criminal activities, such as illegal transference of funds, 
gems, or precious metals, or illegal movement of monies to support terrorism activities.  
 
Due to the relative autonomy of individual emirates within the UAE, established as Free Trade 
Zones (FTZs) and Financial Free Zones (FFZs) according to UAE federal law in emirates, there 
are different approaches to AML enforcement. Furthermore, the approach to preventing money 
laundering in the UAE reflects the official approach often associated with the USA, which is that 
globalisation has permitted the accumulation of immeasurable sums of illegal money originating 
                                                
6  Alfredo Schulte-Bockholt, The politics of organized crime and the organized crime of politics: a study in criminal 
power (Lexington Books 2006) 
7 T. Wing Lo. 'Beyond social capital: triad organized crime in Hong Kong and China' (2010) 50(5) Br J Criminol 
851;ibid 
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in illegal international markets8, and that such wealth is now so vast that moving a fraction of it 
may pose a systemic danger for the strongly interconnected international financial system9. In 
this view illegal income is seen as somehow different to legitimate income and ‘performs’ in a 
different way when placed into the officially recognised financial sector (i.e., it forces the official 
financial system to alter prices, interest and exchange rates, and leads to unfair competition10 in 
legitimate international financial markets. None of these conjectures is, however, been 
empirically corroborated. But these conjectures are what Dubai has based its system of 
prevention on. This research suggests that most of the quantitative and qualitative assumptions 
on the money laundering are partly, if not, mostly in need of preventing money laundering in 
Dubai and elsewhere11.   
 
Regardless, the UAE established a National Anti-Money Laundering Committee (NAMLC) in 
2002 responsible for coordinating anti-money laundering policy across and within the different 
emirates. It is chaired by the governor of the Central Bank, with representatives from the 
Ministries of Interior, Justice, Finance, and Economy; the National Customs Board; the Secretary 
General of the Municipalities; the Federation of the Chambers of Commerce; and five major 
banks and money exchange houses; these latter members, however, are allowed access as 
                                                
8  Financial Action Task Force. (2010) Years of the FATF Recommendations.1990-2010 ;United Nations. Scientific 
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation: United Nations 
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: 1988 Report to the General Assembly, with Annexes (UN 
1988) 
9  Vito Tanzi. 'Money laundering and the international financial system. No. 96/55. International Monetary Fund,' 
(1996) Money laundering and the international financial system  
10 Armando Fernández Steinko. 'Financial channels of money laundering in Spain' (2012) 52(5) Br J Criminol 
908;ibid 
11 Michael Levi and Peter Reuter. 'Money laundering' (2006) 34(1) Crime and Justice 289;Peter Reuter and Edwin 
M. Truman. 'Chasing dirty money' (2004) Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC ;Armando 
Fernández Steinko, 'Financial channels of money laundering in Spain' , vol 52 (CCJS 2012) 908 
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observers and only when policy is discussed12. The penalty for breaking NAMLC regulations 
ranges from fines to imprisonment on officers, employees and managers of financial institutions, 
as elsewhere in the world, that fall short of reporting suspected money laundering. However, the 
NAMLC is able to offer immunity from criminal prosecution, civil or administrative action if 
correct procedures were followed. In practice it appears that a combination of these is used 
depending on the case, the victim and those involved (i.e. they are far less tolerant if crime has 
affected a UAE citizen).    
 
Furthermore, the establishment of the AMLSCU in the UAE was aimed at investigating fraud 
and associated suspicious transactions. Established by the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2002 and 
designed to enhance the actions of the UAE Central Bank, which aims at supporting international 
attempts to combat money laundering as well as the financing of terrorism, it is considered as the 
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the Central Bank and is charged with examining and 
coordinating the release of information to law enforcement and judicial bodies – this expected 
coordination, however, is yet to be completely successful, and suffers from lack of procedural 
and legislative support (see research chapter 6), which is found in literature and assessments, and 
is a key part of this research.   
 
The AMLSCU further exchanges information with the international FIU and since December 
2000, the Central Bank has referred 108 cases to international FIUs. From December 2000 to 
December 2005, the AMLSCU has received and investigated 3031 suspicious transactions 
reports (STRs) and from December 2004 to December 2005 alone, the AMLSCU received and 
investigated 772 STRs. No freeze orders were issued in 2005 based on STR submissions, but 
from December 2000 to December 2005, the Central Bank has issued 27 freeze orders based on 
AMLSCU and law enforcement investigations. Twelve of these cases are in progress with 
prosecution planned for money laundering offences and confiscation of all illegal proceeds. 
                                                
12 Belaisha Bin Belaisha and Graham Brooks. 'Money laundering in Dubai: Strategies and future directions' (2014) 
17(3) Journal of Money Laundering Control 8 
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Since 2000, the Central Bank has also frozen (US dollars) $1,348,381 in 17 different financial 
accounts 13. 
 
However, the problem of preventing money laundering in the UAE is compounded by cash-
based sectors. Gold and diamonds, especially in the markets of Dubai, are extremely vulnerable 
to money laundering. Aware of this problem, the UAE has participated in the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds (KPCS) since November 2002. The certification 
process is under the control of the Dubai Metals and Commodities Center (DMCC), a quasi-
governmental organisation that employs four individuals full-time to administer the programme 
to an estimated 50-diamond traders operating in Dubai.  
 
The UAE has also become sensitive to organisations claiming charitable status as well, with 
fears that these are fronts for terrorist organisation/cells. It therefore changed the law that all 
licensed charities interested in transferring funds overseas must do so via one of three umbrella 
organisations: the Red Crescent Authority, the Zayed Charitable Foundation, or the Muhammad 
Bin Rashid Charitable Trust. These three quasi-governmental bodies are in a position to ensure 
that overseas financial transfers are sent to a legitimate body/person by a recognised party. As an 
additional step, a list of recognised acceptable recipients for UAE charitable assistance is 
compiled by the state.  It is understandable that such a change occurred to protect the integrity of 
the UAE but also this protects and is supported by Islamic laws.  
 
The concept of money laundering is also known and established in Islamic law. It is well-
established in Islamic law that money derived from illegal activities and converted into 
legitimate businesses is morally unethical and also illegal. There are many Quranic verses 
prohibiting such illicit activities; in Surat An-Nisa’ for instance there is a verse that translates: 
“O you, who have believed, do not eat (up) your riches among you untruthfully, except there is 
                                                
13 ibid 
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commerce by your mutual consent”. O you who have believed, do not consume one another's 
wealth unjustly but only [in lawful] business by mutual consent.14 
 
Furthermore, the Free Trade Zones (FTZs) and Financial Free Zones (FFZs) in the UAE also 
compound the problem of AML. With 17 FTZ already in operation and plans to establish eleven 
more (in 2013), the potential for money laundering is high. Every emirate except Abu Dhabi has 
at least one functioning FTZ and these zones are monitored at emirate levels, as opposed to 
federal-level. However, there are over a hundred multinationals located in these FTZs, with 
thousands of individual trading organisations. The FTZs permit 100 percent foreign ownership, 
no import duties, full repatriation of capital and profits, no taxation, and easily obtainable 
licenses.  Those located in the FTZ are treated as offshore or outside the UAE for legal purposes. 
However, UAE law prohibits the establishments of a shell company and/or trusts, and does not 
permit non-residents to open bank accounts in the UAE15.  
 
In September 2004, the UAE established its first financial free zone (FFZ), known as the Dubai 
International Financial Center (DIFC). The FFZs are exempt from some UAE federal civil and 
commercial laws. They are still, however, subject to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter 
Terrorism Laws at the federal level, due to their significance to the UAE internationally. The 
DIFC established an independent regulatory body - the Dubai Financial Services Authority 
(DFSA), which reports to the office of Dubai Crown Prince and an independent Commercial 
                                                
14 Verses 29 and 30. There is another verse (188) in Quran which says “And eat not up your property among 
yourselves in vanity, nor seek by it to gain the hearing of judges that you may knowingly devour a portion of the 
property for others wrongfully”. There are also many provisions in the Sunna that contain the conception of money 
laundering. Thus, for instance, Prophet Mohammed prohibits any activity funded by money derived from Souht 
(unlawful trade or ill-gotten property). He says “Any activity built from Souht, will be cast into fire.” For more 
detail, see Samah Al Agha. 'Money laundering from Islamic perspective' (2007) 10(4)ibid406. 
15 Belaisha Bin Belaisha and Graham Brooks, 'Money laundering in Dubai: Strategies and future directions' , vol 17 
(Emerald Group Publishing Limited 2014) 8 
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Court. The DFSA is the only authority responsible for licensing firms providing financial 
services in the DIFC.  
 
The DFSA has licensed 21 financial institutions and 13 ancillary services within the DIFC. The 
DFSA's rules prohibit offshore casinos or Internet gaming sites in the UAE, and require all firms 
to send STR to the AMLSCU (along with a copy to the DFSA). Although firms operating in the 
DIFC are subject to AML laws, the DFSA issued its own AML regulations and supervisory 
regime, creating some ambiguity as to the authority of the Central Bank and AMLSCU within 
the DIFC.  
 
In 2010, in the UAE, the political will to tackle money laundering perhaps came of age. It has 
reached unacceptable levels at home but was also conscience and aware of the international 
concern regarding the ongoing struggle to prevent terrorism and organisations/cells access to 
funds.  During a press conference with Lieutenant General of the time, Dhabi Khalfan Tamim, 
Al Suwaidi, it was stressed that the Central Bank of the UAE was committed to addressing 
money laundering and terrorism. He further added that the UAE Central Bank had signed 
approximately 25 international certificates, which confirmed it commitment to AML practice 
with 40 international agreements relating to the exchange of relevant information on money 
laundering and suspicious cases involving organised crime and terrorism.  Finally, he stated that 
the UAE has, to-date, received and supported a number of investigation panels from the USA 
since the year 2001, and also hosted visits from the United Kingdom, Germany, Pakistan, and an 
additional 600 delegations regarding the development of anti-money laundering (AML) 
strategies and practices and associated issues tackling international organised crime and the 
funding of terrorism.16	  
	  
                                                
16 Jerry Hart. 'Criminal infiltration of financial institutions: a penetration test case study' (2010) 13(1)ibid55-65. 
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It is in this complex and international political context that this research project was conducted. It 
was impossible to review and research into every aspect of money laundering and its regulation 
in the UAE without the research developing into a descriptive account of AML rather than a 
piece of research that has made some policy and practice recommendations in the conclusion 
(see chapter eight).  A decision was made at the initial stage of the research that a combination of 
law enforcement, the Central Bank and private financial sectors, primarily with a focus on AML 
in the financial sector was a sufficient broad enough approach to assess AML practice in the 
UAE. Now with an international reputation to defend as an industry of the utmost integrity and 
probity poor AML practice has the potential to become a magnet for individuals and organised 
crime to launder money in Dubai and discredit its reputation as a safe-haven, as a place to live 
and conduct business.     
 
1.2. Problem	  Statement	  
The problem of preventing and/or reducing money laundering is a major international issue. 
Previous and current attempts that have been made to address money laundering are usually 
frustrated by the dynamism of the crime itself. This thesis, therefore, presents an examination 
and evaluation of the present strategies and possible future directions of preventing and/or 
reducing money laundering in Dubai.  
	  
Aware of the international dimensions of money laundering, this research still primarily focusses 
on Dubai, and assesses the ways in which national and international legislation, and law 
enforcement and AML units are tackling, and struggling with the issues and problems of money 
laundering. The study of how to prevent and reduce money laundering in Dubai is critical to the 
nation’s strategic position in the UAE and its position as an important international financial 
centre and as such this research is of practical as well as academic relevance.   
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1.3. Research	  Aim	  
 
The	  primary	  aim	  of	  this	  research	  is	  therefore	  to	  	  	  
• Evaluate the impact of national and international legislation and establishment of a law 
enforcement AML unit in preventing/reducing money laundering in Dubai. 
 
1.4. The	  Objectives	  of	  this	  Research	  
 
• Assess the present legal strategies in preventing and/or reducing money laundering in 
Dubai in order to establish a base and identify amendments needed   
• Examine current policing strategies in preventing and/or reducing money laundering in 
Dubai to establish where amendments are required   
• Assess the possible future directions in preventing and/or reducing money laundering in 
Dubai as identified by interviewees  
• Expose the limits to international AML practice to establish whether UAE/Dubai needs to 
alter some of its current practices  
• To establish whether there is a need for a political and cultural shift in attitude to prevent 
and/or reducing money laundering in Dubai 
 
1.5. Contribution	  and	  importance	  of	  the	  study	  
This study was based on a critical review of the current legislation and development of AML 
strategies in Dubai. The value of this research study is that it completely original; no previous 
research – academic or official – has attempted to assess the impact of current legislation and 
development of AML strategies in Dubai. In addition interviews with key personnel in the 
financial sector and law enforcement highlight the need for changes to the present strategic 
approach in preventing/reducing money laundering in Dubai. Therefore, this thesis is of 
academic and practical policy importance as it seeks solutions for reducing and preventing the 
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spread of money laundering, and suggests a new strategic approach to AML and investigative 
procedures for the police in preventing/reducing potential avenues for money laundering.  
	  
The focus of this research is primarily on Dubai and considers the impact of international 
legislation and conventions (i.e., Forty Recommendations issued by the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) on money laundering) and the compatibility of such practice on the ‘Dubai 
experience’ of money laundering in its cultural and present political context. In one sense then 
this research is a snapshot of the contemporary situation in Dubai; it, however, has resonance for 
the future as strategic approaches now have consequences for future practice.      
 
As money laundering has become a global threat17, to the integrity and stability of financial 
institutions and security the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the size of money 
laundering worldwide to be between $600 billion and $1.5 trillion (US dollars), equivalent to 2-
5% of the world’s gross domestic product that includes individual, organisational and state 
victims. Bartlett noted “money laundering has a more direct negative effect on economic growth 
by diverting resources to less productive activity, and by facilitating domestic corruption and 
crime, which in turn depress economic growth”;18; however, this view is open to contestation, 
and reviewed in this thesis where appropriate (see chapter two).   
 
Money laundering has the potential to impair the development of financial institutions, 
particularly when there is a correlation between money laundering and fraudulent professional 
employees or where money is laundered and risks the insurance of financial security of the 
institution. Institutional fraud and corruption, therefore, becomes an obstacle to trust19 , which is 
                                                
17 Mr Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash, International Criminal Law 3/E (Routledge Cavendish 2007) 247-248 
18 Richard W. Barrett. 'Confronting tax havens, the offshore phenomenon, and money laundering' (1997) 23 Int'l 
Tax J. 12-42. 
19  Graham Brooks, Azeem Aleem and Mark Button, Fraud, corruption and sport (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 
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a key element of any transaction. Morris-Cotterill has suggested that “money laundering 
generally harms society by oiling the wheels of financial crime, and financial crime affects 
everyone …. we all experience higher costs of living than we would if financial crimes – 
including money laundering – were prevented20”. This corruption is further compounded by 
criminal organisations, and provides organised criminal groups, arms dealers and others with the 
opportunity to develop criminal enterprises. Without effective safeguards or preventive 
measures, money laundering can strike at the integrity of a country's financial institutions. The 
removal of billions from legitimate economic enterprise each year and placed into the ‘black 
market’ of organised crime constitutes a real threat to the financial health of a country and affects 
the stability of the global marketplace21. It is for these many reasons that this research was 
conducted, and which Dubai is vulnerable too. 
 
1.6. The	  Structure	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
This thesis is divided into a total of eight chapters. This chapter – chapter one – explains and sets 
out the aim, objectives, the problem statement, and outline of following chapters. 
In chapter two a review of relevant literature, concepts and legal terminology often used to 
explain money laundering is discussed. In this chapter the stages and methods of laundering - 
placement, layering and integration – and explanatory value of how money is laundered is 
consider. In addition the often impenetrable, vague legal documentation is reviewed highlighting 
the national and international confusion on how to prevent money laundering. Reference is made 
to the system of AML strategies and laws in the United Kingdom in particular as the UAE and 
Dubai have drawn on the laws and systems already established in this country. The ‘copying’ or 
‘aping’ of legislation, however, is no indication that both systems will be equally successful in 
preventing money laundering. In fact, a recurring theme in this thesis is that there is a substantial 
gap between policy and actual practice in AML in Dubai.          
                                                
20 Nigel Morris-Cotterill, How not to be a Money Launderer (Silkscreen 1996) Morris-Cotterill “How Not to Be a 
Money Launderer”, 2nd edition, Brentwood: Silkscreen Publications, 1999. 
21 Olivier J. Blanchard, 'The crisis: basic mechanisms and appropriate policies' (International Monetary Fund 2009) 
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In chapter three, the focus is on the political context in which AML legislation has developed in 
the UAE and assesses the legislation presently available to prevent money laundering. The 
debate focuses on the political and legal structure and reputational risk of poor AML practice in 
Dubai. Finally, the literature that offers potential theoretical frameworks helps to build an 
understanding as to why such corrupt acts as money laundering are committed and explains why 
Dubai is currently viewed as a financial sector in need of review. In addition, the FATF 2008 
Assessment, from MENAFATF, was included as it was delivered from the research conducted in 
early 2007. Recommendations are noted, and some consideration is given to the fact that some of 
the key elements, such as legislation, have changed since this assessment was completed.  
 
In chapter four the focus is specifically on specific AML measures and the importance of 
developing strategies in preventing money laundering in Dubai.  Furthermore, these strategic 
developments are reviewed with powers of law enforcement units and the ‘policing’ of the 
private financial sector considered.  This chapter further highlights that a lack of communication 
between law enforcement bodies and the private sector needs to be addressed if AML strategies 
and practice is to prevent money laundering. Data and information on suspected individuals and 
organisations is the basis on which to build case, and as such a clear system of communication 
and combination of civil and criminal sanctions are needed. 
 
In chapter five a detailed explanation of the research methods used and the advantages and 
disadvantages of these in this thesis are discussed. These methodological issues are secondary 
data analysis, i.e. official crime statistics, analysis of legal documentation, negotiated access, 
sampling framework, designing an interview schedule, content analysis of interviews and ethical 
issues and my role as a practitioner researcher/research practitioner. As with all research, 
regardless of the methods employed there are advantages and disadvantages to the approaches 
used. Securing access to those working in law enforcement was straightforward; access to those 
in the international financial sector and Central Bank, however, was problematic. A personal 
contact helped negotiated access to those in these financial sectors. This is a delicate matter and 
the process is based on the assumption that a ‘bond’ or ‘link’ exists between the initial sample 
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and point of contact and that others in the same social population, and allows a series of referrals 
to be made within a circle of acquaintances (Berg, 1988; Broadhead and Rist, 1976, Brooks, 
2012). This research is therefore part targeted sample and part snowball sample. Both are limited 
but a snowball sample was needed to access those ‘hard to reach’ research subjects such as 
‘elites’22 and it was thought appropriate to approach a personal contact to ‘sound out’ the 
possibility of interviewing people in the financial sector. While it is beneficial to have a personal 
contact as a ‘gatekeeper’ it can influence the direction and sample of the research in a number of 
ways; they can limit access and conditions of entry in a social community, limit access to people 
and data and restrict the scope of analysis, or use bias in selection of the individuals for 
participation23. These issues are discussed in depth in this chapter. 
 
In chapter six, the results of the research are analysed. These are presented as two distinct set of 
results but are interconnected. Firstly, the raw, background data obtained from the interviews is 
presented highlighting the male dominated sphere of business, even in the private sector and lack 
of AML knowledge from senior executives; secondly content analysis of the interviews are 
analysed. The results highlight that there is a lack of coordination between the Central Bank, the 
private financial sector and law enforcement, and as such AML practice is dis-jointed, and that 
law enforcements bodies need skilled practitioners with a background in AML practice and/or 
education on how best to prevent this complex crime. There are possible vested interests that 
need to be overcome as Dubai progresses towards providing an AML strategy that is respected 
around the world.       
In chapter seven, The thesis focus on methodology of determining recommendations for a 
country require that assessors be familiar with the country’s current conditions, including but not 
limited to the assessments completed by the country, current socio-economic and cultural 
considerations, cash-based society, likelihood of money laundering and terrorism financing, and 
                                                
22  Rowland Atkinson and John Flint. 'Accessing hidden and hard-to-reach populations: Snowball research 
strategies' (2001) 33(1) Social research update 1 
23  Alan Bryman, Research methods and organization studies, vol 20 (Routledge 2003) 
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the importance of the financial sector in that specific area24. In addition, assessors should analyse 
the effectiveness of the strategies in place within the country, identifying how the effectiveness 
could be improved upon. These recommendations also include a review of the UAE and Dubai, 
based on the FATF 40 + 9 recommendations and in comparison with the UK results from 2014. 
This quasi-assessment acknowledges the most current legislation that was added to the UAE, and 
notes some of the research that indicates that while the improvements have been added in 
documentation, and the increase in public awareness campaigns, there have been many issues 
left unresolved in implementation. 
 
In chapter eight, the conclusion, information is drawn from the previous chapters and the 
findings of the research. The conclusion includes recommendations for new AML counter-
measures in the UAE and Dubai in particular. Money laundering is international in its reach and 
highly organised and profitable. However, if Dubai is unable to implement sound AML 
procedures and strategies and police its financial sectors its reputation as a ‘safe’ ‘secure’ 
environment to conduct commerce will be affected. This chapter is dedicated to 
recommendations as to how law enforcement and the financial sector in Dubai can counteract 
money laundering; staying on its present course of action – a signatory to limited conventions 
and lack of expertise in law enforcement - damages investment in national infrastructure and 
international acquisitions, and as such changes in its present strategic course of action is 
required. Finally, in Chapter 7, the models of recommendation include the intelligence led 
policing (ILP), problem – orientated policing (POP), and community – orientated policing 
(COP), were evaluated alongside of the National Intelligence Model (NIM).  
 
The focus of this research was to answer the research objectives by gathering information from a 
number of resources, including literature, primary research, and database assessments provided 
by third parties. Developing an assessment of the current conditions of Dubai could not be 
conducted without evaluating that of the UAE, due to the fact that federal regulations do assist in 
                                                
24 Ibid 
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the management of Dubai, even though the status of Dubai permits it the freedom to manage 
much of the affairs of the financial hub on an independent level. The UAE, to become compliant 
with FATF Recommendations, has instituted a number of laws and changes over the past decade, 
all intended on creating a stable environment for continued financial growth that will improve 
the success of all cities and continue to invite organizations on an international level to join their 
economy. However, not all changes are implemented as effectively as could be done, and these 
issues are noted throughout this research, and concluded with the recommendations on 
implementing models that will increase the success of the regulatory environments and the law 
enforcement organizations. 
1.7. Method	  approach	  
As with all research a mixed method approach is considered more productive than a single 
method for the collection of data.25 Original in its aim and execution, however, this research 
countenanced several obstacles. These ranged from lack of research material on AML laws and 
regulations in the UAE, limited secondary data, access to the financial sector, and the politically 
sensitive nature of discussing past and present cases of money laundering in the UAE and role of 
the AMLSCU and Anti Organised Crime Department (AOCD) and that empirical research is 
completely foreign to the UAE and is to some extent outside the scope of their cultural traditions. 
1.8. Grounded	  Theory	  
Grounded theory is a method of investigation of a topic that reviews a broad perspective of the 
subject and evaluates theories in order to determine a single theory that is relevant for the subject 
matter 26. The use of the grounded theory includes evaluation of literature and the use of 
instruments such as questionnaires and interviews to determine human perspective of the topic. 
This research utilizes the interview method of grounded theory, by questioning individuals 
regarding money laundering, who are in a position to understand these problems, specifically in 
Dubai. The grounded theory is a research method in ethnography, which has some criticisms, as 
it is not perceived by all researchers as involving inductive reasoning and does not have an 
                                                
25 Ray Pawson and Nicholas Tilley, Realistic evaluation (SAGE Publications Limited 1997) 
26 O’Reilly, 2009 & Haig, 2007 
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emphasize on theory validation27. However, in cases where limited information or previous 
research is available on a subject or topic, or where there is limited evidence regarding theories, 
grounded theory can be used to fill the gap in research and give further research a resource for 
evaluating the topics and subjects further.  
 
Research methods have made some progress in the UAE, particularly in the university sector 
where access to larger research is demonstrated by countries such as the UK, USA. However, 
other research has not been as widely sought or made available in the typical resources that are 
available to the general public or other academic areas. Currently, some extended research is 
available for access to people in officially high ranking positions in the UAE and are accessible 
to only a few. Access is secured via a personal contact or family member, and while this is a 
mark of research around the world, privacy and family life are highly valued in the UAE and 
personal contacts are significantly important, in developing significantly large or sensitive 
research topics.      
              
This research employed a combination of methods. These were 
 
• Secondary data analysis, i.e. official crime statistics 
• Analysis of legal documentation 
• Negotiated access 
• Sampling framework   
• Designing an interview schedule   
• Content analysis of interviews 
• Limitations of the research  
                                                
27 Haig, 2007, p. 535 
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• Ethical considerations 
 
1.9. Problem	  Statement	  
The problem addressed in this research is a better understanding of money laundering in Dubai, 
specifically from the views of individuals in law enforcement and AML units. In addition, this 
research is designed to create an understanding of the available research in regards to 
international and national legislation regarding money laundering, and the shortage of 
information available through literature for this specific area. 
 
1.10. The	  Objectives	  of	  this	  Research	  
As established in Chapter 1, the objectives of this research included the following: 
• Assess the present legal strategies in preventing and/or reducing money laundering in 
Dubai in order to establish a base and identify amendments needed   
• Examine current policing strategies in preventing and/or reducing money laundering in 
Dubai to establish where amendments are required   
• Assess the possible future directions in preventing and/or reducing money laundering in 
Dubai as identified by interviewees  
• Expose the limits to international AML practice to establish whether UAE/Dubai needs to 
alter some of its current practices  
• To establish whether there is a need for a political and cultural shift in attitude to prevent 
and/or reducing money laundering in Dubai 
 
 
1.11. Practitioner	  Researcher	  or	  Research	  Practitioner	  
For the sake of clarity each section of the research process is explained, justified and considered 
below. While presented in a sequential order there was a need to sometimes return to and reflect 
on a source of information (i.e., changing sources of AML countermeasures in Dubai and the 
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United Kingdom. However, in the following chapter the literature gathered is compared to the 
results gained from this part of the study. 
All legal and social scientific research also has a political dimension.  Although this research is 
not directly political it has attracted interest from law enforcement bodies in the UAE. This is 
understandable as money laundering is a crime. However, all aspects of this research involve the 
analysis of power and practice (Hughes, 2000), and in-turn have the potential to engender 
conflicts between and within organisations. This research also uncovered (see chapter six) some 
unwelcome truths, particularly about working relationships between the private financial sector 
and law enforcement sometimes. No research therefore takes place in a social, political or moral 
vacuum. A second meaning of the word ‘political’, however, is far more restricted. It can refer to 
state power and institutional power, which are part of the legal system and enforcement of laws.  
This research is a combination of critical challenges to the present approach to preventing money 
laundering in Dubai but also lending credibility to prevailing institutional practices and recent 
developments in the UAE (see chapter four).  No research can simply lend credibility to 
institutional practices without leaving itself open to supporting established ideological 
assumptions. This research, as the results highlight, suggest that much needs to be done to tackle 
the threat of money laundering in the UAE beyond the present laws and practices in law 
enforcement and the private sector. 
 
The research, therefore, is an attempt to understand the present position of the UAE in 
preventing money laundering by drawing on the most major, relevant official studies and reports 
on money laundering, and other financial ‘crimes’ where relevant. In addition academic research 
with clear policy implications was consulted to add conceptual depth to this analysis. 
Furthermore, current and archival respected ‘media’ sources have also been employed as 
background material where other reliable data is unavailable in order to form the most complete 
picture possible. 
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Chapter	  Two	  
Stages,	  laws	  and	  concepts	  of	  money	  laundering	  
2.1. Introduction	  
A systematic literature review of laws/legislation, concepts and theoretical explanations of 
money laundering identified definitions and prevalence of money laundering. However, 
identifying the exact means of money laundering, or the specific purposes of money laundering 
is more complicated. Money laundering can occur as related to drugs, terrorism28, abuse of 
arbitration29, tax fraud30, and other reasons both legal and illegal31. In addition, literature was 
available in both Arabic and English, which resulted in difficulty in acquiring sources that could 
be deciphered without assistance. Rather than approach the matter in a random and 
uncoordinated fashion, it was decided that a systematic approach was most appropriate as it 
allowed literature to be compared, based on the information collected and analysed for 
information over a specific period. This provided different historical, social and cultural 
backgrounds to be evaluated in the review. Due to the complex and expansive nature of the 
research, a process of mapping the key issues provided order and identified the needs of further 
research. 
 
Following the identification of the definition and scope of money laundering, the first step 
included searching for key terms such as AML, terrorism, organised crime in international and 
national official documentation. Much of the official documentation is from international bodies 
                                                
28 'Money Laundering and Financing Terrorism (at EU level). (English)', (2009). 
29 A. McDougall. 'International Arbitration and Money Laundering’(2005)' 20 American University International 
Law Review 1021-1054 
30 Andreozzi,P., Salzman,L. and Hibschweiler,M. 'False Tax Returns, Mail Fraud, and Money Laundering' (2011) 
42(2)112-119 
31 David A. Chaikin. 'Money laundering: an investigatory perspective' (Criminal Law Forum Springer, 1991) 467 
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such as the FATF and the United Kingdom. In addition, legislation and regulation was found in 
sites such as the Central Bank and DFSA, which provided guidance regarding current legislation 
for the country. Influences on money laundering regulation are a result of combined efforts of the 
members of international bodies working with numerous countries, including the UK, USA, and 
China, where results of criminal activities can include sanctions on governments32. 
 
Theoretical concepts were evaluated using the literature to determine aspects of motivation and 
cultural relationships with money laundering. This combination offered both the legal and 
practical approach with that of a theoretical explanation of AML strategies and techniques. This 
information resulted in recurring themes and issues regarding AML development that was 
consistent in the UAE and elsewhere. Following this method, a cross-examination of key 
information that was relevant to this research was conducted, which produced a number of 
resources evaluated to identify the larger influences of money laundering on people, 
governments, and organisations. 
 
The different types of literature resulted in a concept-centric review, which enabled evaluation of 
concepts to create a review of money laundering perceptions internationally. The concept –
centric approach helped produce tables of data and key issues that established a method of 
recording major insights and key relevant points on AML practice in national and international 
jurisdictions. As illustrated by Webster and Watson (2002), tables should not resemble a lists of 
articles; instead they need to add value by categorising key concepts regarding key themes that 
collect information on concepts examined, level of analysis, gaps in the literature, theoretical 
                                                
32 Kern Alexander. 'The need for efficient international financial regulation and the role of a global supervisor' 
(2001) 5(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 52 
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understanding of subject matter, and/or lack of empirical research available33. This process 
helped make sense of the accumulated knowledge and enhanced understanding of the key 
findings and relationships in the relevant literature.  
 
In addition, and part of the learning process, reflection of criticism in some of the articles was 
also required. The reason for this is as Daft (1985) suggested that an extremely negative 
approach to published literature needs careful consideration; previous work is always vulnerable 
and criticism without foundation is of little value. Therefore, those articles that explain how 
AML prevention has developed and make worthwhile and achievable recommendations were 
considered as a significant contribution to the literature. It was further considered that knowledge 
is accumulated slowly in a piecemeal fashion and that all authors are sometimes ‘forced’ to make 
a compromise in research34.  
 
This review identified critical gaps in knowledge regarding AML in Dubai, which is not 
available, and is identified as a gap in the literature. Legislation, laws, conventions, and official 
documentation in Dubai all illustrated that procedures and process were understood and what 
was required to have a comprehensive AML strategy. This chapter identifies the definitions, 
applications of legislation, and representation of AML strategy that involves law enforcement 
and the private sector, regarding money laundering, both internationally and in Dubai, as 
available in literature currently. While there are literally hundreds of articles regarding 
AML/CFT and countries such as those UK and other European countries, as well as the U.S.A, 
only limited data can be obtained regarding the Middle East, including that of the UAE. In 2012, 
                                                
33 William H. DeLone and Ephraim R. McLean. 'Information systems success: the quest for the dependent variable' 
(1992) 3(1) Information systems research 60;Daryl J. Bem. 'Writing a Review Article for Psychological Bulletin' 
(1995) 118(2) Psychol Bull 172-177;Maryam Alavi and Dorothy E. Leidner. 'Review: Knowledge management and 
knowledge management systems: Conceptual foundations and research issues' (2001) MIS quarterly 107. 
34 Kenneth P. Burnham and David R. Anderson, Model selection and multimodel inference: a practical information-
theoretic approach (Springer 2002). 
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it was noted that increased regulation should be included in the UAE35; however, little literature 
or evidence was provided to support these statements. Additionally, literature regarding UAE 
financial markets are typically limited to publications by financial institutes and agencies, rather 
than by researchers, government officials, or AML/CFT regulatory bodies.      
 
In this chapter, there is a review of AML strategies and practices in Dubai. This is dealt with in 
chronological rather order rather than level of importance as laws, strategies and law 
enforcement bodies were established to counter the problem organisational money laundering, 
and criminal and illegal funds associated with terrorism. A recurring theme in this chapter, and 
the thesis, is that laws are passed, law enforcement bodies established, political pronouncements 
made and yet the reality and actual practice of preventing money laundering is completely 
different. This ‘gap’ between laws and practice in not experienced in Dubai alone, it is a problem 
for civil regulation and/or criminal enforcement around the world, and where possible this is 
stressed regarding the United Kingdom, which has an established financial centre in London for 
integrity and probity. This is to indicate that no matter how established mistakes, errors, neglect, 
and criminal acts are still discovered in some of the most rigorous, regulated environments in the 
world.       
  
This chapter first highlights the AML Regulations of 2000 in the UAE and expectations placed 
on those working in the financial sector(s) in Dubai. This is followed by a review of the Money 
Laundering Law 2002 and is effectiveness in preventing money laundering. The next section 
considers the role of the Central Bank and its part in the prevention of money laundering 
followed by an examination of the NAMLC and its roles. Once these have been established a 
critical appraisal of the impediments to developing a comprehensive system of regulation and 
AML practice is considered with a view of Dubai that it is moving in the right direction, albeit 
slowly, in preventing money laundering in its jurisdiction.             
                                                
35 'Money laundering risks in the UAE', 2012, International Financial Law Review, vol. 31, no. 9, p. 60. 
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It was decided after careful consideration to use a systematic literature review of laws/legislation, 
concepts and theoretical explanations of money laundering. However, identifying the literature is 
not always as straightforward as it seems. Reviewing literature in Arabic and English is 
problematic. Rather than approach the matter in a random and uncoordinated fashion, it was 
decided that a systematic approach was most appropriate as comparing literature on one specific 
topic is a difficult task; however, to collect and analyse information, even over a brief period of 
time, from two different historical, social and cultural backgrounds is even more difficult. Due to 
the complex and expansive nature of the research a process of mapping the key issues was 
considered appropriate. 
 
Therefore, an initial step was a search for key terms such as AML, terrorism, organised crime in 
international and national official documentation. Much of the official documentation is from 
international bodies such as the FATF and the United Kingdom. The reason for this is that much 
of the legal documentation in the UAE is based on that of the United Kingdom. This is perhaps 
understandable, as the Middle East and the United Kingdom have an ‘historical 
relationship’36and links to the now diminished British Empire. 
 
Furthermore, theoretical concepts as explanations for money laundering and corruption were 
sought in academic literature. This combination offered both the legal and practical approach 
with that of a theoretical explanation of AML strategies and techniques. From this sifting of 
information recurring themes and issues regarding AML developed that was consistent in the 
UAE and elsewhere. Once the original sifting on information was complete, however, a cross-
examination of key information that was relevant to this research was conducted (see chapter 5), 
which produced detailed and relevant information specific to this research. 
                                                
36 EUGENE L. ROGAN. 'The Emergence of the Middle East into the' (2013) International Relations of the Middle 
East 37 
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This review was designed to identify critical gaps in knowledge regarding AML in Dubai rather 
than a gap in the literature. Legislation, laws, conventions, and official documentation in Dubai 
all illustrated that procedures and process were understood and what was required to have a 
comprehensive AML strategy. However, this research highlights that the actual practice of AML 
was somewhat different to the established official documentation. It established that the 
examination of past research set a chart for future research and recommendations (see 
conclusion: chapter seven) and that much still needs to be done to progress towards a wide-
ranging, inclusive AML strategy that involves law enforcement and the private sector.       
 
Furthermore, current and archival respected ‘media’ sources have also been employed, where 
relevant, as background material where other reliable data is unavailable in order to form the 
most complete picture possible (i.e., cases of money laundering in the news as well as official 
statistics). The volume of literature is assessed throughout this thesis rather than in one chapter; 
however, in this chapter the focus is on how to prevent money laundering; the limited 
explanatory value of the stages and methods of laundering - placement, layering and integration 
– and the often impenetrable, vague legal documentation and national and international 
expectations on best practice and strategic advice on AML practice. Each problem is dealt with 
in turn but should be read as overlapping and blurring the edges of understanding of AML.  
 
2.2. What	  is	  money	  laundering?	  Techniques	  and	  stages	  	  
The techniques and stages of money laundering might seem straightforward but are problematic. 
Described as the process by which a person conceals or disguises the identity or the origin of 
illegally obtained proceeds so as to appear from legitimate source37 is a starting point in the 
                                                
37 Peter Alldridge, “Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery, Criminal Laundering and 
Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime,” Oxford-Portland Oregon, 2003, p. 2. Monica Bond, “Money Laundering,” 
Accountants Digest September 1994, Volume 324, p. 6. Angela Leong, “Chasing Dirty Money: Domestic and 
 
 26 
discussion rather than accepted truth. This is because legitimate funds can be concealed in some 
jurisdictions to avoid taxation. The focus on this research, however, is on the use of illegal funds. 
Money laundering then is “to render it almost impossible for evidence to be obtained, which 
allows a court to establish the derivation of the money”.38 Dirty money, as it is often called, is 
put through a cycle of transactions39 to disguise the unlawful or originally lawful nature of funds 
but both with the same aim of hiding it from law enforcement or revenue and taxation depending 
on the jurisdiction.  
 
Numerous methods exist for money laundering processes, including the use of technology, which 
is a growing problem for money laundering legislation and investigation. In the case of 
technology use, money laundering can occur through online purchases or online currencies. An 
individual may purchase an online service, using their individual funds, but no service or product 
is involved in the actual sale. The individual selling the service receives the money and nothing 
is due in return, but the money has illegally changed hands as a means to move either illegal 
money or to move money for an illegal reason40.  
 
Additionally, the growing ability to use money in many currencies to purchase virtual currencies 
is a great concern for the future of money laundering incidents, such as in the case of Bitcoins or 
Linden Dollars, which may have no traditional value but can be used for money laundering 
purposes. Digital transactions are considered to occur in the case of “online casinos, virtual 
                                                                                                                                                       
International Measures Against Money Laundering”, Journal of Money Laundering Control, Volume 10 Number 2 
2007, p. 140. 
38 Rider, B.A.K. “Fei Chien Laundries: the pursuit of flying money” (Part 1), Journal of International Planning, 
Volume 1, p. 77. 
39 Angela Veng Mei Leong. 'Chasing dirty money: domestic and international measures against money laundering' 
(2007) 10(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 140. 
40 Ramage, S 2012, 'Information technology facilitating money laundering', Information & Communications 
Technology Law, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 269-282. 
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words (such as Second Life); massively multiplayer online role-playing games, abbreviated to 
MMORPG, (such as World of War craft); and the use of digital precious metals (such as e-gold 
ltd)”41. Each of these forms of money transfer are not illegal until they are used in illegal ways, 
which increase the pressure on governments to maintain up-to-date legislation regarding the 
terminology of money laundering and the provide law enforcement with the tools necessary to 
uncover the money laundering activities in different types of laundering situations, including in 
their digital form and growing with the increase of technology.  
 
There are three key stages – placement, layering and integration – however, these stages do not 
always follow a sequential process as much depends on source of original funds, location of 
laundering and ‘assistance’ from financial sectors employees. Regardless of the stages though, 
the process is similar; funds are placed into a bank or non-bank financial institution42 this will 
involve depositing or converting a substantial amounts of cash that would be considered 
unusually large by normal commercial standards43 and should raise a ‘red flag’. Other methods, 
however, might include purchases of traveller’s cheques or foreign currency and the purchase of 
insurance policies44. The process of placement can also be carried out through currency 
smuggling by the physical illegal movement of currency and monetary instruments out of one 
jurisdiction into another.  In addition, the “mainstream financial world” has increased the 
“diversification of money laundering methods or typologies so anything that has value is 
                                                
41 Stokes, R 2012, 'Virtual money laundering: the case of Bitcoin and the Linden dollar', Information & 
Communications Technology Law, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 221-236. 
42 W. Gilmore, “Dirty Money,” Council of Europe Press, 1995, p. 37. See also Money Laundering Regulation 2007; 
Andrew Haynes, p. 319. 
43Alastair N. Brown, “Money Laundering in Scotland: The Law,” Paper on Public Policy: Volume 1 No 2, 
Edinburgh University Press, 1993, p. 50. 
44 Monica Bond, “Money Laundering” Accountants Digest September 1994, Volume 324, p. 8. 
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susceptible to money launders and any mechanism, technology or indeed profession, which 
facilitates the transfer of value is equally vulnerable”45. 
 
However, although complex, it is at this stage that Brown argued that money laundering is most 
vulnerable, because it is at this stage that an explanation for the funds will be thinnest, 
unsupported by the body of circumstantial evidence to lend it credibility if illegal. If money 
laundering can be detected at the stage of placement, there will be an opportunity to secure the 
confiscation of the benefit which the offender(s) has derived from the crime46. It was further 
suggested that the effort to combat money laundering should primarily focus on this placement 
stage, as it is the most vulnerable to detection47 and emphasized increased importance of 
institutions ‘knowing their customers’48 (see chapter six for customer relations in Dubai). This is 
common practice now but ‘criminals’ at this stage of placement might employ strategies to avoid 
detection49 such as the use of ‘front’ businesses such as bars, restaurants, or casinos that do 
business in cash and/or the use of ‘smurfing’ techniques by opening and placing many deposits 
in institutions with small amount of cash to avoid raising suspicion.   
                                                
45 Stokes (2012), p. 221. 
46 Alastair N. Brown, Proceeds of crime: money laundering, confiscation and Foreiture (W. Green/Sweet & 
Maxwell 1996)p. 8 
47 Drage, J., “Countering Money Laundering: The Response of the Financial Sector,” Hume Paper on Public Policy: 
Volume 1 No 2, Edinburgh University Press, 1993, p. 61. 
48 W. William C. Gilmore, Dirty money: The evolution of money laundering counter-measures (Council of Europe 
2005) Gilmore, “Dirty Money” The Evolution of Money Laundering Countermeasures. Council of Europe 
Publishing, 1999, p. 31; This subject will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. 
49 Peter Lilley argued that “it is getting more and more difficult to identify suspicious activity because criminals are 
becoming increasingly clever in the ways that they wash their dirty money. However, there are some basic steps that 
form part of any anti-money laundering regime. Companies must be aware of two essential anti-money laundering 
procedures: they must put in place Know Your Customer Checks and procedures; and they must actively look for a 
Red Flag that signifies money laundering, such as unusual transactions, large cash payments and movements of 
funds that have no real logic.” Peter Lilley “Dirty Dealing - The Untold Truth About Global Money Laundering, 
International Crime and Terrorism,” 2007 Kogan Page, London and Philadelphia, p. XIV. 
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The purpose of this stage of layering is to separate the illicit proceeds from their criminal source 
by creating complex layers of financial transactions so as to disguise the audit trail and to make it 
more difficult for law enforcement to detect money laundering. At this stage, layers of 
transactions can be inserted between the sources of the funds50 by electronic bank transfer (wire 
transfer) to avoid the inclusion of real names in records51. In recent years concern has been 
expressed about the abuse of electronic funds or wire transfers and Savona and De Feo have 
pointed out that “wire transfers are probably the most important layering method available’52. 
Speed, distance, minimal audit trail, and increased anonymity amid the enormous daily volume 
of electronic fund transfers are all major benefits.”53 Further methods used might include the 
importing or exporting of non-existent products, the use of casinos and the purchase and resale of 
fixed assets or real estate. 
 
                                                
50 Monica Bond, “Money Laundering,” Accountants Digest September 1994, Volume 324, p. 8. 
51 Other methods of moving the proceeds of crime are Cash Conversion, Credit Cards, Foreign Bank Accounts, 
Trust and Safe Deposit Facilities. For more details, see Anthony Kennedy, “Dead Fish across the Trail: Illustration 
of Money Laundering Methods,”  Journal of Money Laundering Control, Volume 8 Number 4 2005, p. 305. 
52  William C. Gilmore, Dirty money: the evolution of international measures to counter money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism (Council of Europe 2011) 
53 Savona and De Feo, “Money Trails: International Money Laundering Trends and Prevention/Control Policies.” 
Paper presented at 1994 Conference p. 84. Following the events of 9/11, the Financial Action Task Force drafted 
eight special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing to complement its 40 Recommendations on Money 
Laundering. Recommendation Seven, which was concerned with “Wire Transfers,” stated clearly that “Countries 
should take measures to require financial institutions, including money remitters, to include accurate and meaningful 
originator information (name, address and account number) on fund transfers and related messages that are sent, and 
the information should remain with transfer or related message through the payment chain. Countries should take 
measures to ensure that financial institutions, including money remitters, conduct enhanced scrutiny of and monitor 
for suspicious activity funds transfers which do not contain complete originator information (name, address and 
account number). 
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The third stage – integration - makes the proceeds of the crime appear to be legitimate funds in 
the financial system. This is the stage where the money is said to be ‘laundered’ back to the 
economy54. The various sources of criminal money are brought together and used to purchase an 
existing company or investments, which are, to all appearances, perfectly normal55. This may 
occur under the auspices of a company domiciled in a set jurisdiction, which conducts business 
with offshore shell companies used in the layering process, or via returns on investments in those 
companies. It may also take the form of loans with highly favourable or negligible terms of 
repayment, real estate investments, or other transactions, which will be unremarkable once a 
plausible legal commercial and business identity has been established. The same, however, can 
be said for hiding legitimate funds from taxation.  
  
While offshore financial centres provide many potential avenues to avoid disclosing the origin of 
assets, and take advantage of international business or the services of offshore banks56 there is a 
gradual recognition by the international community that a clear distinction exists between well-
regulated and under-regulated offshore centres and that not all offshore centres offer services that 
can be easily exploited.57 These stages, however, can occur anywhere in the world but there is 
concern (see results chapter six) in the UAE and Dubai about the use of Hawala58 system and 
potential for laundering illegal funds and the vulnerability of the whole financial sector in Dubai.  
                                                
54 Drage, J., “Countering Money Laundering”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, November 1992, pp. 418- 420. 
55 Monica Bond, “Money Laundering.” Accountants Digest, September 1994, Volume 324, p. 8. 
56 A number of high-profile scandals in companies from the 1990s highlight the risk from offshore operations, 
including the Meridian International Bank case and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International case that led to 
the seizure of more than US$12 billion and a tightening up of regulations by the supervisory authorities. See Alexa 
Rosdol. 'Are OFCs leading the fight against money laundering?' (2007) 10(3) Journal of Money Laundering Control 
337 
57 Jack A. Blum and others. 'Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy And Money Laundering, United Nations Office for 
Drug Control and Crime Prevention' (1998) Global Programme against Money-laundering  p. 9. 
58 Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists and operates outside of, or parallel to, 'traditional' 
banking or financial channels. It was developed in India, before the introduction of western banking practices, and is 
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These conceptual stages are useful as a framework to discuss money laundering. However, there 
are limited and primarily a descriptive account of what might happens with illegal funds. Such a 
conceptual framework is useful, but hardly reflects the legislation needed to prevent money 
laundering. It is these ‘laws’ and conventions that are assessed in the next section of this chapter.          
 
2.3. Legal	  definitions	  and	  international	  conventions	  	  
Money laundering is considered an “old business” with limited need for regulation, until the 
relationship between money laundering and terrorism was solidified 59. The process of money 
laundering is the concealment of money from existence, either due to illegal acquisition, 
avoiding taxes, illegal movement, or any reason where the goal is to conceal, move, or distribute 
money that is outside the legal regulation of the regulatory environments of the individuals 
associated with or located within the region(s)60. As of 2011, money laundering was estimated as 
including more than 1.5 trillion USD of illegal activities internationally61 . 
                                                                                                                                                       
currently a major remittance system used around the world. It is but one of several such systems; another well 
known example is the 'chop', 'chit' or 'flying money' system indigenous to China, and also used around the world. 
These systems are often referred to as 'underground banking'; this term is not always correct, as they often operate in 
the open with complete legitimacy, and these services are often heavily and effectively advertised. The components 
of Hawala that distinguish it from other remittance systems are trust and the extensive use of connections such as 
family relationships or regional affiliations. Unlike traditional banking or even the 'chop' system, Hawala makes 
minimal (often no) use of any sort of negotiable instrument. Transfers of money take place based on 
communications between members of a network of hawaladars, or Hawala dealers. 
59  D. Ross, 'Money Laundering. Encyclopedia of White-Collar & Corporate Crime. SAGE Publications, Inc.' 
(2005) 543-546 
60  Sabrina Adamoli and others, Organised crime around the world (Heuni Helsinki 1998);D. Ross, 'Money 
Laundering. Encyclopedia of White-Collar & Corporate Crime. SAGE Publications, Inc.' (2005) 543-546 
61 Charles Robert Davidson, 'Drugs and Money Laundering. Encyclopedia of Drug Policy. SAGE Publications, Inc.' 
(2011) 253-255 
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Uses of money laundering are most often associated with drugs and terrorism62. This recognition 
of money laundering as this association has created a number of types of legislation 
internationally, including the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 1988, which established the first convention recognizing 
money gained from drug trafficking as an autonomous crime63. In addition, the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) established the “Forty Recommendations” that were designed to encourage 
and promote serious consequences and reporting of suspicious activity that could reduce and 
control the money laundering that occurred within the countries64. 
 
2.4. Definition	  of	  Hawala	  
Hawala is associated with money laundering, in that it does not conform to the legal regulations 
of money transfer and movement. However, Hawala is also used to transfer money where 
individuals cannot send money to family and friends in countries, due to a lack of “Western-style 
banking”65. The definition of Hawala is an informal money system that does not transfer actual 
funds between countries, requires minimal paperwork, includes no guarantees, and is rarely 
documented66. In addition, the use of Hawala is noted as occurring with tax evasion, financial 
crimes, drug and terrorist activities67. Another term used for Hawala is informal funds transfer 
systems (IFTSs), and is considered representing both opportunities for individuals and risks to 
                                                
62 Sabrina Adamoli and others, 'Organised crime around the world' (Heuni Helsinki 1998) 
63 ibid 
64 Charles Robert Davidson, 'Drugs and Money Laundering. Encyclopedia of Drug Policy. SAGE Publications, Inc.' 
(2011) 253-255 
65 M. Brooks, 'Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. Encyclopedia of Law Enforcement. SAGE Publications, 
Inc.' , vol 2 (2004) 679-680 
66 ibid 
67 ibid 
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financial institutions68. Joyce (2005) identified the purposes of Hawala as lending “itself to other 
purposes, including all types of capital flight, tax avoidance, the circumvention of exchange 
controls, the avoidance of customs duties by over –and under invoicing, smuggling, trafficking in 
human beings, and the financing of terrorism”69. 
 
Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system70. It exists and operates outside of, or 
parallel to, 'traditional' banking or financial channels. This form of money transfer has historical 
importance and has existed prior to the introduction of western banking practices, and is 
currently a major remittance system used around the world71. It is one of several forms of 
“shadow banking systems”72, other examples include terms such as 'chop', 'chit' or 'flying money' 
system indigenous to China, and also used around the world. These systems are also referred to 
as 'underground banking'; this term is not always correct, as they are not exclusively for illegal 
operations and often operate in the open with complete legitimacy, and these services are often 
heavily and effectively advertised73. The components of Hawala that distinguish it from other 
remittance systems are trust and the extensive use of connections such as family relationships or 
regional affiliations74. Unlike traditional banking or even the 'chop' system, Hawala makes 
minimal (often no) use of any sort of negotiable instrument. Transfers of money takes place 
                                                
68 ELIZABETH Joyce. 'Expanding the international regime on money laundering in response to transnational 
organized crime, terrorism, and corruption' (2005) Handbook of transnational crime and justice 79-98 
69 ibid 
70  Dulce Redin, Reyes Calderón and Ignacio Ferrero. (2012) Cultural Financial Traditions and Universal Ethics: 
the Case of Hawala  
71 Edwina A. Thompson. 'Introduction to the Concept and Origins of Hawala, An' (2008) 10 J.Hist.Int'l L. 83 
72 Nicholas Borst. (2013) Shadow Deposits as a Source of Financial Instability: Lessons from the American 
Experience for China  
73  Rob McCusker, Underground banking: legitimate remittance network or money laundering system? (Australian 
Institute of Criminology; 2005) 
74 Edwina A. Thompson, 'Introduction to the Concept and Origins of Hawala, An' , vol 10 (HeinOnline 2008) 83 
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based on communications between members of a network of Hawaladars, or Hawala dealers75. 
Hawala is both the most difficult to control of international money transfer, due to the lack of 
record keeping, and the most concern for money laundering at an international level.  
 
2.5. International	  Conventions	  
International efforts to combat money laundering started with the United Nations (UN) Vienna 
Convention in December 1988 and the Council of European (CoE) Convention in 1990. The 
1988 Vienna Convention introduced an obligation and expectation to criminalise the laundering 
of profits from the illegal market in narcotics and initiated measures to expand international 
cooperation to tackle this issue. There was no recognition at this time by the UN that the illegal 
transportation of people, and other serious crimes, was considered a threat to international order 
and vulnerable to money laundering. Furthermore, the term “money laundering” was not used in 
the 1988 Vienna Convention Article 3. Article 6 of the Vienna Convention identified the 
constituent elements of money laundering which form the basis of all subsequent legislation and 
defines money laundering as:  
 
“a) the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is proceeds, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person 
who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of 
his actions; 
b) the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights 
with respect to, or ownership of, property, knowing that such property is proceeds; and, subject 
to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system; 
c) the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such 
property was proceeds;  
                                                
75 Ibid 
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d) participation in, association or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, 
facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with 
this article. Since this convention, international joint action to combat money laundering has 
increased substantially.”76   
 
A wide range and impressive array of global groups, such as the World Bank77, Offshore Group 
of Banking Supervisors (OGBS), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Interpol, the 
World Customs Organisation (WCO), the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United 
Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), the Council of Europe, the 
Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the European Commission, the Egmont Group 
of Financial Intelligence Units and the Organisation of American States Inter-American Drug 
Control Commission (OAS-CICAD) act as part of the FATF effort78 and are concerned in 
different ways with harmonising developing rules and principles governing money laundering. 
These ‘bodies’ work together and exchange useful facts and data that help with money 
laundering and asset confiscation, estimating the value of local threats, offering advice on 
particular plans of action and executive modifications, and supporting the development of skills 
and logistical assistance. To combat money laundering the ‘bodies’ are aware that both 
governmental and administrative communication of thought, political and non-political 
participants, are needed to prevent the threat of money laundering79 around the world. These 
‘bodies’ are described below as a chronological order of laws, conventions included for 
assessment.     
                                                
76  Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/141.htm 
77  Pierre-Laurent Chatain. 'World Bank's Role in the Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 
The' (2004) 6 Int'l LFD Int'l 190 
78 FATF Members and Observers. http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/ 
79 Joseph M. Myers. (2005) International Strategies to Combat Money Laundering , p. 4. 
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In 1990, the Council of Europe (CoE) chose and followed the Strasbourg Convention, namely 
the “Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from 
Crime”80, which briefly describes the procedures needed to reduce the incidence of money 
laundering. The CoE founded a Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money 
Laundering Measures. The Select Committee progresses statistical information for the CoE and 
joint assessments producing statistical information and sporadic field visits following the 
example set by FATF. Action often takes the form of advice on developing AML strategies to 
those associated with the CoE. This information is then presented in a yearly review of its acts 
and advice to the European Committee and Crime Problems (CDPC)81. 
 
The approach is limited; it is based on advice rather than a legal requirements, and is far more 
complex as new nations have joined the CoE. The Eastern European nations of the Select 
Committee are confronted with difficulties, dishonesty, the removal of individual and corporate 
investment capital, income, and organised crime, as they move from a system-based state 
ownership of capital to one in which private property and the production and distribution of 
products and services take place through the mechanism of free markets82. 
 
In the same year as the CoE convention (1990), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
recommended extending the scope of the offence of money laundering to include any other 
crimes for which there is a link to narcotics, or to all serious offences. The recommendation was 
adopted by The Council of European Convention 199083, which expanded the definition of 
                                                
80 Ibid 
81 Ibid p. 7. 
82  Hans G. Nilsson. 'The Council of Europe Laundering Convention: A recent example of a developing 
international criminal law' (Criminal Law Forum Springer, 1991) 419 
83 For more details see, Tom Sherman, “International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering: The Role of the 
Financial Action Task Force”, Hume Paper on Public Policy: Volume 1 No 2, Edinburgh University Press, 1993, 
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money laundering beyond its traditional association with the production and transportation of 
illegal narcotics to include all ‘relevant’ crimes, with the first European Union (EU) Directive on 
this matter in 1991,84 the second in 2001, and third in 200585. 
 
Article 5.2 of The Model Legislation on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (2005) 
is the outcome of a joint effort of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This defines money laundering “as the process by which 
a person conceals or disguises the identity or origin of illegally obtained proceeds so that they 
appear to have originated from legitimate sources”86. In addition, the model of legislation 
includes explanation of how money laundering “undermines international efforts to establish free 
and competitive markets and hampers the development of national economies”87. Further 
recommending that states establish strict control and regulation to prevent further and future 
damage as well as increasing the success of preventing terrorism and drug trafficking.  
 
Furthermore, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), established in 1997, 
stated that although money laundering has only recently become a priority for law enforcement, 
both domestically and internationally. The actual term ‘money-laundering’ has a long history, 
but only recent acknowledgment that international cooperation was necessary for success, 
including international adaptation of legislation in all countries around the world. The process of 
disguising the origins of money has always existed in some form, ‘as there has been a need, 
                                                                                                                                                       
p.13. See also Alastair N. Brown, “Proceeds of Crime-Money Laundering, Confiscation & Forfeiture,” W. Green / 
Sweet & Maxwell, Edinburgh, 1996, p. 6. 
84 Doug Hopton, Money Laundering: A Concise Guide for All Business (Gower Publishing, Ltd. 2009) p. 25. 
85 Ibid 
86 ‘Model legislation on money laundering and financing of terrorism’, United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crimes, International Monetary Fund, p. 1, retrieved from 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/pdf/amlml05.pdf 
87 Ibid 
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whether for political, commercial, or legal reasons.’88 The UNODC has compared money 
laundering to that of banning usury by the Catholic Church in the medieval era, with the 
merchants and moneylenders of that time developing the same practices used in money 
laundering today, of hiding and moving the money to disguise its provenance89. The UNODC 
also compares the financial havens of today with the havens90, which welcomed the pirates who 
preyed on European commercial ships in the Atlantic in the early seventeenth century, and who 
spent their illegal ‘bounty’ abroad91. 
 
The UNODC has noted, despite the historical precedent of money laundering, it is only recently 
described as a specific crime outside of the focus by law enforcement on the underlying activities 
such as terrorism and the narcotics trade92. The UNODC initiated a three-year systematic 
investigation and global programme to prevent money laundering and support attempt to 
coordinate international ‘harmonious’ interaction of AML strategies and practice. The 
fundamental principles of practice of the programme were to increase joint action, including a 
range of organisations, raise public awareness of the threat of money laundering and where 
possible educate ‘people’ on the best ways to prevent money laundering. This approach was 
designed to achieve an international concern for money laundering with a universal practice of 
inquiry and investigation. It further hoped to provide states with important data for developing 
effective AML plans93. From these initial efforts, money laundering is now viewed as a stand-
                                                
88  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  International Money Laundering Networks 
<http://www.imolin.org/imolin/finhaeng.html> Accessed 16/02/2013 
89 Ibid 
90 Jack A. Blum and others, 'Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy And Money Laundering, United Nations Office for 
Drug Control and Crime Prevention' (1998);Quoting Ingo Walter, Secret Money: The World of International 
Financial Secrecy (G. Allen & Unwin 1985)  p. 2. 
91 Ibid 
92 Ibid 
93 Joseph M. Myers. (2005) International Strategies to Combat Money Laundering  p. 5 
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alone crime with specific criminal punishments and forfeiture94. The overall trend is towards the 
criminalisation of money laundering, found in a number of jurisdictions, but for various reasons, 
some areas have been slow to apply these measures. In a globalised marketplace, cooperation 
between all nations is necessary if the aim of eradicating money laundering is ever to be 
achieved. 
 
However, there are problems with trust between nations, with a difference in the implementation 
of money laundering regulations between wealthy developed democratic and developing nations. 
Mascierando observed, that areas that enable money laundering tend to be ‘relatively poor, small 
jurisdictions that….offer many profitable opportunities for organised crime’, with the 
infrastructure of such a society unlikely to be threatened by money laundering95. In attempts to 
hide the source(s) of illegal funds a lack of transparency and vulnerability in domestic financial 
institutions and systems96 is attractive to those seeking to launder illegal funds. The ultimate 
result of this is the creation of an economy to which organised crime/terrorism is drawn, with the 
potential discouragement of foreign investment97 and the distortion of a nation’s financial 
stability, which undermines a country’s welfare system and distracts resources from legitimate 
economic projects. Furthermore, in an increasingly globalised world, the interconnection of 
national financial systems and international trade means that the failure of some nations to 
implement AML regulations risks the extension of these negative economic effects into regions, 
which employ AML practice. In addition, this addresses the integral role money laundering plays 
                                                
94 Ibid 
95 Donato Masciandaro, Global financial crime: Terrorism, money laundering, and off shore centres (Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd. 2004) 24. 
96 Ibid 
97 Mohsin Habib and Leon Zurawicki. 'Corruption and foreign direct investment' (2002) J Int Bus Stud 291;Beata 
K. Smarzynska and Shang-Jin Wei. 'Corruption and composition of foreign direct investment: Firm-level evidence' 
(2000) (No. w7969) National bureau of economic research;Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra. 'Who cares about corruption?' 
(2006) 37(6) J Int Bus Stud 807;Edward Fokuoh Ampratwum. 'The fight against corruption and its implications for 
development in developing and transition economies' (2008) 11(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 76. 
 40 
in the financing of terrorism, and the fact that it can threaten the stability of a country’s financial 
sector and the external stability and the global financial framework of the region98.  
 
To the IMF, money laundering is a global crime with grave economic consequences, which has 
increased in success due to the growing complexity of financial systems and the methods used by 
organised crime/terrorism to obfuscate the sources of their money, and supported by the 
prevalence of financial crime, growing embezzlement, insider trading, bribery and computer 
fraud99. On 29th September 2003 and 14th December 2005, the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime and the UN Convention against Corruption respectively came 
into force to further support the need to address international conditions or crime and 
terrorism100. Both instruments widened the scope of money laundering offences by stating that it 
should not only apply to the proceeds of illicit narcotics trade but also cover the proceeds of all 
serious crimes. Both conventions urged states to create a comprehensive domestic supervisory 
and regulatory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions, including natural and legal 
persons, as well as any entities particularly susceptible to being involved in a money laundering 
schemes. Under these conventions, members are required to establish national laws including the 
following criminal offences: (1) Participation in an organised criminal group (2) Corruption (3) 
Obstruction of justice and (4) Money Laundering101.  
 
The security and rigour of a financial system is its main defence to prevent money laundering. 
Financial systems include not only its central and other banks, but also a range of financial 
products, pensions and funds, as well as the markets. As the IMF has noted, these institutions not 
                                                
98 International Monetary Fund (IMF) The IMF: The Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/aml.htm> Accessed 17/1/2013. 
99 Ibid 
100 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes. ‘United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime and the Protocols Thereto’, retrieved from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaties/CTOC/ 
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only provide services for their users, but also carry out monetary policy, fund investments, and 
support economic growth 102 . According to the IMF and researchers such as Mojsoska, 
Nikolovska, and Vitanova (2012), vulnerabilities in a national financial framework can lead to 
economic downturns and create huge fiscal costs, ultimately rendering the country economically 
unstable103 104. Financial instability is rarely limited to one region, and the interconnectivity of 
the world’s financial services makes financial institutions that are resilient to financial crime an 
economic necessity. This means, for AML to be effective that there needs to be a ‘culture of 
trust’ and cooperation between nations. The reality is such that a ‘culture of trust’ and 
cooperation is often missing and the effectiveness of corporation is only as effective as the AML 
legislation in each individual country105. The FATF106, observed that the laundering of illegal 
funds results in seeking new ways to creatively disguise them, take advantage of the 
jurisdictional differences between legislation and lack of national political willingness to prevent 
money laundering, identifying the vulnerabilities in systems and exploiting them. Growing 
economies with developing financial centres are attractive and vulnerable to those seeking to 
launder illegal proceeds107.   
 
                                                
102 International Monetary Fund Financial System Soundness January 19 2013 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/banking.htm> Accessed 15/2/2013. 
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104 Mojsoska, S, Nikolovska, D, & Vitanova, G 2012, 'Money Laundering On Financial Markets', International 
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105  Xu Tang. 'The Effectiveness of China's Anti-Money Laundering Policies' (2010) China Economist, 
Forthcoming  
106  History of the FATF. http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/63/0,3343,en_32250379_32236836_34432255_1_1_1_1,00.html. Last accessed 30 May 2010. 
107 Financial Action Task Force. (2008) Mutual Evaluation Report–Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
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The FATF asserts that professional investigations can discover illegal funds and ensure its 
forfeiture and can decrease criminal enterprise, by granting investigative powers to state law 
enforcement bodies enabling them to trace, seize, and confiscate criminal assets. Costs and 
responsibilities of managing these activities are not noted or supported by the FATF, and while 
the FATF does rate countries108  regarding legislation and contributions to preventing the 
occurrences of money laundering and other crimes, the success is country specific109. However, 
the FATF notes that the use of AML task forces and other FIUs (Financial Investigative Units) 
can increase the success of preventing money laundering, by providing the country with 
responsible units trained to recognize the abnormalities in money transactions or movement of 
goods (precious stones and metals) and investigative measures to uncover the truth of the sources 
to provide international support for money laundering.   
  
FATF suggests that countries can and will exchange information, depending on circumstances, 
national laws, and political willingness, which can be used to determine the outcome of 
international cases of money laundering. The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, during the OAS/CICAD debate 
on joint action in preventing the manufacture and distribution of narcotics, is one major example 
of this110. In addition, it is the intention of FATF is to encourage the growth of FATF-fashioned 
regional groups that are already part of FATF or in establishing new organisations to fill gaps in 
regions with need. The Organisation of American States Drug Control Council (OAS-
CICAD)111, the CFATF112, the Council of Europe113, and The Asia Pacific Group on Money 
                                                
108  Joras Ferwerda. 'The economics of crime and money laundering: does anti-money laundering policy reduce 
crime?' (2009) 5(2) Review of Law & Economics 903 
109 FATF Countries, retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/ 
110 Ibid 
111 The Organization of American States Drug Control Council, retrieved from http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp 
112  Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), retrieved from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/caribbeanfinancialactiontaskforcecfatf.html 
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Laundering (APG)114 are further examples of this increased interest in AML, supplying the 
means of regional guidance and helping associated states to plan and  implement AML taking 
into consideration their regional circumstances and distinguishing characteristics. Legislation is 
designed by each individual government; however, the intention is that FAFT and other 
international standards will provide governments with guidance in these areas. To assist 
governments, the FATF uses recommendations and assessments that provide clear guidelines for 
future activities, programmes, or issues that need addressed for each individual country.    
 
The FAFT insists that multilateral programmes are crucial, and have created a ‘black list' of 
nations that refuse to cooperate with FATF standards115. If these standards are not met, other 
member states consider whether to license national banks that apply for licenses to work in or 
with FATF member states. Furthermore, national banks are also unable to gain access to a 
market unless it has money laundering compliance programme in place116, and a national AML 
policy. This is considered a necessity, although as it has been observed, banking regulation ought 
to be insulated from state politics117. In practice, the necessity of state efforts in preventing 
money laundering within their borders has shown that this is not always possible, if at all118. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
113 Council of Europe, retrieved from http://www.coe.int/en/ 
114 The Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, retrieved from http://www.apgml.org/ 
115  ‘Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process - 27 June 2014’, FAFT, retrieved from 
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118 Gordon, RK 2011, 'Losing the war against dirty money: rethinking global standards on preventing money 
laundering and terrorism financing', Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 503-565. 
 
 44 
As part of the FATF methods for identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the country, in 
regards to the AML/CFT regulations, assessments are completed. While the FATF publishes 
these assessments upon completion, they are not conducted yearly, and assessors develop the 
assessments through interactions with the various government and law enforcement bodies that 
implement the legislation and regulations. However, in countries where limited access is 
presented to assessors, or in situations where documentation and statistics are not available, 
assessors must develop the assessment without this knowledge, and this can negatively influence 
the scores achieved. In countries such as the UAE, statistical evidence of implementation is less 
available than in larger countries, due to either newness of the legislation and regulation or in 
part due to the limited database infrastructures to support clarity in the implementation. 
Additionally, countries can have problems implementing legislation when there is little 
collaboration between government agencies or where authority to implement laws has not been 
clarified.  
 
As Braithwaite and Drahos have observed, while international banking standards were for some 
time set mainly by the financial industry, the recognition of the link between money laundering 
and criminal practices such as the narcotics trade made this problem a political issue (see chapter 
for political view in UAE/Dubai), with states setting increasingly demanding legislation for the 
financial sector119. This is illustrated by the Basel Committee, which sets international banking 
standards. Developed by the Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III was intended to 
strengthen the regulation, supervision, and risk management of the international banking 
sector120. As the Bank for International Settlement states, ‘the mission of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) is to serve central banks in their pursuit of monetary and 
                                                
119 Ibid 
120  Bank for International Settlements International Regulatory Framework for Banks (Basel III) < 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm>  Accessed 1/2/2013. 
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financial stability, to foster international cooperation in those areas and to act as a bank for 
central banks.’121   
 
Shehu (2012) considered financial inclusion as an important aspect for consideration of 
countries, in that banks, governments, and citizens benefit from the ability to guarantee financial 
transactions, along with the safety and support of these transactions by inclusion in international 
financial security. Compliance with these standards were identified as including: 
• “AML/CFT measures should be tailored to the domestic environment and the domestic 
risks of money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/CF). 
• AML/CFT controls should be appropriate to the prevailing or potential risks. 
• AML/CFT obligations should be matched to the capacity of both public and private 
institutions. 
• Where institutional capacity is lacking, a plan should be developed to improve capacity 
and phase in AML/CFT obligations as institutional capacity increases.  
• Law enforcement should be reserved as primary responsibility of the state, and law 
enforcement responsibility should not be unnecessarily shifted to private institutions”. 122 
 
The compilation of Basel documents are described as soft law, which contain ‘neither explicit 
remedies not binding enforcement mechanisms’123, still achieves the result of international 
coordination of law as states absorb the reforms into their domestic legislation. One of the 
benefits of this ‘soft law’ is that it allows a speed and flexibility for dealing with complex 
emerging issues such as money laundering. The FATF has further instructed states on best 
                                                
121 Bank for International Settlements, About < http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm>  Accessed 1/2/2013 
122 Abdullahi Y. Shehu. 'Promoting financial inclusion for effective anti-money laundering and counter financing 
of terrorism (AML/CFT)' (2012) 57(3) Crime, law and social change 305-323 
123 Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation (2000) 137. 
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practice in preventing money laundering, which includes information gathering, the mutual 
monitoring by state controlled organisations and ‘naming and shaming’ sanctions, with financial 
institutions expected to ensure customer due diligence, and the reporting of suspicious 
transactions; sanctions are advised for states that are not compliant with these raft measures124. 
These are substantial expectations for any developing nation with a financial sector such as 
Dubai to achieve.  
 
The Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) (2002) redefined money laundering and money laundering 
offences, and created new mechanisms for investigating and recovering the proceeds of crime, 
125 and revised and consolidated the requirements for those reporting and/or suspicion of money 
laundering. 126  Furthermore, POCA (2002) abolished the previous distinction between the 
proceeds of the narcotics trade and the proceeds of serious crime 127 and extended the definition 
of money laundering to cover all crimes. This change was no doubt in response to the piecemeal 
development of international obligations concerning the narcotics trade and money 
laundering128. Use of POCA and its continued revision has enabled the UK to establish higher 
                                                
124 Ibid 
125 The Act effectively repealed all previous anti-money laundering legislation and consolidates it into part 7 of this 
Act. The only exception is the money laundering provisions which relate to the financing of terrorism. These remain 
part of the Terrorism Act 2000 as amended by Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Supra p. 20. 
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Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Drug Trafficking Act 1994. For more detail, see Taby Graham et al. “Money 
Laundering” Butterworth Lexis Nexis 2003, p. 10. 
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ratings with the FATF Recommendations than many countries; however, improvements are still 
required based on the most recent assessment of the UK.  
 
2.6. Section	  340	  (11)	  of	  the	  POCA	  (2002)	  defined	  money	  laundering	  
thus as an act which: 
 
(a) constitutes an offence under Sections 327, 328 or 329 of Part 7, (b) constitutes an 
attempt, conspiracy or incitement to commit an offence specified in paragraph (a), (c) 
constitutes aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence 
specified in paragraph (a), or (d) would constitute an offence specified in paragraph (a), 
(b) or (c) if done in the United Kingdom.129 
 
POCA (2002) further created three principal money laundering offences as well as four related 
offences, with a defence to each of the three principal money laundering offences and related 
offences. These are briefly reviewed below due to their relevance to the UAE’s AML 
development.  
The three principle money laundering offences in Part 7 of the POCA (2002)130 in Sections 327-
329131 are where a:  
 
                                                
129  http://www.chba.org.uk/for-members/library/all-london-seminars/2011-seminars/anti-money-laundering-annex-
proceeds-of-crime-act.pdf 
130 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 came into force on 24 February 2003. For more details, see Andrew Haynes. 
'Money laundering: from failure to absurdity' (2008) 11(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 303 
131 The General structure under Sections 327-329 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is derived from the provisions 
of the United Nation Vienna Convention 1988 and the First EU Money Laundering Directive of 1991, though 
Section 328, like Section 93 A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, its predecessor, goes considerably further than is 
required under either Article 3 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention 1988 or Article 1 of the Directive. 
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a person commits an offence of money laundering if he a) 132conceals, disguises, converts, 
transfers or removes (from the United Kingdom) criminal property133 b) enters into or becomes 
concerned in an arrangement134 which he knows or suspects facilitates (by whatever means) the 
acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another person or135 
c) acquires, uses or has possession of criminal property.136 In the three principal offences of 
money laundering contained in Sections 327-329 to be established, the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002 requires that the property involved in a money laundering offence must be a criminal 
property and it must be obtained through criminal conduct.  
 
However, the notion of criminal property is open to contestation. The two conditions to be met in 
order to prove that the property in a money laundering offence is criminal property, namely, “(1) 
it constitutes benefit from criminal conduct or that it represents such a benefit (in whole or part 
and whether directly or indirectly), and (2) the alleged offender knows or suspects that it 
constitutes or represents such a benefit.137  
 
                                                
132  Concealing or disguising criminal property is defined in Section 327 (3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 as 
concealing or disguising its nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership or any rights with respect 
to it. This covers an extremely wide range of potential activities including mixing criminal funds with legitimate 
cash flows. See,  Toby Graham, Butterworths international guide to money laundering: law and practice (London: 
Tottel Publishing 2002) 
133 Section 327 
134 N. Ryder and A. Baker. 'An Appropriate Response to P v. P? Bowman v. Fels [2005] EWCA (Civ) 226' (2005) 
39(3) LAW TEACHER 388 
135 Section 328 
136 Section 329. For more details, see Doug Hopton, “Money Laundering - A Concise Guide for All Business”, 
Gower Publishing Limited, 2005, p. 42. 
137 Section 340 (3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
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The first condition is wide ranging and is a factual condition concerning the property of origin. 
In R v Causey138, the Court of Appeal “observed that the expression ‘directly or indirectly’ must 
include property which comes the defendant’s way and/or is available to him to be dealt with 
because he is in receipt elsewhere in his estate of property traceable to criminal conduct.” The 
second condition, however, is a subjective one concerning the mental state of a person at the time 
he deals with the property. It should be noted that, because criminal property is widely defined 
by the POCA (2002), there is no distinction between the proceeds of the defendant's own crimes 
and of crimes committed by others.139 It should also be noted that the property, which may 
comprise the benefit from criminal conduct, is all property and it is widely defined by the POCA 
(2002) to include money, all forms of property or real estate, and other intangible or incorporeal 
property, and property obtained by a person if he obtains an interest in it.140 
 
In order to secure a conviction then, under Part 7 of the POCA (2002), it is only necessary to 
evidence that the laundered property was generated as a result of criminal conduct, and that the 
alleged offender knows or suspects that this is the case141. It should be noted, however, that it is 
immaterial who carried out the conduct, benefited from it and/or whether the conduct occurred 
prior to the passing of POCA (2002), as long as the laundering act took place post 
commencement.142143.  
 
                                                
138 [1999] EWCA Civ.233 
139 Section 340 (4) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
140 Section 340 (9) and (10) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
141 Section 340 (3) (b) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. See Taby Graham et al. p. 36. 
142 Section 340 (4) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. See Doug Hopton, p. 42. 
143 See Paul Marshall “Risk and legal uncertainty under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 - the result of legislative 
oversight” 2005, p. 4. 
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However, Hopton argued that the definition of criminal conduct in Section 340(1) of the POCA 
(2002) is liable to cause practical problems because under this definition criminal conduct 
includes any activity abroad that would be an offence if it was carried out in the UK, regardless 
of whether it is an offence in the country where it is actually carried out. It is also of some 
concern whether this definition of criminal conduct will cover all the criminal offences. Section 
413(1) of the POCA (2002) refers to “any offence”. It has been argued that the term “any 
offence” is wide ranging and would include summary offences 144 As a result criminal conduct 
under the POCA (2002) includes minor criminal offences as well as serious ones. Moreover, the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 has no de minimis provision and so covers all benefits or profit, no 
matter how small and no matter how minor the crime. 
 
As was mentioned above, the offender has to "know or suspect" that the criminal property 
represents a benefit from criminal conduct by concealing, disguising, converting, transferring145 
or removing property which was a benefit from criminal conduct. It is further contested that 
                                                
144 See Doug Hopton, p. 42. See also Taby, p. 37. It should be noted that the problem has been, at least partially, 
overcome by an amendment  made to Section 102 of The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 in which 
this Act added another defence to Sections 327-329 when Section 129 stated that: “(a) nor does a person commit an 
offence under subsection (1) if (a) he knows, or believes on reasonable grounds, that the relevant criminal conduct 
occurred in a particular country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and (b) the relevant criminal conduct (i) 
was not, at the time it occurred, unlawful under the criminal law then applying in that country or territory, and (ii) is 
not of a description prescribed by an order made by the Secretary of State.” 
145 Under Section 327(1) (d) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which relates to the transfer of criminal property, 
a bank or other deposit-taking body would need to make a disclosure to, and obtain consent from, NCIS before any 
transfer of funds of a client who was suspected of money laundering. This creates difficulties in relation to what are 
known as lifestyle payments of standing orders, gas bills, mortgages, etc. Problems also arise where the client tries 
to get cash from, or deposit money in, his account. A delay in carrying out each such transaction while the bank 
sought consent to proceed with the transaction from the authorities might also alert the client to what was going on. 
Section 103 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 amended Section 327(1) (d) of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 and allows known deposit-taking bodies to continue to operate accounts without the need to seek 
consent in each case. It is important to note, however, that the reference to threshold amounts is not the introduction 
of a de minimis level in respect of money laundering offences or reporting requirements. 
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under Section 328(1), a person commits an offence if he enters or becomes concerned in an 
arrangement146 which he knows or suspects facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition, 
retention, use or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another person regardless of the 
severity of the criminal relationship. It has been argued that the concept of ‘entering into an 
arrangement’ is a wide concept and may be understood as being not unlike the legal concept of 
conspiracy. 147 There must, in some sense, be a meeting of minds between two or more 
persons148. However, there is no definition of ‘entering into an arrangement’ in POCA (2002) for 
the purpose of money laundering. The Court of Appeal held in Bowman V Fels149 that “Section 
328 of the POC (2002) does not extend to the involvement of a barrister in the ordinary conduct 
of litigation or its consensual resolution”. Thus, Section 328 does not cover or affect the ordinary 
conduct of litigation by legal professionals, including any step taken in litigation from the issue 
of proceedings and securing of injunctive relief or freezing order up to its final disposal by 
judgment.150 However, for court proceedings to be initiated it is not necessary to link proceeds or 
property to a specific predicate offence, nor to prove who committed the predicate offence, 
                                                
146 See, Bowman V Fels [2005] EWCA Civ.226 
147 Mulcahy V R (1868) L R 3 HL 306 
148 Re. British Basic Slags Ltd’s Agreement [1963]2 All ER 807,819. In explaining the term ‘entering into an 
arrangement,’ Diplock LJ observed that “all that is required to constitute an arrangement is that the parties to it shall 
have communicated with one another in some way and that as a result of communication each has intentionally 
aroused in the other an expectation that he will act in a certain way 
149 [2005] EWCA Civ.226 
150 In the light of the decision in Bowman v Fels  a barrister will only fall within the ambit of section 328 if he is 
not involved in the ordinary conduct of litigation but in the extraordinary conduct of litigation. Although the Court 
of Appeal nowhere sets out what it has in mind by the extraordinary conduct of litigation, the Bar Council 
submissions had put forward an example of bogus or sham litigation, where the barrister instructed came to suspect 
that there was no genuine dispute between the parties, but a dispute connected as a cover for the transfer of ill gotten 
gains; and this seems to be reflected in other passages of judgment. Clearly such cases will be extremely rare. When 
they do arise, the barrister must consider carefully whether an authorised disclosure should be made, so as to avoid 
committing a section 328 offence, 
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which generated the proceeds151. All offences under POCA (2002), however, can carry a 
maximum of 14 year’s imprisonment and/or a fine and liability to a confiscation or civil recovery 
order. 
 
The four statutory defences to the three principal money laundering offences mentioned above 
contained in Sections 327-329 are that (1) A person does not commit a money laundering 
offence under Sections 327-329 if they have made a protected disclosure under section 338 of 
the POCA (2002)152 to the Serious Organised Crime Agency (now National Crime Agency) and 
has been given appropriate consent to continue to act153; (2) he has intended to make such a 
disclosure but had a reasonable excuse for not doing so; or154 (3) the act he did was done in 
carrying out a function he had relating to the enforcement of the provision of POCA (2002) or of 
any other enactment relating to criminal conduct or benefit from criminal conduct155. (4) He 
acquired or used or had possession of the criminal property for adequate consideration.156The 
                                                
151 Sections 340 (4) and 340 (5) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2000 
152 Andrew Haynes. 'Money laundering: from failure to absurdity' (2008) 11(4) Journal of Money Laundering 
Control 303 
153 Sections 327 (2) (a), 328  (2) (a) and 329 (2) (a) 
154 Sections 327 (2) (b), 328  (2) (b) and 329 (b) (a) 
155 Sections 327 (2) (c), 328  (2) (c) and 329 (2) (c) 
156 Additionally, a person does not commit an offence under this section if he acquired, used or had possession of 
the property for "adequate consideration." The defence replicates that available under the offences in S.93 B of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988. It is available to cover those cases where the funds or property have been acquired by a 
purchase for a proper market price or similar exchange and to cater for any injustice which might otherwise arise: 
for example, in the case of tradesmen who are paid for ordinary consumable goods and services in money that 
comes from crime. 
This defence will also apply where professional advisors (such as solicitors or accountants) receive money for or on 
account of costs (whether from the client or from another person on the client's behalf). This defence would not be 
available to a professional where the value of the work carried out or intended to be carried out on behalf of the 
client was significantly less than the money received for or on account of costs. If a person pays proper 
consideration but it can be shown that he knows or suspects that such payment may help another to carry out 
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Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 added another defence to Sections 327-329 when 
Section 102 provides a defence to these offences where the person: (1) knows, or believes on 
reasonable grounds, that the relevant criminal conduct occurred in a country or territory outside 
the United Kingdom and (2) where the criminal conduct was not unlawful under the criminal law 
applying in that country or territory at the time it occurred157. 
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 created a disclosure regime, which makes it an offence not to 
disclose knowledge or suspicion of money laundering, but also permits persons to be given 
consent in certain circumstances to carry out activities, which would otherwise constitute money 
laundering offences. Thus, in addition to the three principal money laundering offences 
contained in Sections 327-329, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 set out in Sections 330-332158 
related offences of failing to report where a person has knowledge, suspicion or reasonable 
grounds for knowledge or suspicion that money laundering is taking place, and for tipping off a 
person that a disclosure has been made to the National Criminal Intelligence Service159. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
criminal conduct he is not treated as having paid proper consideration to Section 328 (3) (c) of the Proceeds Crime 
Act 2002. Section 329 (2) (c) Under Sections 327 (2c), 328  (2c) and 329 (2c) a deposit taking body that converts or 
transfers criminal property does not commit an offence provided it does the act concerned in operating an account 
which it maintains and the value of the criminal property concerned does not exceed the threshold amount. 
157 Section 129 of The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 stated that: “(a) nor does a person commit an 
offence under subsection (1) if (a) he knows, or believes on reasonable grounds, that the relevant criminal conduct 
occurred in a particular country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and (b) the relevant criminal conduct (i) 
was not, at the time it occurred, unlawful under the criminal law then applying in that country or territory, and (ii) is 
not of a description prescribed by an order made by the Secretary of State.” 
158 It should be noted that the failure to disclose provisions in Sections 330-332 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
apply where the information on which the knowledge or suspicion is based came to a person on or after 24 February 
2003, or where a person in the regulated sector has reasonable grounds for knowledge or suspicion on or after that. 
If the information came to a person before 24 February 2003, the old law applies. 
159 This organisation is the UK's Financial Intelligence Unit with responsibility for collecting and disseminating 
information relating to money laundering and related activities within the UK 
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Under Section 330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 it is an offence for a person who knows or 
suspects or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that another person is engaged in 
money laundering not to report the act to the appropriate authority. However, the offence only 
relates to individuals, such as accountants who are acting in the course of business in the 
regulated sector.160 Thus, persons working in the regulated sector are liable if they fail to report 
where they had knowledge or suspicion or reasonable grounds for knowledge or suspicion that 
another is engaged in money laundering. It should be said that all disclosures must be made 
either to an officer nominated by their employer to receive and process such reports or to the 
National Criminal Intelligence Service161. 
Sections 331-332 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 stated that a nominated officer who 
receives either a disclosure in relation to one of the principal money laundering offences, or a 
voluntary disclosure, which causes him to know or suspect that money laundering is taking 
place, will have committed an offence if that information is not disclosed and reported to the 
National Criminal Intelligence Service as soon as practicable after the information is received.  
The report that he has received should have stated the identity of the suspected person, the 
location of the laundered property or he believes (or it is reasonable to expect him to believe) 
that the information will assist in identifying the person or location of the laundered property162. 
 
The offence which relates to 'tipping off' is contained in Section 333 of the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002. This section outlined how it is an offence to make a disclosure likely to prejudice a 
money laundering investigation already being undertaken, or which is undertaken by law 
                                                
160 What constitutes the regulated sector is set out in Part 1 of Schedule 9 of the Act. This point will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Two. 
161 The disclosure should consist of the person’s identity, the whereabouts of the laundered property concerned and 
any information or other matter on which this knowledge is based which came to him in the course of his business. 
(see Section 330 (5) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) 
162 Section 332 (3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
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enforcement authorities163. It therefore covers the situation where an accountant informs a client 
that a report has been submitted to The National Criminal Intelligence Service.164 It is also an 
offence under this Section to disclose to a third person that a suspicious activity report has been 
made by any person to the police, HM Revenue and Customs, SOCA (now NCA) or a nominated 
officer, if that disclosure might prejudice any investigation that might be carried out as a result of 
the suspicious activity report. It should be noted that the Money Laundering Regulation 2007 
made changes to Section 333 of the POCA (2002). The effect of the changes was to state that the 
offence of tipping off now only applies to those in a regulated sector, essentially those regulated 
wholly or partly under Financial Service Authority (FSA) regime165. 
                                                
163 Section 333 (1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. It should be noted that Money Laundering Regulations 
required that Businesses in the regulated sector must appoint a money laundering reporting officer. The money 
laundering reporting officer’s role is to act as a filter and decide whether to disclose details of matters raised by 
employees to the National Criminal Intelligence Service. The money laundering reporting officer’s decisions must 
stand up to scrutiny. The money laundering reporting officer and employees alike must be fully conversant with the 
‘Know Your Customer’ procedures. 
See Squirrel Ltd v National Westminster Bank PLC and HM Customs. 
164 Section 342 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 also applies if a person knows or suspects that an appropriate 
officer is acting (or proposing to act) in connection with a confiscation investigation, a civil recovery investigation 
or a money laundering investigation which is being or is about to be conducted. Under this section a person commits 
an offence if (a) he makes a disclosure which is likely to prejudice the investigation, or (b) he falsifies, conceals, 
destroys or otherwise disposes of, or causes or permits the falsification, concealment, destruction or disposal of, 
documents which are relevant to the investigation. The defences contained in this Section are similar to those in 
Section 333. 
165 Section 333 of The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is amended by Schedule 2 of Money Laundering Regulation 
2007 which implemented Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26th October 
2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing. The regulations give effect to Chapter 3 of the Directive. Schedule 2 of the regulations makes 
amendments to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. New section 21D contains a new offence of tipping off and new 
sections 21E to 21G set out the exceptions from Article 28. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Schedule 2 to the regulations give 
effect to Article 28 in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The existing offence of tipping off in section 333 of that Act 
is repealed by paragraph 3. Paragraph 4 inserts a new section 333A into the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to create a 
new offence of tipping off to cover the regulated sector. New sections 333B to 333D give effect to the exceptions in 
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However, there is a lack of clarity in that no definition has been provided by the POCA (2002) to 
determine what ‘knowledge is for the purpose of money laundering offences’. The Court of 
Appeal in Bank of Credit and Commerce International [Overseas] Ltd V Akindele166 has 
recognised that there are conflicting authorities in this area, and as Hopton suggested that the 
word ‘knowledge’ in the POCA (2002) means actual knowledge and that “to have actual 
knowledge of money laundering will in practice be a very rare occurrence. It would also be 
difficult for the prosecution to prove that someone had actual knowledge of money laundering 
and had failed to report it”.167 Furthermore, POCA (2002) also does not define ‘suspicion’.  
However, in Shaaban Bin Hussien V Chong Fook Kam168 the Privy Council have said that 
‘suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking’. The 
expression ‘reasonable grounds’ is also not defined in POCA (2002) but the Court will apply the 
objective test to prove the fact or the circumstances for each case.169 
 
A further defence is that no offence is committed under Section 330 if a defendant did not 
receive the specified training170 and did not actually know or suspect that money laundering was 
taking place (even though there may have been reasonable grounds for knowledge or 
                                                                                                                                                       
Article 28 Directive. The regulated sector is defined in Schedule 9 to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (as amended 
by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Business in the Regulated Sector and Supervisory Authorities) Order 2007 (S.I. 
No 2007/3287)). Article 21 of the Directive requires Member States to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit 
(“FIU”). The Serious Organised Crime Agency is the United Kingdom’s FIU. 
166 [2001} Ch 437,[2000] 4 All ER 22, CA 
167 At p. 55. See also Westminster City Council V Croyalgrange Ltd (1986) 83 Cr App Rep 155,164. See Warner V 
Metropolitan Police Comr 1969] 2 Ac 256,259 in which the Court suggested that knowledge includes willfully 
shutting one’s eyes to the truth. 
168 [1970] AC 942, 948; see also, Corporate Affairs Comer V Guardian Investments Pty Ltd [1984] VR 1019. 
169 See Doug Hopton, p. 56; Toby et al., p. 39 
170 Under the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 employers may be prosecuted if they fail to train staff. 
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suspicion).171 There is a further defence to the offence under Section 330 where the person 
concerned has a reasonable excuse for not making the required disclosure or where he is a 
professional adviser and if he knows the relevant information it is because of information coming 
into his hands in privileged circumstances.172  POCA (2002) made it clear that an offence is not 
committed under Section 331 that if a person has a ‘reasonable excuse’173 for not making the 
required disclosure.174 It is unclear; however, what is considered a ‘reasonable excuse’.   
 
Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 also dealt with the issue of consent, and with protected 
and authorised disclosures. The consent provisions apply to cases in which suspicious 
transactions reports are made in advance of the transaction taking place, and consent to proceed 
is sought. It is an offence for a nominated officer to consent to a transaction going ahead unless 
he does not know or suspect that the transaction relates to money laundering175. If he is 
suspicious he must pass the suspicion on to the National Criminal Intelligence Service for a 
                                                
171 Section 330 (7) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. There is also provision for industry guidance, approved by 
the Treasury, to be taken into account in any court proceedings, both in relation to this offence and the offence 
relating to failure to report by nominated officers in the regulated sector. Nominated officers in the regulated sector 
and other nominated officers must pass on the suspicions which are passed to them in their role as nominated 
officer. These suspicions must be passed directly to the National Criminal Intelligence Service in the prescribed 
form and manner. The information need only be reported on to the National Criminal Intelligence Service if the 
nominated officer agrees that there are reasonable grounds for suspicion. If there is no actual knowledge or 
suspicion that money laundering is taking place, or if there are no reasonable grounds, then the nominated officer 
does not commit an offence by not making a report to the National Criminal Intelligence Service. 
172 Section 330 (6) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
173 Section 332 (6) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The term “reasonable excuse” is not defined by the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. There is also no judicial guidance or advice on what might constitute a reasonable 
excuse. 
174 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 also made it clear that an offence is not committed under this section if he 
knows, or believes on reasonable grounds, that the money laundering is occurring outside the UK, and the money 
laundering is not unlawful under the criminal law in the country outside the UK. See Section 331 (6) 
175 R V Central Criminal Court, Ex Prate Francis & Francis (1988) 3 WLR 1018. 
 58 
consent decision176. It seems quite clear that the 'consent' provisions in sections 327-329 and 
section 335 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 have two purposes: they offer law enforcement 
an opportunity to gather intelligence or intervene in advance of potentially suspicious activity 
taking place; and they allow individuals and institutions who make reports seeking to consent to 
proceed with a 'prohibited act' the opportunity to avoid liability in relation to the principal money 
laundering offences in POCA (2002).  
 
Furthermore, POCA (2002) provided a disclosure which satisfies the condition that it came into a 
person’s profession in the course of his trade, profession, business or employment, that it caused 
him to know or suspect that a person is engaged in money laundering, and that it made to the 
constable, a Customs officer or a money laundering officer as appropriate does not breach any 
restriction on the disclosure of information.177 Finally, POCA (2002) makes it clear that a 
disclosure should be made before acting.  However, no offence is committed if the act is still 
taking place without it being known that laundering was taking place and the disclosure was 
made as soon as practical after the person first knows or suspects that laundering is taking 
place.178 
 
However, it is perhaps terrorism that caused the utmost international political concern and thus it 
is hardly surprising that The Terrorism Act 2000 in the United Kingdom created a series of 
criminal offences regarding money laundering and terrorism. The Terrorism Act therefore 
criminalised not only the participation in terrorism but also the provision of monetary support179. 
                                                
176 Section 336 (5) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
177 Section 337 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
178 Section 339  of the  Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
179 Section 14 of the Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorist property as follows: (1) In this Act “terrorist property” 
means- (a) money or other property which is likely to be used for the purposes of terrorism (including any resources 
of a proscribed organisation), (b) proceeds of the commission of acts of terrorism, and (c) proceeds of acts carried 
out for the purposes of terrorism. (2) In subsection (1)-(a) a reference to proceeds of an act includes a reference to 
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The Terrorism Act 2000 set up four criminal offences in Sections 15-18180. These are: (1) 
Receiving funds 181  (2) Possessing funds 182  (3) Funding Arrangements and (4) Money 
Laundering. A person commits an offence if he enters into, or becomes concerned in, an 
arrangement facilitating the retention or control of terrorist property by, or on behalf of, another 
person including… by concealment, by removal from the jurisdiction, and by transfer to 
nominees.183 
                                                                                                                                                       
any property which wholly or partly, and directly or indirectly, represents the proceeds of the act (including 
payments or other rewards in connection with its commission), and (b) the reference to an organisation’s resources 
includes a reference to any money or other property which is applied or made available, or is to be applied or made 
available, for use by the organisation. For more details, See Clive Walker “Briefing on the Terrorism act 2000; 
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2000, p. 1. 
180 Section 19 of the Terrorism Act 2000 applies to persons and businesses outside the regulated sector, whereas 
Section 21 A of the Terrorism Act 2000 applies only to the regulated sector. 
181 Section 15 of the Terrorist Act 2000 stated (1) A person commits an offence if he (a) invites another to provide 
money or other property, and (b) intends that it should be used, or has reasonable cause to suspect that it may be 
used, for the purposes of terrorism. (2) A person commits an offence if he (a) receives money or other property, and 
(b) intends that it should be used, or has reasonable cause to suspect that it may be used, for the purposes of 
terrorism. (3) A person commits an offence if he (a) provides money or other property, and (b) knows or has 
reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism. (4) In this section a reference to 
the provision of money or other property is a reference to its being given, lent or otherwise made available, whether 
or not for consideration. 
182 Section 16 of the Terrorist Act 2000 stated (1) A person commits an offence if he uses money or other property 
for the purposes of terrorism. (2) A person commits an offence if he (a) possesses money or other property, and (b) 
intends that it should be used, or has reasonable cause to suspect that it may be used, for the purposes of terrorism. 
183 The financing of terrorism can be described as the process by which a person tries to collect or provide funds 
with the intention that they should be used to carry out a terrorist act by a terrorist or a terrorist organisation as 
defined in the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism as well as in any one of 
the treaties listed in the annex to that Convention.  Like money launderers, those who finance terrorism misuse the 
financial system. In order to achieve their objectives, they have to obtain and channel funds in an apparently 
legitimate way. However, while the money involved in the money laundering process always stems from a crime 
and is therefore always “dirty”, funds channeled to terrorist groups or individuals may originate from crime and/or 
from legitimate sources. Terrorism may therefore be supported by either “dirty” and/or “clean” funds. Regardless of 
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In the Terrorism Act 2000 “terrorist property means (a) money or other property which is likely 
to be used for the purposes of terrorism (including any resources of a proscribed organisation), 
(b) proceeds of the commission of acts of terrorism, and (c) proceeds of acts carried out for the 
purposes of terrorism. (2) In subsection (1) (a) a reference to proceeds of an act includes a 
reference to any property which wholly or partly, and directly or indirectly, represents the 
proceeds of the act (including payments or other rewards in connection with its commission), 
and (b) the reference to an organisation’s resources includes a reference to any money or other 
property which is applied or made available, or is to be applied or made available, for use by the 
organisation.”184 
 
Of more relevance to this research, the specific offences of money laundering and funding 
arrangements are seen as laundering offences185.However, as far as the money laundering 
offence and funding arrangement offence are concerned, the Terrorism Act 2000 made it clear 
that a person does not commit an offence if he disclose his suspicion or belief to an authorised 
officer after he becomes involved in an arrangement or transaction that concerns terrorist money 
and he provides the information on which his suspicion or belief is based. The Terrorism Act 
2000 requires that a person must make the disclosure as soon as reasonably practical186. 
                                                                                                                                                       
the origin of the funds, terrorists or terrorist organisations use the financial system in a similar way to criminal 
organisations in order to obscure both the source and the destination of their funds. See The International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 2002 which requires Member States to take measures 
to protect their financial systems from being misused by persons planning or engaged in terrorist activities. 
184 Section 14 of the Terrorism Act 2000 
185 Section 17 of the Terrorist Act 2000 stated a person commits an offence if (a) he enters into or becomes 
concerned in an arrangement as a result of which money or other property is made available or is to be made 
available to another, and (b) he knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be used for the purposes 
of terrorism. 
186 The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 extends the provisions for the seizure and detention of cash 
on suspicion that it was to be used for terrorist purposes or was part of the resources of a proscribe organisation to 
anywhere in the UK (Section 1) and contains a power to order forfeiture of seized cash on the civil standard of proof 
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It appears that there is no significant difference between the requirements of money laundering in 
the POCA (2002) and the requirements of money laundering in the Terrorism Act 2002. There is, 
however, one difference relating to criminal conduct. It has been seen that Section 340(2) the 
POCA (2002) defined criminal conduct as “a conduct which: a) constitutes an offence in any part 
of the United Kingdom, or b) would constitute an offence in any part of the United Kingdom if it 
occurred there.” The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 amended187 this Section of 
the POCA (2002) to the effect that the offences of money laundering have to be offences in the 
United Kingdom and abroad; however, no such amendments were made to the Terrorism Act 
2000, which means that offences are not to be the same in the United Kingdom and abroad. It has 
also been said that one of the principal differences between ‘ordinary’ money laundering and 
money laundering for terrorism is that the latter often involves small amounts of cash, frequently 
coming from non-criminal sources.188 I would concur with toby on this point as “ordinary” 
money laundering menial involves large amounts of money and are therefore usually easier to 
detected under the regulation, where the smaller amounts involved where supporting Terrorism 
are much more difficult to detect and can therefore slip through the net. 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
of the balance of probabilities. It facilitates the disclosure of information between government bodies (Sections 17-
20), imposing more stringent demands on those in the regulated sector to report suspicions that funds are destined 
for terrorism (Sections 3 and Schedule II, Part III), and provides the police with powers both to force financial 
institutions to monitor accounts and to obtain financial information. 
187 Section 102 stated that: “(a) nor does a person commit an offence under subsection (1) if (a) he knows, or 
believes on reasonable grounds, that the relevant criminal conduct occurred in a particular country or territory 
outside the United Kingdom, and  (b) the relevant criminal conduct (i) was not, at the time it occurred, unlawful 
under the criminal law then applying in that country or territory, and (ii) is not of a description prescribed by an 
order made by the Secretary of State.” 
188  Toby Graham, Evan Bell and Nicholas Elliott, Butterworths international guide to money laundering: law and 
practice (Butterworth-Heinemann 2003)p.58 
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2.7. Evaluation	  of	  money	  laundering	  laws	  and	  conventions	  
Reviewing these international legal pronouncements/conventions it is noted that many are all-
encompassing and therefore vague and a suggestion on ‘what should happen’ and yet have no 
power of enforcement. Left open to national interpretation, if adopted, these ‘laws’ are limited. 
However, rather than dismiss these approaches completely the law(s) are a needed to prevent and 
ultimately prosecute, and hopefully convict, those caught laundering illegal proceeds. However, 
a note of caution is needed as even if laws are adopted there is the potential that it is little more 
than a paper exercise (see results chapter six) and the problem of definition is irrelevant if claims 
to prevention are an exercise in political obfuscation.  
 
It appears that the English law(s) regarding money laundering have seen significant changes in 
recent years. It is understood that the Government made those changes to consolidate, update, 
expand and reform the criminal law in the United Kingdom with regard to money laundering in 
order to reduce the incidence of known and potential money laundering. However, it has been 
seen that the definition of money laundering is very wide and the structure of the English law is 
complex to the point of impenetrability and is best understood by reference to the full English 
legislation and regulations relating to money laundering189. The abolition of the distinction 
between the proceeds of narcotics trafficking and serious crime190, however, is useful as it 
simplifies the law and makes it perhaps easier to understand and apply.  
                                                
189 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, The Terrorism Act 2000, The Money Laundering Regulations 2007 
190 Under the pre-Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, there were separate offences for drug money laundering under the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Drug Trafficking Act 1994. For more details see Taby Graham et al. “Money 
Laundering” Butterworth Lexis Nexis 2003 p.10. The approach of the Proceeds of Crime 2002 is in line with the 
International obligations and in particular with recommendation 1 which stated that Countries should criminalise 
money laundering on the basis of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (the Vienna Convention) and the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 2000 (the Palermo Convention). Countries should apply the crime of money laundering to all 
serious offences, with a view to including the widest range of predicate offences. Predicate offences may be 
described by reference to all offences, or to a threshold linked either to a category of serious offences or to the 
penalty of imprisonment applicable to the predicate offence (threshold approach), or to a list of predicate offences, 
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Undoubtedly, POCA (2002) made significant changes in the law of money laundering, but not to 
the point of removing all the uncertainties created by previous laws. There are still problems and 
these uncertainties will continue with all their unwanted effects. For example, most money 
laundering offences allows a defence of ‘reasonable excuse’.191 However, POCA (2002) gave no 
definition or guidance on what ‘reasonable excuse’ meant. This uncertainty in POCA (2002) 
includes the use of wide terms, which need interpretation and explanation i.e., the terms ‘entering 
into arrangement’192, ‘knowledge’193, ‘suspicion194 and ‘reasonable grounds’.195 This, however, 
could be levelled at all criminal laws rather than this specific act. 196 Furthermore, definition of 
“criminal conduct” is also unclear and it is uncertain in what circumstances conduct outside the 
                                                                                                                                                       
or a combination of these approaches. Where countries apply a threshold approach, predicate offences should at a 
minimum comprise all offences that fall within the category of serious offences under their national law or should 
include offences which are punishable by a maximum penalty of more than one year’s imprisonment or for those 
countries that have a minimum threshold for offences in their legal system, predicate offences should comprise all 
offences, which are punished by a minimum penalty of more than six months imprisonment. Whichever approach is 
adopted, each country should at a minimum include a range of offences within each of the designated categories of 
offences 3. Predicate offences for money laundering should extend to conduct that occurred in another country, 
which constitutes an offence in that country, and which would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred 
domestically. Countries may provide that the only prerequisite is that the conduct would have constituted a predicate 
offence had it occurred domestically. Countries may provide that the offence of money laundering does not apply to 
persons who committed the predicate offence, where this is required by fundamental principles of their domestic 
law. 
191 Section 332 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
192 Section 328 
193 Sections 330-332 
194 Section 332 
195 Section 332 
196 Bowman V Fels [2005] EWCA Civ.226 
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United Kingdom is criminal conduct Act 2002 (therefore, it is uncertain as to who has to be 
reported as suspected of money laundering and which transactions need consent)197. 
 
It also needs to be emphasized that money-laundering offences are not confined to cases 
involving money; they can, and do include terrorism, the sexual exploitation of children, fraud, 
environmental offences and other organised crime”.198,199 
2.8. Secondary	  Data	  
There is limited secondary data available in the UAE and Dubai. Therefore, there must be a note 
of caution raised about the inferences that is taken from such limited data and the quality of this 
data (i.e., how it is recorded, why it is recorded). While data was widely available regarding the 
policies and legislation, particularly that of Dubai rather than the UAE, there was little or no 
reference to any studies regarding the implementation of AML in countries or statistically 
reliable information regarding the prevalence of money laundering in Dubai or UAE within the 
past three years.  
 
This a particular problem of recording data, however, is an international problem; police data’ 
resemble policing priorities and operational decisions rather than objective crime data. Data is 
                                                
197 It should be noted that this problem has been partially overcome by Section 102 of the Serious Organised Crime  
and Police Act 2005. See Sapra at 
198 Monica Bond, “Money Laundering” Accountants Digest September 1994, Volume 324, p. 7. 
199 It should be noted that a careful judgment will need to be made as to whether it is in the public interest to 
proceed with the money laundering offence in the event of a plea to the underlying criminality by a defendant who is 
also indicted for laundering his own proceeds. The prosecutor should take into account whether the laundering 
activity involves such a significant attempt to conceal ill-gotten gains that a court may consider a consecutive 
sentence. Prosecutors should not simply proceed with a money laundering charge in this situation to trigger the 
lifestyle assumptions in respect of convictions for money laundering under S.327 or S.328. To do so, for no other 
reason, could attract abuse of process arguments. 
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thus socially constructed measures that reflect official decisions on what is important and needs 
police attention. 
 
It is suggested from this research, with a lack of secondary data available, that money laundering 
is not a police priority. This, however, is partially correct. In this research (see chapter six) it was 
discovered that it was both the limited interest in policing money laundering and the actual 
ability to of the police to identify cases of money laundering that compounded the problem of 
limited secondary data; these matters exacerbated the ‘dark figure of crime’ in Dubai.    
 
However, what data was available helped examine the main patterns of money laundering – 
either under or over-representation in the UAE. This in turn provided some potential questions 
for interviews (see chapter six) with key personnel in the AMLSCU, AOCD and Central Bank, 
to evaluate to what extent the prevention of money laundering is considered a problem in need of 
police attention in the UAE. This included an examination of whether the current system – the 
role of the Central Bank, the AMLSCU and AOCD – are ‘fit for purpose’ in the age of 
international trade and commerce. 
 
The problem encountered in this research, however, is that most of the secondary data was either 
withheld for security reasons, i.e. on-going cases, or for private considerations, i.e. protecting the 
integrity of own company, which is understandable or – and this was the most common theme – 
there is little available data on money laundering in the UAE due to the problem of inconsistent 
recording practices - in both financial services and police enforcement – reaching the prosecution 
stage and finally conviction. At each stage a case can be filtered out and dealt with in another 
way i.e. it is a case of money laundering but discounted as such to protect financial 
services/banks, it is dealt with in-house by financial institution and customer(s) involved, it is 
downgraded as a ‘mistake’ and or error. The police act is similar ways if they see that the chance 
of conviction is slim and so another indictment is brought, and/or the case is dismissed due to 
lack of evidence.   
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The problem of recording national crime data, however, is not one specific to the UAE; it is an 
international problem. The problem of recoding money laundering, however, is compounded by 
the very nature of the crime itself, which is based on deception. Rich, powerful, individuals are 
able to launder funds within the financial sector, but only with the help of professionals such as 
accountants, lawyers etc. Furthermore, it is suggested that the majority on money laundered, is 
not placed into the legal financial system but instead kept in shell accounts in tax havens, or 
invested back into purchasing narcotics, arms, etc. depending on the focus of the organised 
criminal enterprise.      
    
Even working with international laws and conventions money laundering is left open to 
interpretation by key individuals in the financial sector and law enforcement. How money 
laundering is viewed is thus down to individual/organisational discretion. This is further 
compounded if trying to assess the level of crime – regardless of the act – within and across 
jurisdictions. This is amply highlighted in Brooks et al (2013) regarding corruption, of which 
money laundering is associated.           
    
What data was obtained was nonetheless still helpful, but it is suggested that recording practices 
need some attention before we can tackle the problem of money laundering from a policy-type 
approach to disseminate practice within and across the different sectors in the UAE that deal 
with AML.  
 
The limitations of criminal justice data, however, are not a problem specific to Dubai. It is a 
problem for all jurisdictions and thus open to criticism200 .The difficulties associated with 
‘criminal justice’ research are well documented; there is a lack of objective data regarding 
                                                
200 Gill McIvor and Peter Raynor, Developments in social work with offenders, vol 48 (Jessica Kingsley Pub 2007) 
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reported and recorded criminal offences201 self-report and victimisation surveys are problematic 
202 and acts of fraud and corruption are difficult to detect 203. 
 
Regardless of this problem, some understanding of the level of money laundering – even if an 
estimate –is important since. This is so we can learn what the key indicators that are involved in 
money laundering and design AML prevention to reduces its incidence204. Measurement is 
therefore critical when combating money laundering, providing some benchmark of progress 
against its extent, and identifying what effective factors reduce its rate of incidence. 
Measurements can also help test theoretical explanations for its occurrence, as well as providing 
the necessary confidence to business investment. 
 
There are two types of measures relevant to this research: objective and subjective measures. 
Objective measures are quantifiable and based on datasets which are verifiable. Examples of 
these objective indicators are the number of (i) official complaints to police (ii) or convictions205. 
However, as mentioned earlier such measurement is more likely to be a reflection and indication 
of the availability of resources and a reflection of the attitudes towards the vigilance of the 
money laundering. For example, in a highly corrupt nations there is perhaps minimal law 
enforcement, and therefore, ‘officially’ little money laundering. Alternatively, in a nation where 
there is a low tolerance threshold of individual and institutional money laundering, which is 
evident in the number of convictions might suggest that money laundering/corruption is rife. As 
                                                
201   Steven Box, 'Power, Crime and Mystification' (1983);Martin Bulmer, Sociological research methods 
(Transaction Publishers 1984);Victor Jupp. 'Methods of Criminological Research (1989)' London and New York: 
Routledge  
202  Clive Coleman and Jenny Moynihan, Understanding crime data: Haunted by the dark figure, vol 120 (Open 
University Press Buckingham 1996) 
203  Gary Slapper and Steve Tombs, Corporate crime (Longman 1999) 
204 Paul Collier. 'How to reduce corruption' (2000) 12(2) African Development Review 191 
205 Erlend Berg. 'How Should Corruption be Measured' (2001) London School of Economics and Political Science  
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a result of this, measurements of official data are largely discredited and alternatives considered, 
particularly for crimes such as money laundering, i.e. the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
published by Transparency International (TI), the Word Bank, i.e. the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) and the Business Environment and Enterprise Survey (BEEPS)206.  
 
Even though all of the above limited, aggregate indicators are more useful than simple national 
crime data because of their sophistication and extensive use, as they claim to be both more 
reliable and accurate207. However, comparing aggregated data is also problematic as information 
is combined from multiple sources and measures of ‘corruption’.208  Nonetheless, it has been 
well documented how difficult it is to measure money laundering because of its secretive nature, 
as with most financial crime. The approach to gathering different types of data from various 
sources, however, makes it highly desirable and credible, when a reasonable degree of 
corroboration and verification achieved 209 . Yet again, however, all data sets - police 
enforcement, convictions etc. in the Dubai were limited with little information on level of or 
types of crime committed.  As such it was suggested (see more in chapter…) that all recording 
practices, regardless of the crime, needed attention and data sets developed to prevent/reduce the 
incidents of crime.  
 
With little official data available it was decided to extend the search for data on money 
laundering in Dubai. Drawing on available subjective measurements such as surveys that gauged 
participants’ perception or experience money laundering/crime was considered. However, there 
                                                
206 Graham Brooks, Azeem Aleem and Mark Button, 'Fraud, corruption and sport' (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 
207 Lambsdorff, J. G., (2006). Causes and consequences of corruption: what do we know from a cross-section of 
countries? In: S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption (pp. 3–51).  
Edward Elgar: Cheltenham 
208 Anja Rohwer. 'Measuring Corruption: A comparison between the transparency international's corruption 
perceptions index and the world bank's worldwide governance indicators' (2009) 7(3) CESifo DICE Report 42 
209 ibid 
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were no publicly available surveys on crime in Dubai. Surveys of perceptions can capture the 
reality of situations, particularly if they are carefully designed and developed, the fact remains 
they remain perceptual data, lacking objectivity, and results from such surveys might not reflect 
the actual or anywhere near the level of money laundering in the UAE and elsewhere210. It 
would, however, have been useful to obtain some indication of the problem of money laundering 
in Dubai.   
 
From this research it would appear that there is limited information available on crime with little 
on money laundering in Dubai. There was also some disquiet regarding the effectiveness of 
AML measures from the police in this research. Due to their multi-dimensional character, and 
hidden nature of money laundering it is also difficult to discover and then secure a conviction. In 
the UAE some efforts have been undertaken to prevent and reduce the incidence of money 
laundering (i.e. the establishment of the AMLSCU); there is, however, little official data, as yet, 
that illustrates that this is happening. This research is a contribution to this ‘gap in knowledge’ in 
highlighting the paucity of data that needs to be addressed in the UAE.  
 
A lack of official data is not a problem that is specific to the UAE. It is a worldwide problem. 
Objective ‘criminal’ data is difficult to obtain, either on a national or international level and 
perception surveys are imperfect for measuring actual levels of crime because of subjectivity211 . 
This research is therefore part of a snap shot of the present situation in Dubai on preventing and 
reducing money laundering and extending practical and theoretical understanding or of AML 
practice for the future.    
 
                                                
210 Maurseth Botolf. 'Governance Indicators: A guided Tour' (2010)  
211 Graham Brooks, Azeem Aleem and Mark Button, 'Fraud, corruption and sport' (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 
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2.9. Analysis	  of	  legal	  documentation	  	  	  
As part of this research, national and international legal documents, statutes, conventions and 
regulations on money laundering in Dubai and the United Kingdom were analysed. The primary 
analysis, however, was of the AML countermeasures in preventing money laundering. The 
official UAE and Dubai response to money laundering was mixed. As is highlighted in 
chapter…and following section, those in the financial sector, officials of the AMLSCU and 
Dubai police officers working in the AOCD held different views on who was primarily 
responsible for preventing money laundering. This illustrated that any interpretation to 
legislation/laws is contested and no amount of analysis leads to one uncontested definition of 
what the law is ‘saying’ and what it can ‘mean’. 
 
Before analysing any documentation, however, a classification of documentation was required. 
The sources were placed into two sources – primary and secondary. In this research primary 
documentation rather than interviews which produced primary data were considered materials 
that have a direct relationship with the people interviewed. In this sense courts cases, minutes, 
contracts, strategic reports. These provided, when accessible, an account of the situation. 
However, these were not simply accepted as ‘working practice’. Many of the documents 
accessed were only available at the interview, and as such limited analysis was completed.  
 
A further distinction in documentary analysis was between public documentation and private 
documentation. Public documents were seen as actuarial cases, political and judicial records, and 
press articles and news content. There was, however, limited documentation available regarding 
money laundering in these documents. Private documents are self-explanatory and personal 
communication within a company and colleague were not sought. These documents were seen as 
unobtainable and the research was far more concerned with identifiable practice in the public 
domain. Finally there is a distinction to be made between unsolicited and solicited documents in 
research. The unsolicited documents were produced with the research in mind such as diary of 
interviews while the solicited documents are those requested – due to the research, however, 
these documents were rarely asked for, and if so mostly declined. There is also much room for 
ambiguity in personal documentation and interpretation. This interpretation, however, can lead to 
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distortion of information and as such it was decided that the energy would mainly focus on 
accessible, official documentation.           
                
International laws and conventions, some of which the UAE and United Kingdom have signed to 
tackle money laundering, leave less room for interpretation and are more of a ‘statement of 
intent’ to prevent money laundering, i.e. Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations. 
However, the differences between global ‘best practices’ and the Dubai’s response highlighted 
the need for improvements in a far more systematic, coordinated way. 
 
A note of caution needs to be raised here, however, as the UAE is a young nation. Prior to its 
recognition and establishment in 1971 it existed as separate and distinct Emirates. These are still 
evident with regional autonomy, but the UAE as a nation is still developing its laws, drawing on 
a combination of legal doctrines. This research, therefore, focussed on ‘factual’ information 
rather than rhetorical pronouncements from judges regarding cases of money laundering. Those 
cases which were of use have been referred to in this thesis and hopefully illustrate the 
international problem of preventing and convicting those engaged in money laundering regarding 
of the jurisdiction. 
 
2.10. Conclusion	  
This chapter has provided definitions for money laundering and Hawala, and included the 
importance of money laundering at an international level. The implications of money laundering 
are considered as to the relationship with criminal activities that influence the safety and success 
of countries and organisations around the world. In addition, this chapter illustrated that stages of 
money laundering is limited as it is a descriptive account of ‘what might happen’ rather than 
‘what does happen’. The stages can, and are circumvented and/or by-passed depending on 
individuals/organisation and willingness of jurisdictions to implement and enforce AML laws. In 
addition the wealth of legal definitions, laws, conventions etc. make a complex problem worse 
with its attempt at passing legislation that is all-encompassing and yet so vague. UK and UAE 
legislation is not largely different, with the exception in its completeness, as identified by 
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recommendations in the FATF, regarding the need for UAE legislation to be more thorough. In 
this way, the identification of UK legislation improves on the knowledge base required for 
improvement in legislation for the UAE. Additionally, legislation difficulties are further 
compounded by constant additions rather than amendments to existing laws and the focus on 
proceeds of crime and terrorism at the expense of powerful international commercial 
organisations and/or individuals that might also commit money laundering. In the following 
chapter we focus on the political context in which AML legislation has developed in the UAE 
and consider that perhaps drawing on the development of legislation in United Kingdom was 
only partly of some use, as the political and social context is substantially different.  
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Chapter	  Three	  
Political	  context	  of	  AML	  in	  UAE	  and	  Dubai	  
3.1. Introduction	  
In the UAE money laundering was often, and still is, primarily associated with fraud in the 
financial sector rather than linked to organised crime. This has led to a failure to recognise the 
value of financial intelligence as an effort to combat transnational crime and terrorism as well as 
the impact of capital on the political, legal and economic sector within the UAE212. Lack of 
comprehensive AML practice, however, or appropriate mechanisms for combating the emerging 
financing of terrorism has led to significant vulnerability in the international financial system 
rather than the UAE alone.	  This is not a defence of the system currently in the UAE but terrorism 
is an international problem that needs international cooperation rather than an exchange of 
information between two nations.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
However, when the UAE ratified both the Vienna and Palermo regulations and implemented 
UNSCRs links to the prevention and reduction of the financing of terrorism its compliance was 
highly thought of by the International Monetary Fund.213 Furthermore, the development of 
twenty five articles on federal law criminalised money laundering in 2002 214and subsequent 
research has indicated that the UAE was one of the earliest nations to adopt AML provisions in 
money laundering, particularly within its Federal Law No. 3. This was based on the 
promulgation of the Penal Code of 1987, which was prepared for the 1988 Vienna Convention.  
 
                                                
212 Jerry Hart, 'Criminal infiltration of financial institutions: a penetration test case study' , vol 13 (Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited 2010) 55, pp. 55-65. 
213 RE Bell. 'Discretion and decision making in money laundering prosecutions' (2001) 5ibid42, pp. 42-51. 
214 Marcel Pheijffer. 'Financial investigations and criminal money' (1998) 2ibid33 
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In addition, FATF further emphasised that the UAE had then created an inclusive anti-money 
laundering system215; however, the success of the systems in UAE are questioned due to the 
results of the assessments conducted up until 2008. However, UAE laws and regulations at the 
federal level have been changing since 2001, growing to become more compliment with FATF 
regulations and designed to establish conformed regulation throughout the country. Where some 
of the challenges have not been meet, have been more recently in application rather than in 
legislation.  
 
Much has changed since original conventions and regulations were signed and although the UAE 
has recognised, and is currently responding to, the continued challenges that are posed by 
increasingly well-resourced and organised international crime networks, the rate at which its 
systems and processes are developed, and the policing and enforcement of such networks are 
unable to keep pace with the criminal exploitation of financial sectors. Furthermore, the 
exponential development remains a challenge both at the strategic and implementation levels.216 
This was recognised as early as 1998 with the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering and 
Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU). Now considered the Financial Intelligence Unit of the UAE 
It investigates known frauds, money laundering and suspicious transactions 217 and assists the 
actions of the UAE Central Bank (UAECB) in preventing money laundering.  Furthermore, the 
FIU supports international attempts to combat money-laundering as well as the financing of 
terrorism, the fulfilment of the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1373 of 2001, 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Board Decision referenced No. 144-
(52/51).	  	  
                                                
215 Presentation of enhanced Anti-Money Laundering Policies: Temple, P. 1998. Best explains the essential 
elements of the prevention of money laundering. Securities Institute Ltd, www.securitiesinstitute.org.uk. 
216 Guy Stessens, Money laundering: a new international law enforcement model, vol 15 (Cambridge University 
Press 2000) 
217 Jackie Johnson. 'An analysis of the obligations of gambling entities under the FATF's 2003 anti-money 
laundering recommendations' (2006) 9(1) Journal of Money Laundering Control 7, pp. 7-18. 
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Swift measures were undertaken by the United Arab Emirates Central Bank (UAECB) to explore 
and freeze those accounts that belonged to individuals or organisations considered to have links 
to terrorism once established.  The AMLSCU also joined the prestigious membership of the 
Egmont Group in 2002.218 The UAE then is a signatory to many international conventions, and 
has met the standards required to join recognised international bodies, and established its own 
law enforcement units and regulations to prevent and combat money laundering, financial crimes 
and terrorism 219. This is seen with unequivocally supporting the international schemes to 
prevent money-laundering with a particular focus on those that finance terrorism, and the 
UAECB establishing a comprehensive system of anti-money laundering laws and regulations, 
and creation of the Financial Investigative Unite (FIU)220.	  
 
However, it remains to be seen whether the UAE views money laundering as seriously as its 
political profile suggests and undertaking all the measures it can to combat money laundering or 
has a paper commitment rather than practical commitment to preventing money laundering in the 
UAE. This may be a result of failure to maintain evidence of success or statistical evaluations of 
money laundering efforts for review by the FATF and other international organisations. This 
chapter is an attempt to address these issues with a brief review of the political system in the 
UAE; this is then followed by a brief explanation of the legal system in the UAE and Dubai. 
                                                
218 As identified by Johnson, Jackie, 2006. In his analysis of the obligations of gambling entities under the FATF's 
2003 anti-money laundering recommendations, Journal of Money Laundering Control. Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 7-18. 
219 Marcel Pheijffer, 'Financial investigations and criminal money' , vol 2 (MCB UP Ltd 1998) 33 
220 The new global law implementation models are presented in Guy Stessens, 2000, Money Laundering: A New 
International Law Enforcement Model, CSICL, Cambridge 
220 For more detailed understanding: Tom Sherman, on the global Efforts to be applied in Combating Money 
Laundering: The Role of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), derived from a Hume Paper on Public Policy: 
Volume 1 No 2, Edinburgh University Press, 1993, p. 13; and Alastair N. Brown, on the Proceeds of Crime-Money 
Laundering, Acts of Confiscation & Forfeiture, W. Green / Sweet & Maxwell, Edinburgh, 1996, p. 6. 
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There is then a discussion on the international reputation of the UAE and Dubai and its 
conformity to FATF, IMF recommendations and AML strategies and practice. Finally, AML 
practice in Dubai is placed into a theoretical framework(s) that helps explain its current approach 
to money laundering.       
 
3.2. The	  political	  system	  in	  UAE:	  An	  absolute	  monarchy	  
The UAE is a politically federalised structure consisting of seven emirates, with Abu Dhabi the 
capital.  There is a President, his deputy, the Supreme Council, the cabinet, the Federal National 
Council, and an independent judiciary with a federal supreme court.221 The traditional tribal 
system of governing where ‘royal’ families ruled was the basis for the establishment of the UAE 
in 1971 and continues to this day, with little open political appetite for change. Hereditary 
dynastic family rule therefore has local jurisdictional control of state apparatus but also at the 
level of national representation. Therefore, members of the ruling families occupy the most 
important positions in the political and legal systems of administration.222  
 
The Supreme Council then consists of the ‘royal’ rulers of the seven emirates representing an 
emirate but often a powerful family. Although each state - Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Fujairah, 
Ras al Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm al Qaiwain - maintains a large degree of independence, the 
UAE is governed by the Supreme Council of Rulers who appoints the prime minister and the 
cabinet.223The Supreme Council has both legislative and executive powers and thus wields 
substantial influence at the local and national level. It ratifies federal laws and decrees, plans 
policy, approves the nomination of the prime minister and accepts his resignation. It also can 
elect a president and vice-president to serve for a renewable five-year term in office. The 
                                                
221 Rebecca L. Torstrick and Elizabeth Faier, Culture and Customs of the Arab Gulf States (Abc-clio 2009) 
222 Mohammed Omran Taryam. (2011) Development of the Federal National Council in UAE.  
223Jasim Al-Ali. 'Emiratisation: drawing UAE nationals into their surging economy' (2008) 28(9/10) International 
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Supreme Council re-elected President H.H. Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan for another 
five-year term in November 2009 and will only stand down from his post upon the 
recommendation of the president.224 It needs to be noted, however, that the power or influence 
that each emirate holds is not equal. Those with the utmost wealth (mostly based on oil revenue) 
and respected family history hold-sway over national policy such as AML strategies and ‘direct’ 
the outcome of this result. 
 
The cabinet also consists of ministers drawn mainly from ‘royal’ families of the emirates.225 The 
political and social system in the UAE thus continues to retain some of its traditional values at 
formal and informal levels with little political change since 1971. The sheikhs perform dual and 
sometimes conflicting roles - they are expected to be both ‘modern’ and protect the cultural 
heritage of the UAE.226 A close examination of the workings of the federal and local political 
system, both separately and combined, underlines the UAE’s unique (in the Middle East) 
amalgamation of the traditional and modern political systems that has produced national stability 
and laid the foundation for economic development. At present, the federal system includes the 
Supreme Council, the Council of Ministers (Cabinet), a parliamentary body in the form of the 
Federal National Council (FNC) and the Federal Supreme Court, which is representative of an 
independent judiciary.227  
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The Council of Ministers, described in the Constitution as the executive authority for the 
Federation, is headed by a prime minister, chosen by the president in consultation with the 
Supreme Council.228 The prime minister, currently also the vice-president, then proposes the 
cabinet, which requires the president’s ratification. In line with the UAE’s rapid socio-economic 
developments, major steps have been taken, both at the federal and local levels, to reform the 
political system in the UAE in order to make it more responsive to the needs of its citizens, 
which are primarily Arabs, 229 with most of the population on some type of residency permit. 
Emiratis are also traditionally conservative, but the UAE is one of the most liberal regimes in the 
Gulf, with other cultures and faiths tolerated; this is especially the case in Dubai. However, 
politically the UAE remains authoritarian with an absolute monarchy. It was the only country in 
the region not to have elected bodies until 2006, when it convened a half-elected federal 
assembly, which, however, was restricted to a consultative role230 regarding political and thus 
economic decisions.  
3.2.1. The	  legal	  system	  in	  Dubai	  
Dubai's legal system is founded on the principles of profane law and is strongly influenced by 
Egyptian law and Islamic law, with Islamic and Sharia law the principle source of orientation in 
UAE law. Egyptian law, however, tends to be used for general principles of law and subsidiary 
legislation. This is the case in Dubai and other emirates. Due to the flow of international and 
regional business, Dubai and the UAE has developed and modified its system of laws. Dubai has 
its own specific internal legal codes, which were created to serve business and civil proceedings 
such as corporate law, intellectual property, labour law and business and marine laws. Many of 
these laws, however, enacted by the Ruler of Dubai are more administrative in nature than legal 
codes. 
 
                                                
228Al-Muhairi, Butti Sultan Butti Ali. 'The Development of the UAE Legal System and Unification with the 
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For the last decade, there has been an influx of international and commercial enterprises, 
primarily in Dubai. However, this is increasingly happening elsewhere in the UAE as well, as the 
‘commercial model’ employed in Dubai has resonated with emirates lacking in oil. This has 
resulted in the expansion of federal legislation and codes of AML laws, as an example. 
Furthermore, there are certain federal laws once applicable in Dubai that that are now relevant to 
all emirates; these are company law, civil procedures, maritime law, financial sector, 
immigration, and employment law. 231  In this way, Dubai is leading change through the 
implementation of regulation and standards that can increase success when applied to other 
emirates as well. In addition, the court system has recently begun implementing the arbitration 
method of handling disputes, as a result of the increase in the financial area, where this method is 
internationally used.    
 
While the Money Laundering Act 2002 and Terrorism Act 2004 are relevant to the whole of the 
UAE, the political context is of some importance as laws are increasingly national rather than at 
emirate level as the UAE has developed into a nation with a clear identity and concept of nation 
state. This is due to the need of the emirates to have a global presence and be held accountable to 
organisations such as the IMF and the FATF, where policies must be wholly unified in the region 
to meet objectives and remain compliant for international trade, banking, and cooperation. The 
political and legal system are important elements that binds a nation and it is therefore 
worthwhile to review the system of ‘making laws’ in the UAE without which there would be no 
AML strategy or practice or policing of the financial and commercial sector(s) and FTZ.  
 
3.2.2. The	  Legislature:	  The	  Supreme	  Council	  
In the UAE, the Federal Supreme Council is the constitutional and legislative body that decides 
policy and legal matters. The Federal Supreme Council performs many responsibilities such as 
formulating policy on matters of immigration, criminal justice, labour and state investment to 
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name a few; endorsing federal laws prior to their issuance, including the annual budget of the 
federation and the closing accounts; sanctioning the decrees on matters that, by virtue of the 
provisions of the constitution, are subject to the ratification and approval of the Federal Supreme 
Council; ratification of treaties and international conventions such as those relevant to money 
laundering and FATF; approving the appointment of the prime minister of the federation, 
accepting his resignation, and requesting him to resign upon the suggestion of the President of 
the Federation; approving the appointment of the president and the judges of the Supreme 
Federal Court, accepting their resignations, and dismissing them in the cases specified by the 
constitution.232  
 
Such power is in the hands of a few key individuals and family members. To illustrate this hold 
on power the Federal Supreme Council lays down its own regulations, including its procedure 
for the conduct of business and the method of voting on its resolutions. Furthermore, the 
deliberations of the Council remain secret. Resolutions of the Federal Supreme Council on 
substantive matters are made by a majority of five of its members provided that such majority 
includes the vote of the emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The minority shall abide by the 
opinion of the aforesaid majority. However, resolutions of the council on procedural matters 
shall be issued by a majority vote. Such matters are defined in the by-laws of the council. The 
Federal Supreme Council holds its sessions in the capital of the federation (Abu Dhabi); 
however, they can be held in any other place agreed on beforehand233. This legislative body has 
a secretariat consisting of a number of officials to help it in performing its duties and functions 
that the Federal cabinet and Federal National Council must follow.   
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The Federal National Council is the policy advisory board of the UAE established since 1971 
under the Provisional Constitution of the UAE. 234 It consists of 40 members with eight from 
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and six for Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah, and four for Ajman and Umm Al 
Quwain and Fujairah. In addition to this there are a further twenty are elected members of the 
National Council; these representatives are elected or nominated by Electoral College which 
consists of emirate representatives. It is also a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 
and the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union (APU).235 
 
In the past 34 years, however, there has only been 13 legislative seasons. This limited discussion 
on matters of economic development, security, and crime has undoubtedly had an impact on 
developing a consistent and strategic AML approach. During the time that laws are drafted 
and/or amendments to existing laws put forward this is sent to the holding the committees of the 
House of Representatives of the National Council and then once approved to the Cabinet for 
consideration and then approved and ratified.236 Most of these draft recommendations and 
amendments have been adopted and incorporated into UAE laws. Once passed, rather than 
before, it is claimed that the National Council undertakes its own research and collects 
information on the impact of its ‘laws’ on social and political issues. This information, however, 
is hard to obtain, and as such what information is released is no doubt been politically sanitised.   
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3.2.3. The	  role	  of	  the	  attorney	  
There is no formal civic defence system in existence in the UAE, and only the judge is entrusted 
with the responsibility for conservation of the interests of individuals that are not represented by 
counsel.237 Consequently, if an individual is faced with allegations of money laundering, there 
should be consultation with an experienced criminal defence lawyer as soon as possible. If the 
accused is considered a flight risk or the evidence is so overwhelming the Attorney General is 
then required to decide within twenty-four hours whether to accuse, release, or permit further 
limited detention, up to forty eight hours before making a decision. Numbers of people, however, 
receive prompt trials238 particular if linked to organised crime/terrorism or are of a political 
nature. This is due in part to the federal regulations regarding AML/CFT, and the FATF 
recommendations.     
 
Money laundering cases are sometimes placed into different courts depending on whether it is 
considered a criminal or civil matter. How such a decision(s) is made is unclear, perhaps to the 
current system in the UAE. For example, a case of money laundering could be examined either 
by the Sharia courts that are administered by separate emirates or by a federal civil court. 
Regardless of the court rights of due process in money laundering cases are accorded under 
mutual coordination of the two systems, with defendants warranted legal counsel.  
 
In reference to the Criminal Procedures Code approved in 1992, the accused has his or her own 
right to defence counsel, in particular in cases concerning potential sentence of death or life 
imprisonment. These cases often involve national security of the country or its moral offences239 
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and are closed to the public. Furthermore, in UAE, there are no separate courts dealing with 
national security, and military courts only deal with military personnel through a system based 
on the Western military legal principles.  
 
 
3.3. The	  Judiciary	  
The Federal judiciary in the UAE is considered independent from state control and/or influence. 
This was originally established in the by the UAE Constitution. However, due to the political 
structure mentioned above and the influence of powerful individuals and families placement of 
key ‘friends’ in state run apparatuses is a possibility. There is, however, no research on this 
matter and it is one that is in need of some attention. The judiciary in the UAE, however, consists 
of two Tribunals, the Courts of First Instance and the Federal Supreme Courts. The Federal 
Supreme Court has the President of the UAE and 5 judges, who are appointed by the governors 
of the Federal Supreme Council240. All judges shall be considered members of the President of 
the Supreme Court independent from the legislative and executive power. In theory at least, this 
offers judges the power to impose law and order in the UAE, and once approved in post the 
constitution prevents judges removed or forced out of office.  
 
There are, however, slight differences within some of the emirates regarding court structure (i.e., 
in Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah). In Dubai the court system consists of the Court of First Instance, 
the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation.241 Dubai has this retained its own self-governing 
courts (and judges), which are not part of the federal judicial influence of the UAE. Dubai Courts 
will follow corporate or civil law federal law, as well as the laws and decrees enacted by the 
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Ruler of Dubai, where federal law is absent or silent.242 In each of these courts all issues that fall 
within the Emirate of Dubai is divided into the Civilian Division, Criminal Division and Division 
of Islamic law. 243 The civil and criminal court systems are similar to that of the United 
Kingdom and deal with similar issues. The court of Islamic Affairs handles family matters of 
marriage, divorce and inheritance. Furthermore, this court is that which decides on matters of 
‘respect’ in Dubai, and as such non-Muslims are bound by this court and its ‘standards’ while 
living in Dubai. There are other ‘minor’ courts, specialising in disputes arising between 
employers and workers and property ownership. 
 
There is no jury system in Dubai. Matters come before one or more judges, depending on the 
specialisation of knowledge required; and unlike in some western jurisdictions, there is no 
system of precedent in Dubai or the UAE. However, judgments of several upper courts are 
published, not because they are binding on lower courts, but in order to deliver useful evidence 
of future judicial understanding and practice. It should also be well known that the Dubai courts 
conduct themselves in Arabic and so legal representation not only requires legal advocates who 
are properly licensed to appear before the courts, but also requires that they are conversant in 
Arabic. 
 
3.4. The	  international	  political	  view	  of	  AML	  prevention	  in	  Dubai	  	  	  	  	  
Due to the increased national and international concern regarding money laundering, the UAE 
took a keen interest in prohibiting all actions that resulted in money laundering, including, where 
possible, the Hawala system244. Putting in place firm measures to prevent money laundering and 
dubious transactions the UAE claimed it was unequivocally committed to preventing money 
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laundering, and particularly that which lead to terrorism245. This has lent the UAE some 
international political credibility and credit since such measures were employed to prevent 
terrorism. The UAE has further conducted a number of meetings, conferences as well as 
seminars in strengthening its efforts to ‘upgrade’ its approach to combat money-laundering.246 
The UAE’s approach therefore is one that the international community would welcome not only 
to control financial crime, but also to prevent funds for terrorism and organised crime in concert 
with the international code of conduct247. In addition, addressing the Hawala system was an 
important aspect of international concern, and the UAE has begun requiring that Hawala be both 
licensed and consistent with the reporting requirements of financial institutions, particularly in 
the area of suspected criminal activity or money laundering.  
 
However, although a number of eminent financial institutions have offices in Dubai, it still 
maintains a rather dubious reputation as a place that is “not so much awash with vast oil wealth 
but built on a toxic tide of illicit cash: a place where Russian mafia and cartels clean their dirty 
cash and al-Qaida finances terror atrocities.”248 Intelligence from the US supports this; the US 
State Department 2013 Narcotic Control Strategy Report noted that the UAE is the main 
transportation and trading hub for the Persian Gulf States, East Africa, and East Asia.249 The 
constant flow of people, products and money to the region leaves it vulnerable to laundering, 
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particularly due to its position as an international banking and trading centre and the vast number 
of expatriates who amount up to 85% of the total population of Dubai, and who send money back 
to their places of origin.250 Public perception in Dubai is that mostly non-UAE ethnic organised 
crime organisations are guilty of money laundering. This view, however, is not one particular to 
the UAE, as at times volatile anti-immigration sentiment, combined with support for nationalist 
political views, is an international matter with examples in the EU and elsewhere. Financial fraud 
is one of the key international economic issues with sluggish economic growth and/or stagnation 
in the EU and elsewhere. With the movement of people, and potential criminal threats, the EU 
has increased its efforts to prevent money laundering251.  
 
Similar to Dubai then, laws are passed; however, it is the political will to recognise and then 
tackle all white collar crime 252 which is needed.  In particular Dubai has a number of 
vulnerabilities, and one of these is its role as a port, which makes customs and the checking on 
the influx and outflow of visitors difficult. Organized crime is not recognized as a challenge for 
the UAE, or for Dubai; however, measurements of this type of activity are limited and literature 
regarding crime organisations in these areas are non-existent. The UAE’s proximity to conflict 
zones in West Africa also adds to its vulnerability, due in part to the political instability and drug 
trafficking of these areas. In addition to the traditional, informal money-transfer network, which 
is at risk, is also that of Hawala, which remains unreformed,253 with the most notable money 
lenders from Somalia, who have established clearing houses, which are not registered with the 
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UAE.254 Regulation has become a strong concern regarding Hawala, and the UAE has been 
working diligently to develop this through requirements of registration and reporting.  
 
Furthermore, a senior member of the Dubai Centre of Commerce has openly admitted that it is 
well known that Dubai is a centre for the laundering of cash from the trade in Afghan heroin.255 
US intelligence supports this, noting that a significant portions of money laundering and terrorist 
financing in the UAE is directly related to the proceeds of heroin production from South West 
Asia, and drug traffickers from Afghanistan are attracted to the vulnerabilities of the UAE.256 
Some of the difficulties in addressing these problems is the ease of entrance into parts of the 
UAE, specifically for Dubai, due to the need for access by numerous businesses.  
 
The UAE’s offshore financial centre is in Dubai, and there are thirty eight free trade zones, with 
organisations, which are located in the zones considered as legally offshore.257  While offshore 
havens may be viewed with suspicion, characterised by tax evasion, anonymity, and lack of 
transparency and inability to trace assets, it is suggested that as a ‘safe route’ for laundered 
money, they play a ‘drain actor’ position which acts as a ‘security shield’ for developing 
nations.258 Indeed, although the UAE government has implemented some AML legislation, it 
may have no real intention of eradicating it, as ‘the place is built on it….it’s a commercial port. 
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There’s a free trade zone. That’s what made its livelihood.’259 The difficulty is creating control 
without imposing unnecessary controls on the success of businesses, which are necessary for the 
country to be successful. Dubai, as a financial hub, must manage this balance between control 
and organisational freedom carefully to prevent extensive harm to the economy. 
 
Following a report in 1998, FATF and Middle East and North African Task Force has analysed a 
number of vulnerabilities in the UAE and Dubai, which makes it attractive place to launder 
funds260 The last Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism was produced in 2008 by the FATF, and it pinpointed a number of 
weaknesses within Dubai’s financial system. The report stated that the enforcement of cash 
declarations is weak, and there are significant areas of concern to the ‘cash movements and 
inward wire transfers’ with a complete lack of recognition by the authorities as to the extent to 
which overseas criminals utilise these financial services. 261  There is also a much lower 
submission of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR) than there ought to be in a region where so 
much wealth is banked.262 This is the same difficulty with managing Hawala, but also denotes a 
concern that legislation is not enforced or enforceable.  
 
In line with 35-40 FATF recommendations, the UAE conformed to only 17 of the 
recommendations although the United Kingdom, on which it draws so much of the legislation, 
conformed to 29 of the recommendations). It is expected that the UAE will comply with these 
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recommendations according to FATF and address issues outstanding263. However, no timeline is 
forthcoming for these recommendations to be reached. In addition, further assessment has not 
been completed, and while a quasi-assessment is conducted here (see chapter seven), official 
assessment would provide the UAE with new goals and assist in recognizing how improvements 
could be made for the success of AML in the future.   
 
Furthermore, the UAE has failed to completely conform to the nine special core special 
recommendations by FATF; these entail STR reporting. Moreover, the UAE has only partially 
conformed with the key recommendations such as implementing the 1999 UN International 
Convention on the suppressing the funding of terrorism and imposing effective laws for 
confiscation and freezing funds used for terrorism264. While MENA FATF has been created to 
assist the countries of the Middle East and North Africa in becoming more compliant and 
successful in meeting the requirements of FATF recommendations, formal assessments on the 
UAE have not been completed since 2008.   
 
The political and practical implications for non-compliance with FATF recommendations is that 
the UAE will lose its credibility as a safe haven to deposit legal funds in and at the same time 
potentially attracting criminal/terrorism organisations/cells to channel funds via UAE financial 
sector. Therefore, it is necessary for UAE to put in place necessary measures with an aim of 
addressing these deficiencies and put more effort in ensuring that AML is implemented 
effectively in accordance with FATF recommendations. Furthermore, a country that is non-
compliant with FATF recommendations has negative impacts on the credibility of the nation but 
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also its relationship to conduct business with financial sectors and nations elsewhere in the 
world.265   
 
Moreover, there are particular practical implications for non-compliance; with the aim of 
protecting interests and minimising financial and reputational risks, compliant nations and 
financial sectors (i.e., in the United Kingdom) are likely to impose demanding assurances and/or 
fines, if caught breaching regulations, before dealing with those that are non-compliant and 
discouraging trade and relationships with various international organisations such as 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 266. For example, the Financial Services 
Authority in the United Kingdom fined Habib Bank AG Zurich for its failure to establish and 
maintain adequate anti- money-laundering controls.267 Despite this recent prosecution there is a 
suspicion that this will not change practice in Dubai, as the fine of £525,000 of Habib Bank of 
£525,000 by the FSA268 is a pitiful amount, hardly indicating the serious of the breach. IN saying 
tis, however, Richard Brooks, a former tax inspector responsible for corporate tax avoidance has 
described London as ‘the global capital of money laundering,’ and asserts that UK banks are 
awash with dirty money.269 Indeed, Britain’s largest bank, HSBC, was recently denounced by 
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the US Senate Committee for its key role in the facilitation of money laundering operations for 
Mexican drug cartels270 with Coutts and Co., the wealth division of the Royal Bank of Scotland, 
handed the UK’s largest ever fine for its failure to conduct due diligence on mainly foreign 
clients who were politically sensitive and engaged in corruption.271 The IMF emphasised that 
money laundering and terrorism undermine the integrity and stability of the financial institutions 
and discourages foreign investments 272 and can cause the distortion of the international capital 
flows; in addition, in 2009, the G20 Working Group on Reinforcing International Cooperation 
and Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets claimed that nations needed to implement 
measures that provide protection to the international financial system to avoid the risk of 
involvement in illicit financial transactions and systems. This, however, is only one part of the 
problem, as those nations that fail to conform to recommendations are unable to provide 
international law enforcement with essential information such as customer identification, records 
on transactions and tracing the origins of transacted funds273. 
 
In order to improve upon FATF compliance by countries in the Middle East and North Africa, 
whose compliance ratings are substantially lower than most of the world, according the Basel 
AML Index, a separate FATF named the MENAFATF was formed. MENAFATF includes 18 
countries in this region, including the UAE, where the goal is to increase the compliance and 
implementation of the 40 recommendations of the FATF to increase AML success in these 
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areas274. In addition, the separation of this division improves upon the ability of the countries to 
work together in more areas where overlapping occurs in the illegal activities that are 
problematic for control, specifically in the case of drugs or terrorism, where illegal transference 
of money may occur over borders275. Also where the ability to validate information has 
traditional been challenging due to a lack of standardization or accountable departments for 
review of papers declared to represent legality in different situations, such as money or goods 
transfers and transportation. 
 
The primary objectives of MENAFATF include: 
• Adoption and implementation of the: 
o 40 recommendations as identified by the FATF for AML, 
o Special Recommendations of the FATF against terrorism financing, 
• To cooperate effectively between the member countries to meet the compliance standards 
and improve the MENA region through international cooperation and increased 
compliance with international standards, 
• To establish relationships that identify and reduce the presence of the money laundering 
and terrorism financing within the MENA region. 
• Build effective and productive relationships in the region, which do not disrupt or 
disvalue the cultural values, legal systems, or constitutional frameworks of the other 
member countries276.  
In addition, MENAFATF has observers that assist the processes and development of these 
countries in meeting their goals and objectives, which include the Arab Monetary Fund, FATF, 
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International Monetary Fund, United Nations, World Bank, and other organisations or countries 
from around the world. The improvement of compliance is an economic need of all of these 
countries, including for Dubai.  
 
A problem for nations currently having a poor AML reputation, which demonstrates a failure to 
meet the FATF compliance, or to maintain the arrangements of the MENAFATF, is the 
withdrawal of foreign investment.  Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) illustrated that corruption results not 
only in a reduction in FDI, but also in a change in the composition of country of origin of FDI277. 
Research on the relationship between host-country corruption and FDI has found a negative 
relationship278. However, not all studies have produced these results279. In fact, Henisz (2000) 
discovered that for US firms, corruption tends not to affect investments, and in some cases it 
increases, the probability of investing in the foreign country. Even with high levels of corruption, 
such as China or Nigeria, organisations are willing to invest.280 It is therefore clear than not all 
investors are concerned about where, with whom and when to invest. Although money 
laundering issues might have a negative impact on FDI because of the additional uncertainty and 
costs, due to corrupt practices, the cost can vary depending on the country of origin of the FDI. 
Not all investors, however, are equal. The sensitivity of FDI in a state that is seen as corrupt is 
likely to vary, with the country of origin of the FDI.  
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Those nations such as the United Kingdom that have implemented laws to prevent corruption 
such as acts of bribery are expected to increase the cost of engaging in bribery abroad for 
investors/organisations.  During the time that the US passed the FCPA in 1977 in an effort to 
clean up the image of US firms and use of bribery it was not explicit in not penalizing ‘grease 
payments’, or payments to foreign officials to expedite processes that would otherwise occur 
without a bribe. Furthermore, it is not clear that the FCPA has been effective in stopping US 
organisations investing in corrupt states. Hines (1995) provided evidence for a deterrence effect 
from US firms281 while Wei (2000a) found no such evidence282. As Cuervo-Cazura (2006) 
noted, there are two possible explanations for these conflicting results; one is that US 
organisations had an incentive to bypass the FCPA to avoid losing competitiveness in the 
allocation of contracts abroad and that the US was not forceful in prosecuting bribery abroad, 
especially in ‘friendly’ but corrupt nations283. 
 
Legislation, conventions, national and international laws, however, will not prevent investment 
in corrupt states, in particular from those that are seen as corrupt. Organisations that ‘do 
business’ in corrupt environments, where the payment of bribes is a normal way of ‘doing 
business’ continues to invest in search of profits and launder illegal funds without fear of 
repercussions. Therefore, FDI from states with high corruption may not only be undeterred by 
corruption, but may even be attracted by it and launder personal and states funds.  
 
This notion builds on the incremental internationalisation process or Uppsala model284. This 
model explains the selection of states in which to invest based on the concept of ‘psychic 
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282 Shang-Jin Wei. 'How taxing is corruption on international investors?' (2000) 82(1) Rev Econ Stat 1 
283 Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, 'Who cares about corruption?' , vol 37 (Nature Publishing Group 2006) 807 
284 Jan Johanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne. 'The internationalization process of the firm-a model of knowledge 
development and increasing foreign market commitments' (1977) ibid23 
 95 
distance’ between the home and host 285. Psychic distance is the difference between states in 
terms of language, culture, education, business practices, industrial development, and 
regulations, all of which may limit the transfer of information. This distance reduces the ability 
of the firm, and particularly of its managers, to understand foreign information. As a result, the 
firm first expands into those geographical/socially close to the host country in terms of psychic 
distance, and only later enters those that are more distant. Furthermore, as illustrated by Cuervo-
Cazura, 2006 there is little evidence to suggest that the majority of FDI of OECD nations, which 
represent the world’s highest income is invested in OECD nations, meanwhile the majority of 
FDI from low-income nations is invested in low-income nations. FDI then is not straightforward; 
money laundering, therefore, has an unequal impact depending on a range of circumstances286. 
 
Success in preventing money laundering is based on five themes, namely building a legal 
framework, and building a financial system regulatory or financial management, intelligence and 
ability to implement the legal provisions, and lawsuits, and raising the parliamentary 
proceedings. The FATF for its part, after the September 11, 2001, suggested nine 
recommendations for preventing the financing of terrorism, the most important of which is a 
comprehensive legal framework regulating efforts to prevent money laundering and the 
establishment of the institutional framework. 
  
The factors affecting this compliance, however, presuppose the existence of advanced 
technology and ‘sound’ structure of governance of the financial sectors and appropriate 
infrastructure established287 to ‘police’, monitor and punish, if needed, those that breach codes of 
conduct and break laws. Corporate governance is a creation of western states which  depends on 
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‘modern’ existence of developed procedures and policies, ethical standards, audit capacity and 
capability and appropriate resources. Developing states, such as Dubai, do not have the historical 
antecedents that many in the west do (i.e., United Kingdom) and as such are still at the stage of 
developing and progressing towards the required level of supervision expected of the financial 
sector in western states288. 
 
The FATF report also criticised the low number of staff allocated to the AML unit of the UAE 
Central Bank, with confusion between what is an ‘unusual’ and what is a ‘suspicious’ 
transaction,  in addition to which there is ‘no indication of whether institutions are expected to 
apply a subjective or objective test to suspicion.’289 This is a criticism of the UAE’s inadequate 
legal framework for banks to identify and deal with money laundering, suggesting that there is a 
lack of emphasis on due diligence checks for bank customers (see chapter six), with the same 
criticism levelled at lawyers and accountants required to carry out due diligence checks on their 
customers.290  
 
The regulations concerning tipping off in the UAE are also worrying as not only are the 
provisions rather narrow, but it would appear that financial institutions are able to notify 
customers of their suspicions, thereby warning them of any potential investigations291. Other 
problems with the AML legal framework in the UAE include variation of standards concerning 
the real identification of owners and beneficiaries of companies292, as well as record keeping 
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provisions of the securities and insurance sectors, which are subject to even less demanding 
regulation and oversight than the banking sector.293 
 
3.5. Money	   laundering	   as	   an	   act	   of	   corruption:	   Placing	   AML	   in	   Dubai	   into	   a	   theoretical	  
framework	  	  	  	  
It has been suggested that corruption can have a positive impact on investment in states that have 
excessive regulation294. More commonly it is claimed that corruption is an inefficient allocation 
of resources295. These two approaches are referred to as the “grease the wheels” advocated by 
Leff296 and the ‘sand in wheels’ hypothesis supported by Myrdal297.  These are reviewed below, 
and while they focus predominantly on corruption, money laundering is seen as a corrupt act, 
and as such they are useful frameworks, on which to analyse this type of corruption. 
 
3.5.1. ‘Grease	  the	  wheels’	  
This approach suggests that an inefficient bureaucracy is a major impediment to economic 
activity and that some ‘speed’ or ‘grease’ money is needed to help circumvent the problem. Lui 
(1985) offered a formal illustration of this and showed that acts of corruption may be an efficient 
way of reducing the time, cost of queues or bureaucratic blockages and thereby improving 
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economic efficiency298. Indeed, this approach suggests that corruption is beneficial in states 
where other aspects of governance are defective, but is damaging elsewhere; it is not suggesting 
that corruption and/or laundering the proceeds crime will increase economic development 
everywhere. Therefore, the observation is that such an act is a potential stimulus of economic 
performance in those states whose institutional frameworks are ineffective299. 
 
There are different ways, however, in which it is thought such acts can increase bureaucratic 
inefficiency.  First, bureaucratic inefficiency that can be compensated for through the range of 
corrupt acts is slowness. Leys (1965) stressed that bribes might offer bureaucrats an incentive to 
quickly process the establishment of new firms in an otherwise sluggish administration300. Lui 
(1985) later adopted the same approach and showed in a formal model that this could efficiently 
reduce time spent queuing for ‘services’301. In addition Bailey (1966) claimed that all corruption 
has the potential to amend a bureaucracy by improving the quality of its civil servants i.e., if 
wages are low but perks are available, it may attract able civil servants who would otherwise 
have opted for another line of business302. Even more so Leff (1964) and Bailey (1966) argued 
that such acts might simply be a hedge against bad public policies303. The civil servants in 
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Dubai, however, are UAE citizens and handsomely paid. In this sense then the slowness of 
bureaucratic procedures (if considered slow), are not a possible consideration in the UAE.      
 
Furthermore, Ehrlich and Lui (1999) argue that autocratic regimes, which are able to steer the 
administration in a centralised way, and maximise their rents but will also internalise the 
deadweight loss associated with corruption304. These regimes therefore have incentives to avoid 
impairing the productivity of the private sector due to personal aggrandizement. Such incentives, 
however, do not exist in more decentralized regimes, where no bureaucrat views the harmful 
effect of bribes on productivity. If this is the case then, it is possible to suggest that corrupt acts, 
provides an incentive to implement better procedures in autocratic regimes but not in democratic 
regimes. If ‘all matters are equal’, it is therefore beneficial in states that are less democratic (see 
earlier on for outline of UAE/Dubai political system).  
 
Olson (1993) similarly put forward the view that a corrupt autocrat may have an incentive to 
implement policies conducive to growth and development and in fact seize assets for further 
personal profit and then launder them305. Moreover, it has also been reasoned that laundered 
funds may in some circumstances improve the quality of investments. As Leff (1964) pointed out 
if corruption is a means of tax evasion, it can reduce the revenue of public taxes and, provided 
that sufficient investment avenues are available elsewhere, improve the overall efficiency of 
investment306.  
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This notion of efficiency has been extended to offering bribes (Bailey, 1966) and referred to as a 
similar exercise to a competitive auction 307 . Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986) 
subsequently showed that corruption replicates the outcome of a competitive auction aimed at 
assigning a state procurement contract because the ranking of bribes replicates the ranking of 
firms by efficiency. All the above views share the presumption that corruption may contribute 
positively to productivity if a country is endowed with set factors because it compensates for the 
consequences of a defective institutional framework, such as an inefficient administration, a 
weak rule of law, or political violence. Corruption, however, also has its drawbacks 308.  
 
3.5.2. ‘Sand	  in	  the	  wheels’	  
The ‘sand the wheels’ hypothesis emphasizes that some of the costs of corruption may appear or 
be magnified precisely in a weak institutional context. For instance, the claim that corrupt acts 
speed up an otherwise sluggish bureaucracy is flawed. Myrdal (1968) claims that corrupt civil 
servants may cause delays for other reasons than a bribe309. However, Kurer (1993) suggests that 
corrupt officials have an incentive to create distortions in the economy to preserve their illegal 
source of income, which can be laundered nationally or internationally, depending on 
circumstances (i.e., civil war,). They stress, however, that nothing is gained from corruption at 
the aggregate level, and the person to secure a contract with bribery is not necessarily the most 
efficient. However, the bribe will still need to be laundered is some way or another310.  In 
auctions where the profitability of a license is uncertain, the winning bid may simply reflect the 
more optimistic rather than corrupt. As Rose-Ackerman (1997) illustrated the person paying the 
highest bribe may simply be the one most willing to compromise on the quality of the goods they 
will produce if getting the license. Under these circumstances, corruption will simply reduce 
                                                
307 ibid 
308 Da-Hsiang Donald Lien. 'Corruption and allocation efficiency' (1990) 33(1) J Dev Econ 153 
309 Gunnar Myrdal. 'Asian drama, an inquiry into the poverty of nations.' (1968) Asian drama, an inquiry into the 
poverty of nations.  
310 Oskar Kurer. 'Clientelism, corruption, and the allocation of resources' (1993) 77(2) Public Choice 259 
 101 
rather than improve efficiency311. The contention that corrupt acts may raise the quality of 
investment is therefore questionable. Mauro (1998) observes that corrupt acts results in a 
diversion of public spending toward less efficient allocations. Corruption, therefore, results in 
public investment in unproductive sectors, which is unlikely to improve efficiency or result in 
faster economic growth, but can hide laundered funds if necessary312. 
 
It is also doubtful that corrupt acts serve as a hedge in a politically uncertain environment. 
Money laundering is not a simple transaction. Furthermore, increased uncertainty due to 
corruption may affect the rest of economy. For example, corruption is associated with a shadow 
economy and since transactions in the shadow economy are by definition unregulated, they are 
therefore subject to even more uncertainty than official transactions, but most of all we could 
also add that corruption also impacts on economic performance by weakening the rest of the 
institutional framework 313 . Since corruption and capital account restrictions are mutually 
reinforcing corruption it would lead to a more hostile regulatory framework, which would in turn 
further encourage corruption and more laundered funds. 
 
Consequently, as Bardhan (1997) points out, the inherent uncertainty of corruption may simply 
make the claimed economic efficiency in ‘greasing the wheels’ of commerce described above 
ineffective. Such an environment might provide an incentive to invest in universal capital, as 
opposed to specific capital, which can easily be reallocated but is also less productive. As a 
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result, corruption may worsen the impact of political violence or a weak rule of law on the 
quality of investment instead of reducing it314. 
 
The ‘grease the wheels’ approach is also unpopular with international organisations like the IMF 
or the OECD that view corruption as a major hindrance to worldwide economic development. As 
a result, international initiatives such as Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD, 1999) and UN Convention Against 
Corruption (UN, 2003) that pursue a strand of empirical literature aimed at quantifying the 
consequences of corruption, pioneered by Mauro (1995)315 who observed a significant negative 
relationship between corruption and investment. These results where later confirmed by Wei 
(2000)316 and Lambsdorff (2003)317. 
 
Both the ‘grease the wheels’ and the ‘sand the wheels’ approaches are useful on an abstract 
level318. The two approaches, however, predict that an increase in corruption will reduce efficacy 
in an otherwise efficient institutional context. They differ, however, in the expected impact of 
corrupt acts have in a deficient institutional context; the ‘grease the wheels’ approach predicts 
that corruption may raise efficiency, while ‘the sand the wheels’ approach predicts that an 
increase in corruption will reduce efficiency, even in a deficient institutional context. This 
institutional context is important as inadequate and ineffective organisational response to money 
laundering regardless of numerous laws has the potential to encourage money laundering in a 
national and international context. 
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3.6. FATF	  Recommendations	  UAE	  
International regulations of AML standards are established by the FATF and implemented based 
on recommendations, which are evaluated by the FATF and form recommendations for 
countries. In the case of the UAE, the most recent assessment available is the 2008 assessment, 
made available by the MENAFATF319. 
This includes the 40 + 9 recommendations, which were also recently used by OECD FATF 
assessments and the factors include: 
1. Money laundering offense 
2. Money laundering offense – mental element and corporate liability 
3. Confiscation and provisional measures 
4. Secrecy laws consistent with the recommendations 
5. Customer due diligence 
6. Politically exposed persons 
7. Correspondent banking 
8. New technologies & non face-to-face business 
9. Third parties and introducers 
10. Record-Keeping 
11. Unusual transactions 
12. DNFBP – R.5, 6, 8 – 11 
13. Suspicious transaction reporting 
14. Protection & no tipping-off 
15. Internal controls, compliance, & audit 
16. DNFBP – R.13 – 15 & 21 
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17. Sanctions 
18. Shell banks 
19. Other forms of reporting 
20. Other NFBP & secure transaction techniques 
21. Special attention for higher risk countries 
22. Foreign branches & subsidiaries 
23. Regulation, supervision & monitoring 
24. DNFBP – regulation, supervision and monitoring 
25. Guidelines & feedback 
26. The Financial Intelligence Unit 
27. Law enforcement authorities 
28. Powers of competent authorities 
29. Supervisors 
30. Resources, integrity and training 
31. National co-operation 
32. Statistics 
33. Legal persons – beneficial owners 
34. Legal arrangements – beneficial owners 
35. Conventions 
36. Mutual legal assistance (MLA) 
37. Dual criminality 
38. MLA on confiscation and freezing 
39. Extradition 
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40. Other forms of co-operation320 
41. Implement UN instruments 
42. Criminalize terrorist financing 
43. Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets 
44. Suspicious transaction reporting 
45. International co-operation 
46. AML/CFT requirements for money/value transfer services 
47. Wire transfer rules 
48. Non-profit organisations 
49. Cross-border declaration & disclosure 321 
During this assessment, many of the current laws were not in effect; however, a quasi-assessment 
is completed in Chapter 7 of this study, to address these changes. According to the 2008 
assessment, UAE was found to be noncompliant in 11 areas, partially compliant in 18 areas, 
largely compliant in 15 areas, and only five areas were found to be compliant322. 
 
The assessment was developed using materials gathered from February 28 to March 15, 2007, 
and does not reflect legislation and regulation implemented after this time. In addition, the 
materials gathered for the assessment were not able to be supported by the statistics that can be 
gathered from some other countries, due to the lack of availability or the lack completeness in 
                                                
320  FATF International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf 
321  End of year gift to readers: OECD FATF country ratings as an excel file. Retrieved from 
https://financialsecrecymediamonitor.wordpress.com/2013/12/30/end-of-year-gift-to-readers-oecd-fatf-country-
ratings-as-an-excel-file/ 
322 Mutual Evaluation Report, MENAFATF, p. 151 – 158. 
 106 
their delivery to the assessors. In the report, the assessors noted that overall the UAE enjoys very 
low crime rates as compared to most of the rest of the world, but that challenges of maintaining 
control of growing financial markets requires that a focus be placed on meeting the needs of that 
market to prevent the crime that often is included in this type of growth. Notable is other 
literature, which identifies that money laundering is very likely to occur when financial crimes 
enforcement is not strictly maintained or supported by legislation 323 or when the international 
growth of the country is beyond the ability of the enforcement agencies to monitor and enables 
errors to go uncontrolled324.  
 
Recommendations and comments were developed for all of the areas identified by the assessors. 
The ratings included credit to Dubai, for advanced approaches to managing AML/CFT 
regulations and developing specific methods for addressing these concerns in the growing 
financial market; however, the assessors also noted that legislation improvements were necessary 
for continued success and growth in these areas. In addition, much of the current legislation 
during the assessment was not specific in addressing issues such as punishment for crimes, clear 
definition of the crimes, and methods that enable people to safely report that suspicious activities 
have occurred. Some changes have occurred since this assessment, in regards to the legislation 
and regulations, both in the UAE and in Dubai, to improve on the wording of these laws and add 
new legislation and regulation as recommended.  
 
In addition, implementation was a concern that the assessors noted, such as implementation of 
the legal restrictions or in prosecutions, while assessors noted that much of the area experienced 
very low crime levels, it was also noted in research that an informal economy is in existence, 
which does not include only Hawala. In the case of the informal economy, it is noted that the 
UAE does have difficulty with employment equality, which has increased the social factors that 
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encourage both formal and informal domestic and care work, but also informal sex work325. In 
addition, research in 2009 noted that the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
was concerned with the growing alcohol and drug problems in the Middle East, including 
suggesting that the rise in substance abuse in the Arabian Gulf region was unsupported by 
successful models of treatment326. In the case of the UAE, it is perceived the rapid growth in this 
area can likely be tribute to the rapid growth of the financial market and increased number of 
both foreign visitors and non-nationals entering the country for work. Due to the growth in 
human trafficking in both the UAE and in Dubai327, it is likely that more work must be done to 
implement a stronger law enforcement agency in many areas of the country, including financial 
and other criminal activity areas. 
  
Criminalization of AML/CFT offences was present in the 2008 assessment, and identifies that 
the legislation needed more work at this time. While research suggests that the largest risks of 
terrorism is directly related to the maritime activities, particularly because of its size328. 
However, this particular risk is not identified in the assessment, though it is noted that there 
needs to be more support for customs, due to the lack of power the customs authority had 
regarding investigative measures329. While the UAE has implemented a variety of different 
offices to manage the requirements of the legislation regarding AML/CFT, some of the difficulty 
that is identified is the standardization regarding investigation powers, implementation between 
emirates, and that these agencies are still newly formed. This assessment was conducted during 
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the first years of much of these implementations, which suggests that some changes have 
occurred since this time. 
 
Law enforcement was noted as having limited access to the investigative information and tools 
necessary in aiding the FIU to accomplish goals. In addition, the assessment noted that public 
awareness campaigns, as well as outreach programs, were limited and would improve upon the 
ability of both law enforcement and FIUs to be successful in gaining information regarding 
current suspicious activities. In addition, access to suspicious transactions reports appeared to be 
limited, which restricts the ability to acquire information during investigations in other criminal 
areas that may be related to these types of offences, or in addressing concerns reported. The 
assessors recommended that a database be implemented for improving this type of access. 
 
In the case of other investigative measures, it was found that there were authoritative powers to 
obtain information using “investigative techniques including telecommunications interception, 
listening devices, controlled deliveries, physical and electronic surveillance, and the use of 
undercover officers”330 . However, the ability to obtain this required that at least verbal 
permission be obtained, and statistics of its use were limited and did not demonstrate the 
expected use that might be found for a financial hub of the size located in UAE. These problems 
were similar throughout the documentation from the assessment, as statistical evidence of 
implementation was either largely missing or incomplete, and in cases where the evidence 
existed, it did not demonstrate the expected number that are typical for a country operating with 
the size financial market established in the UAE.  
 
The primary considerations of the assessment is in addressing the areas requiring the most 
change, which were identified as the noncompliant areas, including customer due diligence, 
politically exposed persons, correspondent banking, DNFBP areas, suspicious transaction 
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reporting, AML/CFT requirements for money/value transfer services, wire transfer rules, and 
cash border declaration and disclosure. These aspects are not widely studied in other research, 
and legislation has been adapted since this time to bring it more into compliance with the 
requirements. However, other considerations still exist, in that areas of guidance and 
harmonization have not necessarily been completely implemented and represent areas of 
deficiency, which are identified as resulting in a failure to meet the full compliance necessary for 
the best scores in these areas. 
 
Customer due diligence issues identified required that the UAE focus on adapting legislation that 
better embeds the requirements of the FATF into the documentation, and that these documents 
include full detailed provisions that identify all the necessary elements. In addition, the 
provisions regarding politically exposed persons and correspondent banking relationships were 
limited, and required additional attention to be brought into compliance. Finally, the 
recommendations insisted that it was necessary to build standardization between emirates, 
increase the ability to investigate these areas, provide regulation for institutions as well as 
DNFBPs, and to create communications that provide awareness to the population using financial 
services or conducting financial activity within the country.  
 
The recommendations also noted that areas of improvement required included the reporting, 
strategic management of areas such as cross border transportation of cash, provisions for risk 
assessments, definition of authority roles, and requirements of institutions to have formal 
procedures. Other considerations were that increases and clarification was required in the 
supervisory and oversight systems for competent authorities, in the areas of duties, powers, roles, 
and functions. Finally, the recommendations suggested that improvement be made the processes 
and systems in place, as well as legislation, which enable the UAE to work cooperatively with 
other countries in addressing or investigation AML/CFT issues.  
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3.7. Conclusion	  	  
This chapter has illustrated that the UAE is in need of updating its AML approach. The political 
and legal system, which is closely intertwined, regardless of the appearance of independence 
might be a contributory factor to the slowness with which AML strategy has developed. While 
much progress has occurred since 2000, in UAE legislation and regulation, the application of 
FATF recommendations has not met the standards expected. These factors may be due to the 
need to remain effective in attracting organisations or may be due to the inability to apply the 
missing elements effectively throughout the country, possibly as a lack of uniformity between 
emirates. However, regardless of the factors, the reputational risk is significant. International 
investments which contribute to the economic development of the UAE might seek financial 
centres elsewhere in the world. In turn, a limited AML strategy might be attractive to many 
criminal organisations which seek to launder illegal funds. This ‘defect in the system’ and/or 
practice can undermined confidence in the country, and it is difficult for the state to reform its 
system without incurring political, social, financial and reputational costs to correct this 
imbalance.331 In addition, there is some explanatory value in attempting to place money 
laundering into theoretical frameworks where a discussion of corruption and vested interests 
illustrated that money laundering is seen as a benefit and also a brake on economic development 
and success. Finally, the FATF Assessment from the MENAFATF, in 2008, was included to 
demonstrate the current views of the AML/CFT regulation and implementation within the 
country. In the following chapter we focus on the political context in which AML legislation has 
developed in the UAE. 
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Chapter	  Four	  
Methodological	  approach	  and	  limitations	  
4.1. Negotiating	  access	  
It is customary for discussions of research to consider the relationships between different phases 
of the research project. These are presented in terms of the research design, which, it is argued 
should precede all social research332 ; the reality is different. Rather than view social research as 
a linear model, social research is often more complex requiring some reflection on the part of the 
researcher at different stages of the project. In this case this research project is no different.  
 
Gaining access is an essential phase in the research process; it is prerequisite, a precondition for 
the research to be conducted. It further influences the reliability and validity of the data obtained. 
The numerous points of contact – gatekeeper, respondents and supervisor(s) – affect the 
collection of data and subsequent perspective on money laundering in the UAE is portrayed. 
Finally, the negotiated activities - access, content of interview schedule - that are part of the 
research process influence they ways in which those that are involved define the parameters of 
the project and role of the researcher. The key issues involved then in this section are initial 
contacts, gatekeeper(s), ethical issues, and development of the research project and potential 
obstacles. These are all considered below.                
                                                                
In keeping with social research this project is about more than ‘a question of neat procedures’ 
333but a social process of interaction between the researcher and respondents, which influence 
this outcome of this research. This is compounded by working in the UAE that has no historical 
                                                
332 Robert G. Burgess. 'Conversations with a purpose: the ethnographic interview in educational research' (1988) 
1(1) Studies in qualitative methodology 137 
333 ibid 
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social science research methods practice of its own to draw on. The project is this defined and 
redefined while keeping the core element of the research project mind. Nowhere is this 
negotiation of research more apparent than in trying to secure access – directly or via a 
gatekeeper - to people to interview. This is further compounded when working in the UAE in an 
environment where key, important people in the financial sector and law enforcement are not use 
to having requests made to them for an interview for a research project, and particularly one as 
sensitive as money laundering in the UAE. Research is thus not merely the translation from one 
set of techniques from one social situation to another, and this is highlighted in this original piece 
of research in the UAE.  
A note of caution or perhaps context is needed here, though. As a serving police officer in the 
UAE, it is inescapable that this research is a combination of personal experiences and objective 
social research. It is often viewed that the literature review is the starting point of all research; 
this, however, overlooks the relationship between the researcher’s personal experience and social 
setting and aim of the research. This ‘relationship’ also has bearing on access to key individuals 
and organisations in research, which this project reflects.  This project has a set aim, and it also is 
exploratory in nature, which is illustrated by the lack of antecedents of social research in the 
UAE and Dubai. None of this is too dismiss the importance of research preparation and design, it 
is to be aware that the framework in which the research is place is flexible, keeping the core aim 
and objectives in mind, while maintaining discipline rather than rigid inflexible approach to 
research.  
 
It was at this stage of securing access to some of the respondents that flexibility was first 
required. With three different ‘sectors’ to access – private financial sector, Central Bank, and law 
enforcement -  the same approach was originally used. This encountered a few issues such as 
lack of response, refusal to engage in the research, requests for interview schedule to be seen 
beforehand, willingness to be interview but citing lack of time due to workload to assist in the 
research. Therefore, out of the 56 people originally approached 30 were finally interviewed.  
This is disappointing but also the reality of social science research.  
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On reflection it was perhaps a mistake to assume that as a police officer I would secure access 
with ease and particularly when requesting an interview on money laundering practices in the 
UAE. However, in defence of this project, 30 interviews is a breaking new ground in the UAE. 
The majority of the respondents that declined to be interviewed were from the private sector (21) 
citing the reasons above, with 2 from Central Bank and 2 from law enforcement; the latter two 
sectors, however, made it clear that work commitments prevented them from participation in the 
project.   
While some from the private sector were willing to be interview, there was a problem in securing 
access to people in the Central Bank. As a recently established body it was perhaps protective of 
its position and reputation in the UAE. Furthermore, it was made clear in all originally emails 
sent that I was a Dubai police Captain, which could have raised some concern that this research 
was an investigation by the police even though it was made clear in the contact that I was an 
individual working alone. This protection of institutional remit is something often found in the 
UAE, as governmental bodies, until recently, have been concerned about ‘empire-building’ 
rather than working together. This, as the research illustrates, was also a problem regarding 
money laundering in the UAE. 
 
This research required the negotiating of access and this was fundamental to the research 
process. Additionally, it enabled the research to consider the relationships people have within 
and between organisations and sections of them. This was particularly apparent in the Central 
Bank (see below). Access to such an organisation involved negotiation and renegotiating via a 
gatekeeper. 
The personal contact that helped with the negotiated access worked in the police and has contacts 
within the financial sector. Access to such people and their social networks and set of contacts334 
is a delicate matter. This process is based on the assumption that a ‘bond’ or ‘link’ exists 
between the initial sample and point of contact and that others in the same social population, 
                                                
334 Steven K. Thompson. 'Adaptive sampling in behavioral surveys' (1997) 167 The validity of self-reported drug 
use: improving the accuracy of survey estimates.NIDA research monograph 296 
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allow a series of referrals to be made within a circle of acquaintances335. Furthermore, in this 
case one of the researchers was from a similar social and cultural background to those 
interviewed; this helped secure access under which this research was conducted but also raised 
some methodological and ethical issues336. Although a snowball sample is to some extent 
limited, it is, however, often used for those ‘hard to reach’ research subjects such as ‘elites’337 
and it was thought appropriate to approach a personal contact to ‘sound out’ the possibility of 
interviewing people employed in the Central Bank, if they were, and thought that other 
‘colleagues’ in this sector were willing to respond to questions on matters of money laundering 
in Dubai. 
The problem of access is, however, does not end ‘once through the door’338. It was, and is an on-
going process of negotiating and re-negotiating. Defined as an individual in an organisation who 
has the power to permit or withhold access. However, there are often multiple entry points into a 
social setting or institution and as with this research the gatekeeper had access to one institution 
– the Central Bank – and this was itself limited to a few ex-colleagues. The powerful can resist 
research and as such access is either highly procedurised or personalised. A procedurised 
approach is official access laid down and explicitly stated in detailed documentation339. This was 
not needed in this research. As a serving police Captain, access was established on a personalised 
basis with superiors prior to research. This personalised approach allowed access to a range of 
organisations, with the gatekeeper used to secure access to one institution.  
 
                                                
335 Sven Berg. 'Snowball sampling' (1988) 8 Encyclopedia of statistical sciences 528;Robert S. Broadhead and Ray 
C. Rist. 'Gatekeepers and the social control of social research' (1976) Soc Probl 325 
336 Khalid Farooq and Graham Brooks. 'Arab fraud and corruption professionals' views in the Arabian Gulf' (2013) 
20(3) Journal of Financial Crime 338 
337 Rowland Atkinson and John Flint. 'Accessing hidden and hard-to-reach populations: Snowball research 
strategies' (2001) 33(1) Social research update 1 
338 Gordon Hughes. 'Understanding the politics of criminological research' (2000) Doing criminological research 
234 
339  Raymond M. Lee, Doing research on sensitive topics (Sage 1993) 
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In some research it is possible that there is an imbalance between the researcher and 
gatekeeper340. This did not happen in this research. However, the research was viewed as 
potentially threatening by some in the financial private sector, law enforcement and Central 
Bank, as it exposed the need for current practice to consider changes to better prevent money 
laundering the UAE.  There was at the start of the research what has been refer to as the ‘politics 
of distrust’341 and concern about this research but these were dealt with swiftly once the 
interviews started an news of my project was communicated to others in the relevant sectors. 
This was illustrated by many people that I interviewed that informed me I came recommended 
by colleagues I previously interviewed.      
                        
However, access was eventually secured but, as with the private financial sector, the research 
was delayed as ‘talks’ were underway as to when and whom I should have contact with. This 
restriction affected the research but without access there would be no interviews. In addition (see 
Results chapter) some of those interviewed, regardless of organisation, were defensive i.e. 
limited answers.  Therefore, this research encountered a problem of initial access – people to 
interview – and access to information – people willing to talk and answer questions in the 
interview schedule.      
 
Although it is recommended that access should not merely be negotiated with those in the 
highest positions342 to avoid any misunderstandings, but the UAE is a hierarchical and honorific 
society. As such access was negotiated with those in a position of power and authority 
representing either a sector i.e. law enforcement or head of company. This was inescapable as 
conducting research in the UAE required the need to be flexible and slightly different to that of 
‘western’ research.     
                                                
340 Gordon Hughes, 'Understanding the politics of criminological research' (Sage 2000) 234 
341 Raymond M. Lee, 'Doing research on sensitive topics' (Sage 1993) 
342 Robert G. Burgess, 'Conversations with a purpose: the ethnographic interview in educational research' , vol 1 
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Field notes were kept from the start of this research but increased as the research project 
progressed. These notes consisted of personal reflections, impressions, and unexpected 
problem(s). The main purpose of keeping these notes was reflection on the progress of the 
research and what, if anything could be done to resolve a problem. This is mentioned here as the 
problem of access was the first obstacle encountered. It is at this stage that notes were made and 
returned to that helped negotiate the rest of the research.     
 
4.2. Sampling	  framework	  	  	  
Deciding on when, where, what and whom to interview is a crucial part of any research. The 
research takes place in a social situation in which all researchers participate and record the 
responses of those interviewed. Therefore the research needs to be defined and a narrow focus of 
work decided on so as to obtain the clearest possible answers/data to the aim of the research. 
However, as what illustrated many years ago ‘people do not have the responsibility of analysing 
and categorising their social and cultural experience and therefore cannot sort their own 
behaviour or responses to questions into neat packages for placement into…an analytical 
framework’343.      
 
The selection of locations of interviews, time and data obtained is problematic for all research. 
These decisions affect the choices made on sections of the population under study and as such 
include and exclude people to be interviewed. These sets of problems therefore had bearing on 
the types of sampling employed for this research.  Defending the types of sampling in this 
research there a few key points that need highlighting; it is impossible to interview all people in 
the financial sector in Dubai. It is possible to interview all relevant people employed in the 
AMLSCU, AOCD and Central Bank, if willing, but a sample of key individuals was thought 
                                                
343  Raoul Naroll, Ronald Cohen and Rauol Naroll, A handbook of method in cultural anthropology (Columbia 
University Press New York 1973) 
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more appropriate from the financial sector and thus more of these interviews were sought. In 
addition people that had experience of working in Dubai and elsewhere and possessed 
international knowledge of anti-money laundering techniques and strategies were considered 
useful to interview due to international context of this research. Therefore, websites ad profiles 
of key individuals were undertaken before a request for an interview was made, which is a type 
of targeted sampling (see below), but due to the earlier interviews were I was ‘tested’ some 
interviews were forthcoming due to recommendations rather than direct request for an interview. 
Furthermore, time constraints, as will all research, prevented the research from going beyond a 
fixed time period.    
 
However, before sampling approach is chosen to access individuals to interview the selection of 
research locations of ‘sites’ needed to be established. This is an important step in the research 
process. Research can focus on one site/location i.e. in a hospital and focus on the interaction and 
rhythm of ‘social life’ in a specific institution. However, multiple sites offer a range of views on 
the same subject and reliability and validity if results are similar. Social views are thus linked by 
physical location where people occupy the same social space i.e. in a building and/or office but 
also connected because same people participate in different locations344. In addition to this the 
development of technology has broken these physical barriers and this interconnectedness is part 
of modern life.      
      
The selection of research site was more complex than it appears.  For this research four criteria 
were considered in the selection of a research site. These were simplicity – will the research 
site(s) allow for the development of studying simple situations to far more complex ones i.e. 
those interviewed awareness of current practice regarding anti-money laundering practice to 
discussion on future developments and predictions of AML practice and direction in the UAE. 
The second criterion was accessibility - the degree of access available to interview people. The 
third was an attempt to be unobtrusive as possible, hopefully encouraging people to speak openly 
                                                
344 Lynda Baker. 'Observation: A complex research method' (2006) 55(1) Library Trends 171 
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in the interviews. This was not always the case, but increased as my name and approach secured 
favour with those in the sectors I accessed. The fourth criterion was participation – that is to keep 
in contact with key individuals and inform them of my progress and also return to interview them 
if necessary and/or possible. No interviews were conducted a second time; however, points of 
clarification were sometimes sought at a later stage in the research process where feedback on 
the progress of the project was discussed.     
     
As a form of non-probability sampling two approaches were used here; one was judgement 
sampling and the other snowball sampling. As has been explained above judgements were made 
on whom to interview in the private financial sector due to the numbers of people employed in 
Dubai in this industry. The criteria used was based on status, position in company, role(s) which 
is relevant to anti-money laundering, previous experience and knowledge of working in UAE 
and elsewhere. These distinct ‘qualifications’ are available on company websites. Age was not 
considered so important in this sector, as people are vastly experienced at a young age – one 
person interviewed was 28. Gender was an issue; Because of the few women work in the 
positions in Dubai in the banking sector and the enforcement authority who specializes in anti 
money laundering or suspicion. There was failed to respond to a request for an interview. There 
would be little chance of claiming that is represented views to be similar to what was obtained 
through interviews. 
 
Snowball sampling was used as an indirect approach – see above – gaining access to interviews 
based on recommendation rather than direct approach, and direct snowball sampling via 
gatekeeper and personnel in the Central Bank.  While only a few interviews were secured 
employing this method they were still invaluable for the research. Aware that this method is open 
to criticism regarding limited representation of sector under study and also reliability i.e. is this 
case hand-picked people representing the gatekeepers’ views or narrow predetermined responses 
presenting a fixed organisational view rather than that of the person interviewed.     
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4.3. Designing	  the	  interview	  schedule	  	  
A semi-structured interview schedule was designed with six sections345. Letters were sent to key 
personnel in the financial sector and law enforcement in Dubai. There was little response to the 
original letters requesting an interview with Central Bank of Dubai personnel; however, the 
following emails were sent via a personal contact to secure access to potential interviewees. The 
methods used were, therefore, a combination of survey, interview schedule and a snowball 
sample 346 and directly negotiated access.  
 
The interview consisted of six sections. These were 
• Factors Encouraging Money Laundering in the UAE 
• The ‘Know Your Customer’ Policy 
• Arrests 
• The Investigation of Cases 
• Cooperation and Information Sharing 
• The Hawala System 
 
There is a tradition in social research where interviews are seen as ‘conversations with a 
purpose’347. Such an approach can produce rich detailed data that is used alongside other 
methods.   In this research it was felt appropriate to use a semi-structured interview schedule. 
This, if dealt with correctly, can elicit useful data, as the interviewee sees the interviewer as a 
                                                
345 see appendix 
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347 Robert G. Burgess, 'Conversations with a purpose: the ethnographic interview in educational research' , vol 1 
(1988) 137 
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potential confident that has understanding and sympathy for the role(s) they have.  There were 
some signs of this in the research as interviews with financial service sector employees became 
increasingly detailed as I became known in the social circle’ of the financial sector. This further 
elicited attitudes to current practice, and expectations, both realistic and unrealistic; it was 
considered realistic and appropriate to know details about your customer(s) as well as possible, 
but due to the instability of the surrounding geographical nations and cultural closeness some felt 
that knowing a customer(s) and requesting personal information without causing offence was 
unrealistic.  
 
In addition, unstructured interviews were dismissed as they were considered time-consuming and 
might possibly last several hours depending on respondent and can be difficult to control, and to 
participate in, as the lack of predetermined interview questions provides little guidance on what 
to talk about. This can therefore lead to substantial unwanted data that needs sifting and 
processing.  Instead semi-structured interviews consist of several key questions that help to 
define the parameters of the research and topics to be explored, but also allows the potential to 
depart from research in order to pursue an idea or response in more detail that is still of relevance 
to the research project as a whole.  
 
Furthermore, surveys were also dismissed as they were considered too limited for this research. 
As a social practice involving individuals and organisations, money laundering, which falls 
under the umbrella of corruption is inherently difficult to measure348. However, in recent years, 
several organisations have developed a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for the purpose of 
qualitatively assessing the pervasiveness of corruption around the world. At one level these CPI 
are acknowledged as an important development in raising public awareness of corruption and 
promoting reform, particularly Transparency International. However, these approaches are also 
criticised for a lack of methodological rigour showing one side of the corruption equation, e.g., 
                                                
348 Mitchell A. Seligson. 'The measurement and impact of corruption victimization: Survey evidence from Latin 
America' (2006) 34(2) World Dev 381 
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those that receive a payment or gift, while ignoring those offering the bribe, often from the 
private sector349. These CPI surveys, however, are also limited as their selection process e.g., 
which country is included in a CPI survey, often reinforces stereotypical perceptions of corrupt 
regions of the world, and as such reflects the confusion and inadequacy and current corruption 
discourse350. A CPI then is not a reflection of a ‘real’ geography of corruption, and therefore 
their measurements are problematic.  
 
A review of the literature on corruption reveals that a variety of theoretical frameworks have 
been used to analyse the incidence of, and recorded growth in, corrupt practices in recent years. 
Some approaches, which have dominated corruption studies, in the socio-political and economic 
literature is; capital accumulation as a theoretical lens351 state and class theory 352, a policy 
choice and public choice approach353. Furthermore, some have relied on ‘modernisation and 
political development354, a cultural perspective355 , the concept of globalisation 356 and a 
                                                
349 Olatunde Julius Otusanya. 'Corruption as an obstacle to development in developing countries: a review of 
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355 Christopher J. Anderson and Yuliya V. Tverdova. 'Corruption, political allegiances, and attitudes toward 
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‘governmentality’ framework 357 . However, perhaps a common theme in these different 
approaches is that without the use of intermediaries and professionals such as bankers, 
accountants, and lawyers etc. the flow of corrupt funds is impossible358.   
 
Prior to this requesting access, however, a pilot study was conducted. The interview schedule 
was sent to two people to review independently; both were personal contacts. One worked in the 
financial sector and one was a current police officer. The information provided by these 
individuals was invaluable. Neither was informed that the schedule was reviewed by another 
person as I wanted a complete independent review and combine suggestions on how to improve 
the interview schedule. In particularly where both made the same comments it was obvious 
change was needed. For example, clear sections were needed to help people follow the research 
interview if access was denied and the interview schedule had to be posted and later returned; 
some of the questions needed rephrasing as they were too vague and ambiguous even if asked by 
the researcher in an interview and both reviewers thought my original interview schedule was too 
long and needed to be narrowed down before commencing the research. However, to achieve this 
detailed knowledge of the subject matter and preparation before the interview was needed.    
 
The purpose of the interviews was to explore the views, experiences, beliefs and/or motivations 
of individuals on specific matters of many laundering in the UAE and the best way forward to 
prevent and/or reduce its incidence. Interviews provide a deep understanding of social issue 
under research rather than questionnaires, which were considered inappropriate in trying to 
access material to understand current practice and views on money laundering in Dubai and the 
UAE. A semi structured interviews was therefore considered most appropriate as little was, and 
still is known about the study of money laundering in the UAE.  
                                                
357 Jeff Everett, Dean Neu and Abu Shiraz Rahaman. 'Accounting and the global fight against corruption' (2007) 
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358 Olatunde Julius Otusanya, 'Corruption as an obstacle to development in developing countries: a review of 
literature' , vol 14 (Emerald Group Publishing Limited 2011) 387 
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It was made clear before the interviews that only some of the questions could be answered even 
after this review, as others were of a ‘sensitive nature’ and the respondents were unable or 
unwilling to respond to them within and across the different sectors. For example, five of those 
working in the financial sector declined to answer ‘are you willing to share all available 
information with the AMLSCU to prevent money laundering in Dubai? This is perhaps due to a 
number of facts; exposing powerful and rich corrupt clients that might place funds elsewhere, 
aware that a positive response to this question is false, interviewed by a police captain with 
knowledge of money laundering etc. The police, however, were also unwilling to fully answer 
some questions, particularly on the investigation of cases. A common response to ‘How many 
cases have the AMLSCU (or ACOD) dealt with?’ was to decline to answer or respond with 
‘many cases are in progress’ and therefore unable to offer a figure.  
 
Even though individual anonymity359 was assured before any interviews were undertaken some 
respondents were un-cooperative.  Suffice to state though, that anonymity is a common practice 
in assuring access to potential respondents in research and particularly regarding issues of police 
security in Dubai and confidentiality in the private financial sector. Furthermore, it was made 
clear that no company was to be identified either. This was disappointing, but without such 
assurances no interviews would have taken place. 
 
Consequently, none of the interviews were recorded as requested by the interviewees in the 
sample, with some of them producing notes acquired during the interview. Due to the nature of 
the work of the people interviewed and the commercial interests involved this was also 
understandable. Therefore, even with a partial semi-structured interview schedule, it was difficult 
to pay full attention to the interview and some of the more subtle elements of the interviews were 
                                                
359 Judith Bell, Doing your research project (Open University Press 2010) 
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inevitably lost. Rather than assume ‘understanding’ from the notes, some of them were returned 
to the relevant company for clarification.  
 
Furthermore, due to my knowledge of national and international money laundering laws, 
regulations and conventions I became aware in the early interviews conducted that some people 
interviewed ‘tested’ my promise of anonymity and confidentiality by passing on information  
that was innocuous and sometimes inaccurate.  The later interviews, across all organisations 
were therefore far more extensive, as I passed this ‘test’ by maintaining an ethical position and 
keeping individual names and company names out of the final research. The inaccurate 
information was obviously, and blatantly inaccurate i.e. claims regarding well-known cases that 
were incorrect. This was not an error(s) or misunderstanding as those interviewed were in 
positions of power and authority, knowledgeable and experienced, and most of all in some of the 
early interviews the respondents contradicted what they said. This was not down to subtle 
questioning more a ‘test’ of my reaction. I politely informed any of those interviewed that 
perhaps they were mistaken regarding a case(s) to which they readily agreed. These early 
interviews were thus a test of my integrity and own knowledge regarding money laundering in 
the UAE.  
 
There is a perception in the private sector that many UAE citizens are only employed in positions 
such as a police inspector or working in the Central Bank due to family links and personal 
contacts. There is some truth in this, a there is anywhere in the world, but it is often overstated, 
as individuals need knowledge and skills to fulfil the tasks set. I was therefore aware that in the 
early interviews that I needed to establish my own credibility to continue the research. Without 
highlighting my own knowledge there was a chance the research would cease to continue, as I 
would have no credibility, particularly within the private sector.    
                       
A rudimentary indexing system was developed for the interviews; a page with three columns that 
contained the date of interview, the person coded as a letter, and brief summary of interview with 
observations all written in Arabic. Therefore, when it came time to produce the results, a review 
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of these notes offered a starting point of what I had discovered in the research. This approach 
helped extract common themes quickly and as such due to the methodological issues 
encountered it was decided that recurring themes would be presented under the six sections of 
the interview schedule that illustrated common issues that all those interviewed mentioned, 
rather than isolated issues of personal concern specific to the individual interviewed.   
  
Many in the financial sector in Dubai know or know of one another as they sometimes ‘do 
business’ together. All of those in law enforcement knew one another, which was inescapable. 
This small sample was far more suitable than interviewing police officers that had no knowledge 
of money laundering rules, regulations and/or cases.      
 
Although these methods of sampling might not be representative of all of those people who work 
in some anti-money laundering capacity, it was considered a ‘representative’ account by those 
interviewed of how those involved in protecting the integrity of a commercial enterprise and that 
of Dubai as a city of commerce and a financial centre of trade from risk of fraud and money 
laundering and criminal threats. 
 
The value of this research is that it addresses these and other issues surrounding money 
laundering. It sought solutions to prevent, reduce and deter money laundering in the UAE. 
Moreover, it sought to discover new ways to combat money laundering and procedures, which 
would help reduce the incidents of such a crime and protect the integrity of the financial sector in 
Dubai and integrity of the UAE as a place in which to invest and engage in international 
commerce. 
 
The UAE has developed rapidly and as such its international legal system and controls are in the 
process of adjusting to international commerce. Even though laws were passed years ago when 
the UAE sought and secured independence, the financial system increased its financial controls 
regarding money laundering, putting pressure on the financial sector to implement and tighten 
controls on the transfer of funds within and across jurisdictions to comply with international laws 
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and conventions the UAE had signed. This process of updating laws and controls is ongoing and 
in this sense the UAE and Dubai in particular, is no different to London or New York. 
 
During the interviews three themes in particular emerged. These were: 
• the use of experience in making decisions regarding money laundering, which was 
thought invaluable;  
• letting evidence determine the direction the ‘case’ went in employing the use of 
technology to ‘mine’ information i.e., the analysis of data transactions on an account(s) 
and track and trace patterns of customers’ behaviour,  
• the willingness of the banks, police and organised crime unit to use the full panoply of 
sanctions available to them to deal with illegal criminal acts.  
 
These recurring themes discovered in this research and ‘views from the inside’ of those 
employed in some AML capacity, however, are similar to previous research (…), and as such are 
illustrative of the international problem of developing AML measures. Therefore, while the 
following issues are presented independently they are interconnected; they are connected in the 
UAE and also part of the international financial sector. 
 
4.4. Content	  analysis	  of	  interviews	  
Content analysis is a widely used qualitative research technique and was thought appropriate for 
this research. It offered the chance to quantify the number of times key words were mentioned in 
the interviews i.e., organised crime and corruption and/or a collection of words in a sentence i.e., 
lack of professionalism, lack of communication. It further offered the chance to then qualify the 
use of key terms and place them into a recurring theme(s) from the interviews.  
However, rather than a single method approach, content analysis has three distinct approaches: 
conventional, directed, or summative. All are used to interpret meaning from the content of text 
data but possess major differences. The primary difference is the design and application of the 
coding schemes and origins of codes. In conventional content analysis, coding is derived from 
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the data, and a directed approach starts with a theory or relevant research results as direction for 
initial codes. However, while useful a summative content analysis – the counting and 
comparison of key words or content, followed by the interpretation of the underlying context, 
was considered most appropriate. Typically, a study using a summative approach to qualitative 
content analysis starts with identifying and quantifying key words or content in text with the 
purpose of understanding the contextual use of the words or content. In this thesis, the focus was 
on discovering underlying meanings of the words or the content360 of the prevention of money 
laundering in Dubai.  
 
Summative content analysis then offers more a word count of key terms; it examines language 
for the purpose of classifying substantial amounts of text into a number of themes that represent 
similar meanings and/or understanding of problem361. .These themes can represent either explicit 
communication or inferred communication and thus the aim of content analysis is “to provide 
knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon under study”362. In this thesis then, content 
analysis is defined as a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text 
data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes. 
 
While the 6 sections of the semi-structured interview schedule were decided beforehand, based 
on previous research and the literature review there was still room for those interviewed to 
express themselves beyond set interview parameters. In the 30 interviews conducted the 
frequency of specific key words were counted, with source or speaker identified. Recurring key 
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words were identified by systematically reviewing each interview. From this method key themes 
emerged from the research that reoccurred in the financial private sector, the Central Bank and 
law enforcement. However, rather than rely on one reading of the interview they were reviewed 
three times; the first review identified key recurring words, the second, key themes, and the third 
themes were those that cut across the different sectors under review.     
 
Such an approach has its advantages as it is unobtrusive and nonreactive way to study the 
phenomenon of interest363. It helped provided basic insights into how words are used, and 
common themes. The success of content analysis, however, depends primarily on the coding of 
data placing a quantity of data into key themes. Once completed relationships, if any, are 
discovered and recurring themes are identified. Although content analysis was useful for this 
research, the lack of a firm definition and procedures potentially limits the application of content 
analysis364. It has the potential to produce false positives i.e., items of interest might be missed, 
and that such analysis is open and shapeless as notions of the subject under study change. It is 
hoped, however, that by reviewing the interviews three times that such mistakes are at a 
minimum.   
 
4.5. The	  limitations	  to	  research	  
With all research there are limits to what it can achieve. This research is no different, and 
therefore the following sections are a reflection on what the limits of this research are, and so 
that other academics that wish to continue to research into money laundering and contribute to 
this debate can review and amend depending on the research, particularly in Dubai due to the 
paucity of research in the UAE n criminal justice issues.   
 
                                                
363 Earl Babbie, 'The practice of social research' (Cengage Learning 2012) 
364  Renata Tesch, Qualitative analysis: Analysis types and software tools (Falmer Press, London 1990) 
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4.6. Problems	  faced	  in	  interviews	  
Due to the nature of the research and people interviewed there were a few issues with the method 
chosen. Gaining access to respondents and making the necessary arrangement(s) to visit 
premises, in confirming and keeping appointments and securing the necessary permission365 was 
a problem in this research. In addition the problem with the interviews once access, was secured 
was that so many of the respondents were busy and had limited time available with many 
important cases is pending. The interviews were, however, valuable, and it was important to 
interview a section of people involved in AML in Dubai rather than from one agency.  
 
The final, and perhaps most contentious part of the interviews, particularly with the police, was 
interview bias. As a serving police captain in Dubai there were dangers of bias in how the data 
was solicited, recorded, or interpreted. Therefore a check list of potential biasness was developed 
prior to the interviews. These were, in brief (see chapter seven for full discussion). 
    
Stereotyping, particularly those employed in the financial sector and personal view and previous 
experience of the sometimes obstructive relationship between the police and financial sector; 
inconsistency in questioning, which was a problem when interviewing high ranking senior police 
officers as ‘respect’ and honour are expected to be shown to elder and people in ‘important 
positions’ in UAE culture; this was compounded by potential snap judgements or ‘first 
impression errors’ (either positive or negative), giving  more credence to information from a 
respondent already known in some capacity rather than his responses, knowledge, skills, or 
answers; this was a problem that needed addressing and constant review as potential negative 
views, particularly of some of the more reluctant respondents in the financial sector and limited 
information on AML obtained.  
 
                                                
365 Colin Robson. 'Real world research: A resource for social scientists and practitioners-researchers' (1993) 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Oxford  
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Furthermore, there were aspects of this research that were considered highly important by myself 
(i.e., sharing information), which needed careful management so as not to overshadow other 
worthwhile parts of this research such as lack of knowledge and skills on part of the police in 
preventing money laundering. It is felt that this halo effect was dealt with as the results (see 
chapter six) illustrate positive and negative views of the financial sector and policing of money 
laundering.  
 
Finally, there was always a danger of the ‘contrast effect’ i.e., strong respondents followed by 
less qualified, knowledgeable ones. To prevent this happening interviews were arranged, where 
possible, approximately one a week and all respondents were numbered rather than named and 
the interviews were analysed at a later date rather than immediately to avoid this potential affect. 
The issue of non-verbal communication was also considered; unintended or intended physical 
postures, movements, facial expressions can lead to different responses. In Arabic culture eye 
contact is expected, however, deference to people of higher ranking and social status is also part 
of the culture. Therefore, adjustment was needed depending on interviewee (this is discussed 
further in chapter six).    
 
Therefore, as part of this research, once each interview was completed and a period of reflection 
on how the interview was conducted. As a police officer some respondents might have produced 
‘guarded responses’ and as such limited information was discovered. This, however, is a problem 
for all research as demographics and personal conduct affect the outcome from access, interview 
to final data obtained.  
 
There was also the question of accessing documentation. Legal statutes, conventions, national 
laws were easily accessible. However, internal documentation of organisations in the private 
sector was far more difficult, if not impossible to secure. For example, access to a clear, 
documented, strategic approach to preventing money laundering in the UAE was unobtainable. 
This is understandable regarding issues of company and client confidentiality but evidence that 
all organisations in the financial sector had a clear strategic approach or even considered money 
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laundering a serious issue in the UAE was limited. Instead, I had to rely on the interviews for 
verbal rather than documentary evidence that the private sector was doing all it could to prevent 
money laundering in the UAE.              
 
4.7. Ethical	  considerations	  
There are some important key principles in social research: voluntary participation, no harm to 
participants, anonymity and confidentiality, avoiding the deception of subjects, analysis and 
reporting of final information/data, and political considerations, which has been illustrated 
above. All of these issues were considered and reflected upon in this research project.  
 
In the course of any research the researcher(s) are presenting the project but also themselves. In 
these circumstances, the question arises as to what should and/or will be discussed. All those 
interviewed were informed that, if requested, access to this research is possible with perhaps the 
exception of some sensitive data obtain in an interview, which has been deleted from the 
research notes. In this situation then the role(s of the researcher and the content needed to be 
explained. However, as the research developed and the role(s) modified accordingly, so the 
account that is provided by the research is subject to change.   This research, thankfully, did not 
alter that much. Questions were omitted from interview schedule as requested. However, in some 
interviews people were willing to talk about matters that were previously decided as too 
sensitive. Respondents would stray from the questions set and while the information received 
was highly informative and interesting a decision was made that this was data beyond the 
parameters of the research that had been negotiated.         
       
Due to its very sensitive nature and dealing with powerful and high-ranking individuals in 
respected sectors in the UAE, five precautionary steps were taken. These were: 
 
• Be mindful of any harm which could result from the research 
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• Determine who/what institution might be harmed and in what way if acting 
inappropriately 
• Assess the possible risks and examine safety measures already in place to see if more 
could be done to protect respondents identification 
• Keep a detailed record of all results, and 
• Re-evaluate the process, assessment of project and debrief all subjects involved if 
requested. 
 
In this research all the ethical considerations were followed. Apart from wishing to produce an 
ethical and thoughtful and useful piece of work, conducting oneself in a professional and ethical 
manner, no research should ruin the ‘field of opportunity’ for potential research by behaving in 
an unethical manner. 
 
Furthermore, this research is the work of an individual, it has been made clear that this work is of 
interest to key individuals outside of Dubai. These contacts were direct and from high ranking 
officials in the UAE. Therefore, while this research has no sponsorship it has become of interest 
to those in governmental circles. This became obvious while conducting the research, which 
added pressure with requests for the final report to be disseminated policy makers in the UAE. 
Rather than inform those that were still to be interviewed it was decided that such information 
should be kept quiet. The reason for this is that a substantial number of interviews had been 
recorded. It was impossible to inform all of those previously interviewed that this research had 
now aroused interest. It would has potentially altered the feedback from interview yet conducted 
as such information might alter quality of interviews with people concerned about influence on 
research outcomes and publication of all data previously obtained.          
      
Moreover, ethical issues arise concerning the impact of this study; this is considered at different 
levels such as the research results and impact on those interviewed and those working as 
practitioners and AML, the contribution this research make to existing knowledge on the subject, 
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and implications or those tasked with developing policy. As with all research reflection was 
required on both the content of the study and the way in which is presented and written. The 
language of research can sometimes be impenetrable, with the key points and messages lost in 
jargon but a decision was taken early on to attempt to produce an accessible ‘document’ and 
reach a wide as possible audience and thus this research is of a far more practical rather than 
theoretical nature.         
      
4.8. Practitioner	  Researcher	  or	  Research	  Practitioner	  
As indicated in this research, the author is a professional police officer and thus access to some 
of his fellow police officers was straightforward. Access to those in the financial sector was a 
little more difficult, but accomplished. This project, however, has benefits for the police and 
financial sector. Firstly, personal and professional development and increasing the knowledge 
base of the author. Secondly, and more importantly, the knowledge created by this research and 
the changes needed to combat money laundering in the UAE. From this perspective, the 
researcher can be said to be a practitioner researcher in accordance with366 the definition that 
‘the practitioner is someone who holds down a job in some particular area and at the same time is 
involved in systematic enquiry which is of relevance. However, since the researcher was 
temporarily suspended from police duties, it could be said that it was more of a researcher 
practitioner’s role. Either way, the research is invaluable and a contribution towards developing a 
‘better’ policy and ultimately practice in preventing and prosecuting those that engage in money 
laundering in the UAE and elsewhere. 
 
Aware that this research produced some ethical issues, it did not place anybody in a position of 
danger nor compromise. No covert methods were required to access information but it was clear 
that some of those in the financial sector were concerned about my role as a member of the UAE 
police force.  In this context my practitioners’ role was detrimental to the research. Even though 
it was made clear I was primarily researching this subject for personal reasons rather than 
                                                
366 ibid 
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organisational ones. Therefore, such research might be encouraged in the future, drawing on the 
strength and knowledge of practitioners, it is a balancing act where one has to be both open and 
objective.  
 
4.9. Conclusion	  	  
As with all research there are advantages and disadvantages to the methods used; this thesis is no 
different. It is hope, however, that this chapter defends the methods chosen and has explained 
and highlighted the limitations of these methods as well. These methods and the execution of 
them, however, have affected the results, in both a positive and negative way. It is to these that 
we now turn.  
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Chapter	  Five	  
Results	  and	  Interview	  Analysis	  
 
5.1. Introduction	  
 
This chapter includes the background data on the respondents as a starting point of analysis. This 
background data is the demographic profile of years employed in international financial sector, 
years employed in Dubai financial sector, age ranges of respondents, positions held in financial 
sector and in law enforcement bodies, ranks of those employed in specific AML bodies, and 
direct responsibility for compliance in company are presented. In the next and major part of this 
chapter, the interviews conducted with the respondents are analysed in some depth. Respondents 
were limited to a total of 30 of the 56 respondents selected, where the largest difficulties in 
achieving larger sampling of the population included the private nature of the culture along with 
the time available for the research and the access to a larger population. Data on interviewees  
The total number of people interviewed in this research project was thirty out of a possible fifty-
six peopled approached; of these seventeen were from the financial private sector, three from the 
Central Bank, six from the AMLSCU and four from AOCD. The majority of the respondents that 
declined to be interviewed were from the private sector twenty-one citing the reasons above, 
with two from Central Bank and three from law enforcement; the latter two sectors, however, 
made it clear that work commitments prevented them from participation in the project 
Interviews 
During the interviews, three themes in particular emerged. These were the use of experience in 
making decisions regarding money laundering, which was thought invaluable; letting evidence 
determine the direction the ‘case’ went in employing the use of technology to ‘mine’ information 
i.e., the analysis of data transactions on an account(s) and track and trace patterns of customers’ 
behaviour, and the willingness of the banks, police and organised crime unit to use the full 
panoply of sanctions available to them to deal with illegal criminal acts. These recurring themes 
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discovered in this research are considered ‘views from the inside’ of those employed in some 
AML capacity and considered to be experienced with knowledge of money laundering issues in 
their specific positions, and sometimes past experiences.  
  
5.2. Data	  on	  interviewees	  	  
The total number of people interviewed in this research project was thirty out of a possible fifty-
six people approached. The individuals who completed the interview process included seventeen 
from the financial private sector, three from the Central Bank, six from the AMLSCU and four 
from AOCD. The majority of the respondents that declined to be interviewed were from the 
private sector twenty-one, citing the reasons of privacy as the largest reason for objecting to 
complete the interview process. However, two from Central Bank and three from law 
enforcement declined participation as work commitments prevented them from participation in 
the project. 
To secure data on key individuals in the UAE is a difficult task. The cultural differences in this 
region and jurisdiction reduces access, which is a major issue regardless of the position of the 
person. Privacy and family life are of paramount importance to the Arab culture, and as such, 
this view of life is extended to those residing in the UAE employed in the financial sector. The 
problem of access has already been raised in the previous chapter (see chapter five) and such 
limited access has without doubt had some impact on the results. In addition, this type of 
sampling is referred to as a convenience sampling due to limited time to conduct this type of 
research and the access to larger sampling populations of respondents by the researcher.    
 
The ‘raw’ data is presented below in graphical/tabulated form with analysis of such data below. 
The first table presented considers the years of service spent in the financial sector of those 
interviewed in their career. 
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5.3. The	  Raw	  data	  
The ‘raw’ data is presented below in graphical/tabulated form with analysis of such data below. 
The first table presented considers the years of service spent in the financial sector of those 
interviewed in their career. 
Table	  1:	  Position	  and	  Years	  in	  Financial	  Sector	  	  	  
	  
As part of all interviews, some background information on those involved in the financial sector 
and police enforcement was sought (i.e., age, gender, length of service). This reason for this was 
to see if experience, position in company and years of service was linked to knowledge of AML 
measures. In Table 1 above, there is a breakdown of current position of employees interviewed 
and total years of service in the financial sector. Those with the longest period of service in the 
financial sector were reflected in those in the highest current position with senior executives and 
financial managers with the longest period of service in the financial sector. This was the total of 
year service in the financial sector in home country and in Dubai (see Table 2 below for length of 
service in Dubai only). 
However, what was noticeable from the interviews was that of the seventeen interviewed thirteen 
had some AML qualification. Those three without an AML qualification were senior executives. 
Whilst those interviewed had a range of positions – financial analyst, financial manager, internal 
auditor, and senior executive – the financial analyst had the most knowledge and understanding 
of AML prevention. It was also noticeable that those with the longest service, the senior 
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executives, were also the least knowledgeable regarding AML prevention. It appears from the 
interviews that AML prevention was not considered as important an issue in the early parts of 
their careers as it is currently, due to working in the financial sector. Respondents generally 
stated that it was something that ‘passed them by’ or ‘briefly touched on’ some years ago during 
a long career. 
Table	  2:	  Position	  and	  Length	  of	  Service	  in	  Dubai	  Financial	  Sector	  
	  
In Table 2 above information was requested from the respondents on how long they had worked 
in Dubai in the financial sector. The reason for this was to assess if there was a perceptual 
difference in working practice regarding AML to other jurisdictions they had worked. All those 
that worked in Dubai were previously employed in the financial sector in ‘western’ jurisdictions 
(i.e., Australia, USA, United Kingdom) where money laundering is considered a serious matter 
and prosecution sought where possible. Even though a signatory too many international 
conventions and recommendations such as FAFT, Dubai is a completely different cultural 
context in which to work. Therefore, information was sought on the perceived seriousness the 
financial sector took regarding AML practice money laundering in Dubai. The results were 
mixed with senior executives ‘stating there is no difference anywhere in the world ‘to financial 
analysts claiming ‘AML measures are secondary to making money, regardless of financial risk’.   
There was clear view of practice in Dubai; this could be down to the limited number of people 
interviewed, interview bias (people not wanting to offend police captain from Dubai), that 
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practice is erratic and uncoordinated depending on company and key individuals with 
responsibility for AML, or that there is no major problem regarding AML practice in Dubai. 
 
These was one key result from these interviews; those with the longest service in Dubai tended to 
claim that there was no difference in practice to anywhere in the world.  It is impossible to draw 
any clear conclusion from this result but is possible to suggest that those with a long service 
history in Dubai are far more sensitive to criticism of practice in Dubai to those ‘newly’ arrived 
and prepared to speak openly about shortcomings in expected practice.      
 
The same background information was also requested from law enforcement officers 
interviewed.  In the following Table 3 there is the position/ranks of officers interviewed and 
length of service in years in AMLSCU. Before I embark on any detailed analysis of the data 
obtained in this research some explanation of the structure of the police in Dubai is useful. All 
police officers, regardless of rank are male. All attend the police college and are taught ‘Dubai’ 
law. The police ranking system in Dubai is based more on a military system (i.e. cadet, 
lieutenant, captain, major etc.) than civil system. This system therefore reflects the primary role 
of the police in Dubai, as one of maintaining order. Furthermore, due to its geographical location 
this militarised organisation of the police is a potential supplement or secondary ‘force’ in the 
event of social upheaval.  The officers are either transferred into the AMLSCU or can request a 
transfer. This information was made apparent in one of the interviews. It was assumed, and is on 
reflection an error of judgement, that all officers were transferred unless a logistical reason was 
forwarded by the individual in question. The reason these circumstances were not considered is 
that as a serving police captain promotions tend to be automatic and transfers decided by heads 
of the services.        
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Table	  3:	  Position	  and	  Years	  in	  AMLSCU	  
	  
The age range of the respondents interviewed for both the police and those employed in the 
AMLSCU was from 29-60. Age was considered a useful indicator of experience and opportunity 
for personal career advancement but also to acquire specialised knowledge in a particular field of 
policing i.e. AML. There were no expectations from the research that the more experienced the 
more ‘expertise’ in a particular specialism the officers might have as personal contacts and 
family connections help determine career paths in Dubai, and that there is no specific police 
instruction regarding AML practice. This, however, is similar to other jurisdiction such as the 
United Kingdom where police officers has no specialist knowledge of AML. 
What was revealing is that while none of those employed by the police had any formal AML 
training neither had those seconded to, or applied to work for the AMLSCU unit in any capacity 
i.e., courses abroad, international conferences on AML strategies and practices. From all of the 
interviewees employed by ‘policing bodies’ none had specific knowledge of AML prevention 
and analysis. Instead they relied on familiar police methods and approaches to crime, personal 
contacts in the financial sector to assist in cases and formal links to the financial sector. This 
situation is far from ideal. This situation, however, was one that the police recognised as 
unacceptable and sought specialised training in AML techniques after transfer. This ‘lack of 
knowledge’, however, is not something that the police in Dubai experience; it is often a universal 
experience of police officers around the world.  
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This request for specific ‘instruction’ on AML techniques however, was a recurring theme in 
interviews with those employed in the AMLSCU and AOCD. This is understandable, as 
reference was made to the threat of organised crime and money laundering and its effect on the 
Dubai economy and reputation as a financial sector. Previous research has illustrated, however, 
that money launderers do not always use the legal banking system. If they do it has been 
established that they purchase fiscally opaque products, meant to secure future medical coverage 
and personal pension plans.  Only a marginal portion of the financial assets is assigned to 
speculative financial risk367 in the legal system with laundered money used elsewhere (i.e., gold 
market) 368.  
 
This research - due to lack of secondary data and evidence of money laundering - did not 
confirm nor deny that this situation was also happening in Dubai. It did, however, highlight that 
the diverse financial sectors and poorly regulated markets (i.e. in gold) were attractive to 
organised crime and corrupt individuals to launder illegal funds.    
 
In the next section the qualitative data obtained from the interviews is analyzed. These 
interviews were informative and revealing and highlight the need for AML to be updated and 
law enforcement officers provided with continuous development regarding AML practice.  This 
is illustrated by the many comments made by officers regarding their own needs to fulfil the 
role(s) expected of them.   Many were passionate about this as they considered money laundering 
a threat to Dubai’s stability and attraction as a safe place to conduct business.  This is also an 
integrity issue, and as one respondent indicated: ‘Yes… there are people who want stability in 
the United Arab Emirates and the transfer of their property... It is difficult to determine the 
source of the funds sometimes due to the instability of the country from which they came and 
                                                
367  Michael Levi and Petrus C. van Duyne, Drugs and Money: Managing the Drug Trade and Crime Money in 
Europe (Routledge 2005) 
368 Armando Fernández Steinko. 'Financial channels of money laundering in Spain' (2012) 52(5) Br J Criminol 908 
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lack of proof of the source of the funds’. This problem, yet again, is not one peculiar to the UAE 
- it is one that plagues the international financial system369. 
 
Interviews:	  ‘Views	  from	  the	  inside’	  
During the interviews, three themes in particular emerged. These were the use of experience in 
making decisions regarding money laundering, which was thought invaluable; letting evidence 
determine the direction the ‘case’ went in employing the use of technology to ‘mine’ 
information, e.g. the analysis of data transactions on an account(s) and track and trace patterns of 
customers’ behaviour, and the willingness of the banks, police and organised crime unit to use 
the full panoply of sanctions available to them to deal with illegal criminal acts. Therefore, while 
the following issues are presented independently they are interconnected; they are connected in 
the UAE and are also part of the international financial sector. 
 
5.4. Factors	  Encouraging	  Money	  Laundering	  in	  the	  UAE	  
The problem with money laundering in the UAE, as expressed by our respondents, is that it is 
seen as more of an external cause by others – individuals and nations -rather than an internal 
issue. The factors presently contributing to this is the political instability of the region.  While the 
UAE has remained calm and settled other neighbouring nations have experienced unrest and 
turmoil. In this context those with legal and/or illegal funds seek a route to transfer money to a 
stable, and close-by, country that is easy to reach and travel to without the need for a visa.   
 
As one senior executive in the financial sector said ‘you know any cross-border transactions 
incoming and outgoing with Afghanistan, Iraq, some African states and others would raise 
suspicion. It is very hard for us to decide on the legality of these funds. It is impossible to say if 
                                                
369 Ross, D. (2005). Money laundering. In L. Salinger, (Ed.), Encyclopedia of white-collar & corporate crime. (pp. 
543-546). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. & Adamoli, S. (2002). Money laundering. In D. Levinson 
(Ed.), Encyclopedia of crime and punishment. (pp. 1073-1077). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
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there is no money laundering from other places, which do not have any internal conflicts or what 
you called them: developed states’. He further went on to say, and contradict himself, ‘we don’t 
have any organised crime here in the UAE. However, the UAE, being one of the important 
financial centres, has always been on the list of these organised criminals in order to launder 
their money’.  
 
There appeared to be a consensus of opinion in the financial sector and AMLSCU officials, 
however, that ‘black money’ enters the UAE as a result of two main organised criminal 
activities: illicit drugs and arms smuggling. It was reluctantly admitted by the police in particular 
that due to its geographical location and diverse population that ‘there are chances that these 
criminals bring their illegal money to the UAE to launder it through our banking or Hawala 
system’.  
 
Preventing money laundering is also an integrity issue, and as one respondent indicated:  
‘Yes…It is difficult to determine the source of the funds sometimes due to the instability of the 
country from which they came and lack of proof of the source of the funds’. This problem, yet 
again, is not one peculiar to the UAE; it is one that plagues the international financial system370.  
 
5.5. The	  ‘Know	  Your	  Customer’	  Policy	  
All those interviewed where keen to point out that there is no ‘hard and fast rule’ in spotting 
money laundering. Each case has to be approach based on the existing evidence available. After 
all, even if a case of money laundering, it will be unclear at what stage in the process it would be. 
Therefore, those interviewed were cautious about identifying an account early on as one that had 
used laundered funds and proceeded with caution. Once a customer has established a ‘pattern’ it 
is easier to track a customers’ behaviour. Evidence then is both the knowledge and data on 
                                                
370 Peter Alldridge. 'Money laundering and globalization' (2008) 35(4) Journal of law and society 437;Michael Levi 
and Peter Reuter. 'Money laundering' (2006) 34(1) Crime and Justice 289 
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customers’ interests and the ability to review account information and unusual activity, identified 
as frequent small transactions, inaccurate information, and numerous accounts371.  
 
This ‘real time’ assessment of transactions, if used correctly, helps expose some potential frauds. 
This communication of ‘evidence,’ however, is also a problem.  Due to the established 
approaches to preventing money laundering substantial information is passed on and processed. 
Information is coming from computerised notification, personal contacts and external sources 
etc. The Know Your Customer regime has thus evolved into a set of precautionary measures 
involving reassessment of client accounts based on a gathering of information for differing 
sources of credibility372. 
 
One respondent described the process of ‘knowing your customer’ by explaining that ‘from our 
new clients, we ask them to produce a copy of their passport, a driving license, their employment 
status and the company for which they work, and any other documents that show their name, 
date of birth, nationality [and so on]. To what extent these documents are real or forged, we don’t 
know, especially in the case of non-UAE documents’.  
 
It was clearly the case amongst many in the financial sector that procedures were followed more 
as a ‘defensible decision’373 or ‘defendable compliance’374. One respondent interviewed simply 
                                                
371 Longfellow (2006).  
372 MARK W. Fraser, A. Rosen and EK Proctor. 'Intervention research in social work: A basis for evidence-based 
practice and practice guidelines' (2003) Developing practice guidelines for social work intervention: Issues, 
methods, and research agenda 17;Petter Langseth. 'Measuring corruption' (2006) Measuring Corruption, Burlington: 
Ashgate Publishing Company 7 
373 Hazel Kemshall. 'Risk assessment and management: An overview' (2007) Handbook for Practice Learning in 
Social Work and Social Care: Knowledge and Theory.London: Jessica Kingsley 153 
374 Richard V. Ericson. 'Ten uncertainties of risk-management approaches to security' (2006) 48(3) Canadian 
Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice/La Revue canadienne de criminologie et de justice pénale 345 
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said ‘we play by the rules of the game’. I can understand if someone lower down {meaning below 
executive level} passed everything on as a way to protect his self’. He won’t want to be blamed if 
some piece of information that he did not pass on is found out to be important in a case later on.     
    
Furthermore, a different respondent in the financial sector suggested that ‘some bank managers 
argue that the competition amongst banks to attract customers has meant that the verification of a 
client’s documents is sometimes not as thorough as it should be…and we can’t know the 
intention of the person who wishes to open a bank account. It could be an ordinary person’. 
Some financial managers accepted that the system is not totally free of corruption, in spite of the 
provisions put in place to ensure that transactions are properly recorded. 
 
Two key important issues further developed from this part of the interview schedule. Due to the 
vast wealth of some of the people that used the financial sector in Dubai it was suggested that 
some transactions were briefly reviewed. This ‘light-touch’ approach, however, is something that 
can be levelled at the financial sector elsewhere i.e., Nat West Bank in United Kingdom and lead 
to money laundering. In addition there was some concern from the police in particular about 
Political Exposed Persons (PEP). As one respondent said ‘we know there are some people that 
bank here that are involved in illegal activity but some of the banks don’t seem to mind.’ This 
view echo’s Gill’s and Taylor’s (2004) where ‘Know Your Customer’ rules can have negative 
implications and alienate established customers. 
 
There are conflicting views then between those representing law enforcement bodies and those in 
the financial sector; the financial sector tended to play down the level of corruption while law 
enforcement bodies were aware of some corruption but limited in what could be done without 
the necessary evidence.          
 
Furthermore, requests for information on customers, particularly from policing bodies 
encountered obstacles. This is not clear if the financial sector was obstructive or disorganised or 
both in some cases.  However, the financial sector was aware of the role that it had to play in 
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identifying potential money laundering, but the procedure for identifying high-risk accounts is an 
ongoing process, applied to new and existing customers. Any transaction that is not compatible 
with the economic status of the customer is considered suspicious and is reported by financial 
institutions to the Central Bank for further investigation. However, there was no indication that 
the amount of money was a key element in the decision regarding a transaction as suspicious. 
One respondent made it clear by saying that ‘a suspicious transaction has nothing to do with its 
amount. I know the common sense approach lead us to believe that any big transaction could be 
suspicious, which is wrong. The criminals are very clever and they know that bank officials will 
monitor any big transaction’.  
 
5.6. The	  Investigation	  of	  Cases	  and	  Arrests	  	  
The financial sector respondents felt that they were part of the solution rather than the problem 
and willingly worked with the criminal justice system, if required. They were keen to also 
emphasise that it is not in the interests of the financial sector to be party to money laundering. 
Therefore, the respondents were vociferous in defence of the financial sector, which would be 
expected, but produced a sound, logical case, that if they had a vested interest, if at all, it was to 
see banks as honest and trustworthy to attract customers.  
 
It was also suggested that the police needed to do more regarding the ‘policing’ of money 
laundering. This was particularly the case when provided with overwhelming information from 
the banks that suspicious activity had occurred regarding an event. Often it was felt that some 
type of investigation would be useful, but as was pointed out by one police respondent the 
‘banks’ did not always seem keen to expose corruption in their business and so were vocally 
supportive but official obstructive. This is similar to other business sectors that discover internal 
frauds375.  
                                                
375  Lawrence A. Cunningham. 'The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls To Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other 
Ills’(2004)' 29 Journal of Corporation Law 267;Khalid Farooq and Graham Brooks, 'Arab fraud and corruption 
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Furthermore, everyone interviewed agreed on the necessity of contributing to the struggle to 
prevent money laundering, organised crime and terrorism, however, opinion differed on the 
‘small-scale ’misappropriation of funds with no clear view from either law enforcement or the 
financial sector. In addition views diverged on the emphasis of punishment and persuasion as 
part of a regulatory regime376. Law enforcement preferred unsurprisingly punishment to deter 
future acts while those in the financial sector suggested a more light-touch approach to wayward 
acts and actors. As illustrated elsewhere, getting the right balance is weighed down with practical 
problems 377. 
 
Developing a sound case of money laundering, however, is difficult, particularly if a successful 
arrest is to be made and subsequent conviction. One police officer explained ‘first gather 
information and then continue to build the criminal case based upon your initial investigation. 
Our job is to start looking for the mistakes they have made to find foolproof evidence; it is not an 
easy job, honestly’. The police officers interviewed found it more convenient to focus on the 
criminal element of the crime, in other words, to ascertain that the suspect has indeed committed 
the crime. The majority of police officers said that the financial aspect of the money laundering 
was of less concern to them than the criminality of the act itself.  
 
Thus, while accepting the relevance of effective laws to prevent money laundering, many of the 
officers said that this should be complemented by a better system of criminal investigation in 
which police officers are trained in, and able to use, more sophisticated methods of criminal and 
financial investigation. Some of the police officers also mentioned, as a very important hindrance 
                                                                                                                                                       
professionals' views in the Arabian Gulf' , vol 20 (Emerald Group Publishing Limited 2013) 338;Michael Levi. 
'Taking the Profit out of Crime: the UK Experience' (1997) 5 Eur.J.Crime Crim.L.& Crim.Just. 228 
376  John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global business regulation (Cambridge University Press 2000) 
377 John Braithwaite. 'Beyond positivism: Learning from contextual integrated strategies' (1993) 30(4) J Res Crime 
Delinquency 383;John Braithwaite. 'Large business and the compliance model' (2003) V.Braithwaite 177 
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to an effective money laundering investigation, the fact that the Dubai Police do not have access 
to all financial data and information. As suggested, ‘if the Dubai Police is given direct access to 
the database of STRs and CTRs, it will improve our efforts in fighting organised crime… and 
money laundering in particular’. However, many of the respondents said that the transfer of 
cases from the AMLSCU to the Attorney General and the Public Prosecutor and then onto the 
police takes far too long for a case to reach it conclusion.  
 
Furthermore, even when knowingly victimised, individuals and organisations fail to report 
money laundering and other acts. An individual may feel embarrassed and fail to report the 
crime; an organisation might investigate in-house and decide that it would be best to resolve the 
matter internally, even though a crime has been committed, to protect its public reputation, rather 
than open a ‘Pandora’s box’ and expose the level and depth of corruption in their company378.  
 
The police respondents recognised, however, that some institutions had considered the problem 
of money laundering and were trying to ‘do something’ about it. These organisations, however, 
appeared to have had little success, and acted ‘after the event’ rather than prevent it, which is 
necessary to protect the integrity of business. The problem, however, appears to be one of 
integrity within some financial institutions as one part of the tripartite structure – legal 
framework, private financial sector and police - needed to work together to help prevent/reduce 
money laundering.  
 
When asked ‘do you find it easy to discover money laundering, and arrest suspects’, an 
AMLSCU representative suggested that there is ‘a general consensus of opinion amongst the 
bank managers and the AMLSCU officials that money laundering is not an easy crime to detect. 
Criminals use different tactics in order to hide the true origin of black money’.  
 
                                                
378 Michael Levi. 'Money laundering and its regulation' (2002) 582(1) Ann Am Acad Pol Soc Sci 181 
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However, the respondents from all sectors interviewed were aware that the UAE is committed to 
sharing financial information with its overseas partners in order to strengthen mutual cooperation 
to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The AMLSCU were particularly 
aware though, that criminal elements were taking full advantage of the cash-based economy in 
the UAE to launder money in the region. One respondent made it perfectly clear when they said 
‘If, for example, a person suddenly becomes rich without having any proper business or 
employment, there is no mechanism in place to ascertain the source of that person’s money’. It 
was further believed that criminals are also taking advantage of the weak immigration control 
systems increasing the problem of policing a growing illegal population and cash payments and 
transfers via the Hawala system379. 
 
Pursued on the matter of how they would arrest someone investigated for money laundering, the 
police generally agreed on the complex nature of this process. All agreed that money laundering 
is a different and unique type of crime; it varies from one case to another depending upon the 
nature of the case. In some cases one respondent said, ‘we arrest people on the spot, whereas in 
other cases we have to search homes, offices [and so on]. In some cases, we do not even manage 
to arrest the accused person for years. All the officers agreed that, ‘generally, cases referred to 
them via the Customs Authority are easier to handle than cases that have come via the 
AMLSCU’, as suspects in former cases could be arrested immediately at the port of entry. 
 
The only available information, however from the Dubai police released by the Director of 
Investigation was from 2002, with 16 cases associated with money laundering reported to 
relevant authorities. Nonetheless, some of the cases are still pending as they require detailed 
investigation years after they were discovered.  
 
                                                
379 Michael Levi and Peter Reuter. 'Money laundering' (2006) 34(1) Crime and Justice 289 
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5.7. Cooperation	  and	  Information	  Sharing	  
It was also suggested by those working for police institutions that the financial sector needed to 
do more regarding the ‘policing’ of money laundering, such as increased monitoring of financial 
activity through the use of money tracking requirements of organisations, such as invoicing as 
these sources can indicate where money laundering may occur380. This was particularly the case 
when provided with overwhelming information from the Anti-Money Laundering Suspicion 
Cases Unit (AMLSCU) that suspicious activity regarding transactions had occurred regarding an 
event.  
 
The role of the AMLSCU was made clear from one respondent: ‘we receive suspicious cases and 
we study the situation and if there is any inquiry, we notify the bank. And if it is proved that the 
transaction is illegitimate, we notify prosecutors and police and establish procedures to prove 
evidence to the court’.  
 
This sharing of information and communication is a necessary part of the system of preventing 
money laundering. All of the respondents interviewed agreed that without ‘sound’ information 
and clear channels of communication the UAE leaves itself open to money laundering, 
particularly from some of its neighbouring cash-based nations and those with a reputation for 
corruption. A few of the respondents named specific states and some even specific regions of a 
country as problematic. However, no evidence was forthcoming to substantiate these claims, and 
as such, it was decided keep such information anonymous rather than speculate on the personal 
judgement of a few respondents.  
 
This communication, however, is a dual exchange of information. For example, one respondent 
from the AMLSCU made it clear how important the financial sector is in preventing money 
                                                
380 Ramage, S 2012, 'Information technology facilitating money laundering', Information & Communications 
Technology Law, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 269-282. 
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laundering. It is not a role the ‘police and law enforcement’ bodies can achieve unless 
cooperation is forthcoming’. As one officer said ‘we receive information from the banks because 
they are the backbone of all business in the state… we also receive suspicious cases from 
exchange houses, and from public or private enterprises…receiving reports from all financial, 
commercial and economic development in the state’.  
 
However, one respondent from AMLSCU said that ‘all…operating in the country, whether 
commercial or industrial…if suspect suspicious transactions must notify the Central Bank of 
suspicious cases…but they tend to receive information from the private sector once an issue is 
exposed and gets publicity’. 
 
These competing views were typical of the interviews where personal experience and contacts 
made a difference on the question of communication and information sharing.  It appears that a 
system of communication needs to move beyond its informal system of information sharing to 
one of a more formal and standardise system. There was no concern about the use of technology 
and the spread of what is referred as to ‘soft security’, ‘dataveillance’ or ‘surveillance in either 
sector381, however. This is perhaps because the informal system is part of the cultural context of 
Dubai. It was made clear, however, that ‘this system is not available to everyone’. There appears 
to be two present systems running parallel depending on customer; the formal or informal.    
 
One Dubai police officer made his views clear when claiming that ‘it is not easy to find evidence 
in a money laundering case because criminals have thought about the way of hiding money from 
us. So we need to access to bank records or any financial information but there is too much 
trouble in the investigation to obtain and swap records’. Most tellingly ‘he added you cannot 
                                                
381 Michael Levi and David S. Wall. 'Technologies, Security, and Privacy in the Post‐9/11 European Information 
Society' (2004) 31(2) Journal of law and society 194 
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fight money laundering effectively by introducing laws alone. You need effective 
implementation of the law’. 
 
Furthermore, an AMLSCU official said, ‘the facts that the police are not trained in the 
investigation of financial data do not have expertise in understanding banking records. However, 
they {the banks} would never welcome the police coming to them and asking for their clients’ 
records. It does not give a good impression of the bank’. 
 
The majority of the interviews ended on a positive note, however, with many saying such as “it 
is my responsibility to share information or SARs if relevant”. And the other saying “Money 
laundering as a crime could possibility be used against us (as a country)”. Some of them say that 
“I believe sharing of information would help our department and solve and combat money 
laundering. But we need to give each department chance to do fulfil their objectives in the way 
that helps investigation to bring the cases to justice”.  
 
5.8. Hawala	  system	  	  
There is concern in political circles in the UAE that the Hawala system is abused to transfer 
funds. Since Hawala is considered to be an undocumented and non-transparent system with a 
high resilience to law enforcement and regulation, controlling and applying mechanisms to 
prevent money laundering, criminal exploitation and potential terrorism is difficult. This view of 
the Hawala system was supported by many in the private financial sector that felt that ‘it was a 
threat to the stability of the proper system (meaning legal system), and desperately needed 
regulation’ and ‘Hawala’s lack of transparency allows it to function as it wishes’. Perhaps aware 
of these views the UAE is making progress through highlighting its vulnerability to Hawala, and 
its business reputation with a public campaign.  The result of this campaign, however, are yet, if 
ever to be assessed. 
It further was felt that to ‘police’ the Hawala system that experience and some knowledge of 
money laundering was important. This, as above, was a view held predominantly by those in the 
private sector. As one respondent claimed ‘the police seem to find it difficult to police us let 
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alone the Hawala system’, he further went on to suggest that ‘the private sector could help train 
the police, if they wanted it’.  The respondent, however, was unsure how this would be accepted 
and developed.       
 
Experience was a common theme in the private sector, with many claiming that those who are 
vastly experienced in other businesses that deal with money laundering, fraud and matters of 
company integrity; it was merely expressed as a point of view that some experience of money 
laundering was useful. The detection of money laundering, however, is perhaps compounded by 
the Hawala system. Money transfer, however, is not the only way to launder money, but it is one 
of the other ‘tools’ that organised criminal elements use. It is here that those employ in law 
enforcement illustrated some concern that ‘the system is old; it has been around for years…we 
can’t simply change it’. There was also some ‘defence’ of Hawala ‘we can’t simply change just 
because some western powers are complaining; this is an international problem…but this system 
has worked for years, why change now?   As mentioned above the Hawala systemis not a 
problem for the UAE; it is one for the whole international financial sector and law enforcement 
bodies.  
 
When questioned that the Hawala system is a legal loophole used by criminals and terrorism to 
commit money laundering and terrorism, the response from an AMLSCU Official was, ‘I am 
surprised that after 9/11, everybody was talking about the illegality of Hawala, but nobody 
demanded punishing those (legal) banks that were used by the hijackers for money transfers’. 
However, on the other hand, others thought that the link that was made between Hawala and 9/11 
had ‘alerted the government to the need to pay more attention to the monitoring of Hawala’. 
This is perhaps a step in the right direction but to what extent the Hawala system is resistant to 
attention and ultimately regulation is for future research.    
 
Seen as ‘different’ to other types of crime those tasked with protecting the integrity of a 
legitimate company were fully aware of the negative view held if a breach of security occurred. 
It was made apparent in the interviews in the financial sector that if a ‘business was to be used as 
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a conduit for money laundering they could be seen as incompetent, lacking a ‘proper’ AML 
strategy instead as a victim of crime’. It is, however, perhaps misleading to view the ‘respected’ 
parts of the financial sector in highly regulated sectors in this way. They, rather than many other 
businesses, spend their time investing the funds they have; they, however, are also vulnerable to 
individuals and organised criminal elements that wish to launder money and use the legitimate 
banking sector as a conduit to ‘clean’ illegal funds (See case of HSBC earlier). However, it was 
apparent from the interviews that the unregulated Hawala system was seen as damaging to the 
financial sector as a whole. Those tightly regulated and licensed felt that they were often 
categorised and portrayed as the same as those based in ‘questionable jurisdictions’ and the 
Hawala system. 
 
However, much of what was said in the interviews was speculation, as there is no complete 
estimate of the number of individuals who are UAE-based Hawala brokers.382As an attempt to 
combat money laundering, the UAE has conducted a number of meetings, seminars and 
conferences to strengthen its efforts in this consideration. A committee was established to visit 
specific states in 2007 so as to strengthen and implement AML measures. Little progress, 
however, has been made since these visits regarding the regulation of the Hawala system.   
 
The Central Bank, however, is currently supervising 61 Hawala brokers in the same way as other 
financial institutions in an attempt to enhance the reputation of this system. The brokers are 
required to present sheets that contain the names and addresses of both transferors and 
beneficiaries to the Central Bank. This also includes the completion of the suspicious transaction 
reports. The new attention given to Hawala is encouraging a number of people to make use of the 
regulated exchange houses within the UAE. Attractiveness of Hawala is said to include “low 
cost, speed, anonymity, and versatility”, perceived as a threat to global banking industry and 
                                                
382 Temple, P. 1998. Provided the most essential Elements applied in the Prevention of Money Laundering. 
Securities Institute Ltd, www.securitiesinstitute.org.uk. 
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financial security383. Legitimacy of the Hawala system is critical to achieving global financial 
structure in UAE Banking384. This is a step in the right direction and the UAE Government 
(UAEG) has acknowledged the need to regulate “near-cash” markets as well such as the Gold 
Souk 385 in an attempt to prevent money laundering. 
 
Furthermore, an international supervision committee in charge of the standards for banking 
regulation and supervision in the UAE, for instance, in Bahrain has recently embarked on 
implementing AML strategies. This appears a move in the right direction but with money 
laundering is estimated to be 5% of worldwide GDP or worth more than US$1 trillion per annum 
as presented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Interpol, this ‘relationship’ is still 
limited in what it can achieve. The data from the IMF and Interpol was based on monitoring 
customer transactions for potential racketeering and illegal asset movement386 and as such is no 
doubt an underestimate of the percentage of funds illegally transferred around the world.   
 
While the federal laws on AML are equally applicable to the domestic sector and within the 
DIFC, the obligation for issuing or implementing regulations and overseeing compliance rests 
upon the relevant regulatory authorities. For instance, the domestic sector involves the Central 
Bank to control banks, money changers and other related finance sectors, the Emirates Securities 
as well as Commodities Authority or securities brokers and with the support of the Ministry of 
Economy. However, a single regulator known as the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) 
is in control of all the financial service providers within the DIFC. This is due to the current 
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variance of specified obligations that are imposed on various parts of the financial sector within 
the UAE. The procedures used in AML require the entire practices to produce, maintain AML 
policies and the related procedures that could be reviewed on a regular basis as part of the 
practice undertaken in the ant-money monitoring process. Such procedures include a money 
laundering reporting officer (MLRO). 387  The MLRO is responsible for executing AML 
strategies and must be a senior person from within the business and having the ability to portray 
sufficient authority to make independent decisions on the roles undertaken in AML strategies 
and implementation388. 
 
These changes, however, make little impact of the Hawala system. This is an area in need of 
detailed research, particularly it regulation, but it will undoubtedly be hard to secure access and 
interview willing participants.  
 
5.9. Key	  Issues:	  Building	  Strategies	  for	  the	  Future	  
As with all research there are limitations to what it achieves. This research is no different. 
Firstly, interviews are sometimes time consuming as they require careful preparation, such as 
making the necessary arrangement(s) to visit premises and confirming and keeping appointments 
and securing the necessary permission (Robson, 1993).  Secondly, the main problem encountered 
in the interviews was that so many of the respondents were busy and had limited time available. 
This was because many important cases are pending and as such time was limited.  The 
interviews were, however, valuable, and it was important to interview a broad section of people 
involved in preventing money laundering in Dubai rather than from one agency. The final and 
perhaps most contentious part of the interviews was interview bias with one of our team a 
Captain in the Dubai Police. This, however, is a problem for all research which can affect the 
outcome from access, interview to final data obtained. Though this is a problem, this research 
                                                
387 Marcel Pheijffer, 'Financial investigations and criminal money' , vol 2 (MCB UP Ltd 1998) 33. 
388 RE Bell, 'Discretion and decision making in money laundering prosecutions' , vol 5 (MCB UP Ltd 2001) 42-51. 
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would not have been possible without one member of the team from a similar cultural 
background in a position to access the respondents.    
 
There was also the problem of analysis and examination of secondary data such as official crime 
statistics and cases of money laundering in the UAE, which was limited. This in turn affected the 
basis for interviews with key personnel in the AMLSCU, AOCD and Central Bank, in order to 
evaluate to what extent the prevention of money laundering is to be enhanced in the UAE. This 
included examining whether the current system is ‘fit for purpose’ in the age of international 
trade and commerce.  
 
However, the rate/percentage of money laundered is difficult if not impossible to assess. As 
illustrated by the percentage of money coming from the proceeds of wholesale illegal narcotics 
trade that actually gets laundered is a multiple of the sum that has been confiscated, and the value 
of that multiple depends on how efficiently anti-laundering regime confiscates illegal money 
(Steinko, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, money launderers do not always use the legal banking system. If they do it has 
been established that they purchase fiscally opaque products, meant to secure future medical 
coverage and personal pension plans.  Only a marginal portion of the financial assets is assigned 
to speculative financial risk389 in the legal system with laundered money used elsewhere 
illustrated (i.e., gold market). This research, similar to other research confirmed that money 
launders and productive legal financial sector sometimes have very little in common and that 
launderers prefer to place money in a shell company with no activity to those that are formally 
capable of developing a regular productive business activity390. The problem of competition in 
                                                
389 Michael Levi and Petrus C. van Duyne, 'Drugs and Money: Managing the Drug Trade and Crime Money in 
Europe' (Routledge 2005) 
390 Armando Fernández Steinko. 'Financial channels of money laundering in Spain' (2012) 52(5) Br J Criminol 908 
 159 
legal banking sector was also a concern raised by a few police officers: ‘in the search for more 
money, profits, these banks will not always do what is necessary and tell us what is happening 
with some accounts.    
 
The problem encountered in this research is that most of the secondary data was either withheld 
for security reasons i.e. ongoing cases or private considerations i.e. protecting integrity of own 
company, which is understandable or, and this was the most common theme, there is little 
available data on money laundering in the UAE, which needs to be addressed. What data was 
obtained was nonetheless still helpful but it is suggested that recording practices need some 
attention before we can tackle the problem of money laundering from a policy-type-approach to 
disseminate practice within and across different sectors in the UAE that deal with money 
laundering.  Data, and particularly criminal justice data is, however, open to criticism391 and acts 
of fraud and corruption are difficult to detect 392.  
 
Regardless of this problem, however, some understanding of the level of money laundering – 
even if an estimate - in a certain domain is important. From this research it would appear that to 
varying extents and in various ways money laundering could be, but was rarely assessed (both 
directly and indirectly) for its prevalence at particular moments, as well as over periods of time. 
It is still doubtful, however, as to what extent assessments reflect the level of money laundering. 
There is also similar disquiet regarding the effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures due 
to its multi-dimensional character.  In the UAE efforts have been undertaken to prevent and 
reduce money laundering. There is, however, little official data, as yet, that illustrates that this is 
happening. This research is a contribution to this ‘gap in knowledge’ in highlighting the paucity 
of data that needs to be addressed in the UAE.  
 
                                                
391  Steven Box, Recession, crime and punishment (Macmillan Education Hong Kong/London 1987);Victor Jupp, 
'Methods of Criminological Research (1989)' () 
392  Gary Slapper and Steve Tombs, Corporate crime (Longman 1999) 
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However, a lack of official data is not a problem that is specific to the UAE, it is a worldwide 
problem. Objective ‘criminal’ data is difficult to obtain, either on a national or international 
level. One of the problems of drawing on secondary data then is trying to gather international 
comparison of money laundering with initiatives that do not take into account the variations that 
exist in the world of international finance393 . In saying this we hope that this original research is 
step in the right direction in producing some background to present strategies in preventing 
money laundering in Dubai.     
 
Furthermore, it was discovered that in Dubai, new forms of exchange found elsewhere in 
Europe, USA etc. instituting a joint form of surveillance - the financial sector and law 
enforcement - is hardly developed in Dubai.  It was as one respondent said ‘work in progress’. 
Elsewhere the hybridization of money laundering with public and private sector connections 
(i.e., police work in financial sector) is also absent in Dubai. Here there is a clear demarcation of 
roles. However, communication between sectors is on more of an informal, familial basis than 
official, and personal, familial contacts keep the flow of information going. A respondent did, 
however, raise the issue that the internationalisation of the financial sector is ‘leading to a stage 
where informal and personal contacts were becoming less important as people from outside 
{other cultures} were increasingly employed’. 
 
 A telling final difference we discovered is that the homogenisation of procedures such as 
training, network exchange and the use of information technology where not always so obvious. 
These procedures were in place but perhaps because of the cultural context and personal, familial 
networks that are part of ‘Dubai life’ had not reached the stage of homogenisation highlighted in 
previous research394. This, however, is something that is changing.  
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This thesis then is a snapshot of current strategies to tackle money laundering in Dubai. Many 
issues were highlighted with some – sharing information and professional communication – 
perhaps in need of immediate attention. However, we are aware that legislative and cultural 
changes are slow regardless of the jurisdiction. There is also a fear that the cultural context and 
‘way we do it here‘ is lost due to globalisation; as a few of our respondents in the police and 
financial sector in reference to anti-money laundering practices said ‘we work in the same 
industry but different environment’, ‘you can’t expect everyone around the world to be the same’ 
and the more vociferous ‘the international community (meaning western interests) is not always 
right’ and ‘at times, it is if we are some backward state in need of help’.  Since money 
laundering is an international problem working relationships with other jurisdictions in necessary 
if this crime is to be prevented in anyway.             
 
 
5.10. Conclusion	  
In this chapter themes emerged that indicated that AML practice in Dubai is in need of some 
attention.  This is particularly the case for those tasked with the supervision and regulation of the 
financial sectors, and other markets (i.e. gold market). This is compounded by the lack of skills 
and knowledge of law enforcement in dealing with cases of money laundering. This is not a 
criticism of law enforcement bodies; it is a result of this research that police officers illustrated 
professional reflection and requested increased resources and information and education on how 
best to prevent this crime.  
 
Furthermore, the lack of communication was a concern, primarily from law enforcement that 
considered the ‘sometimes’ limited response for information from the private sectors as 
indifference, studied obstruction and/or in-house incompetence. Regardless of the potential 
reason a clear channel of communication about possible cases, suspicious behaviour and access 
to client accounts needs to be addressed. However, rather than be seen as part of the problem, 
those working for the financial sector interviewed felt they were part of the solution in 
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preventing money laundering and saw their role as one of exposing illegal acts, and preventing 
frauds. This perception, however, did not chime with law enforcements views nor the actual 
practice discovered in this research.   
 
There was also concern that there are matters beyond the control of law enforcement bodies and 
the financial sectors. Discussing the issue of new regulation or laws into financial system, one 
respondent said ‘new regulation might help in preventing money laundering but some sectors are 
beyond our (the police) and their (financial sector) control. For example: if you are going to rent 
an apartment you will be surprised when the real estate or the owner will ask you to pay them in 
cash instead of a cheque. This is beyond our control.’  To state the obvious, it is impossible to 
trance founds that the police and financial sectors have no record of. This is a major problem in 
Dubai, where cash rather than credit is highly valued and sought by legitimate businesses let 
alone organised crime.   
 
This chapter has offered a snapshot of current practice in Dubai and it offered anonymous 
employees in different sectors a chance to express their views. These views are not necessarily 
representative of all employees or across the sectors, but they offer a snap shot of views on the 
issues that count from those working ‘on the inside’ regarding the prevention of money 
laundering in Dubai and the UAE. 
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Chapter	  Six	  
 
AML	  strategies	  in	  Dubai	  
6.1. Introduction	  	  
In this chapter there is a review of AML strategies and practices in Dubai. This is dealt with in 
chronological rather order, rather than level of importance as laws, strategies and law 
enforcement bodies were established to counter the problem organisational money laundering, 
and criminal and illegal funds associated with terrorism. A recurring theme in this chapter, and 
the thesis, is that laws are passed, law enforcement bodies established, political pronouncements 
made and yet the reality and actual practice of preventing money laundering is completely 
different. This ‘gap’ between laws and practice in not experienced in Dubai alone, it is a problem 
for civil regulation and/or criminal enforcement around the world, and where possible this is 
stressed regarding the United Kingdom, which has an established financial centre in London for 
integrity and probity. This is to indicate that no matter how established mistakes, errors, neglect 
and criminal acts are still discovered in some of the most rigorous, regulated environments in the 
world.       
  
This chapter first highlights the AML Regulations of 2000 in the UAE and expectations placed 
on those working in the financial sector(s) in Dubai. This is followed by a review of the Money 
Laundering Law 2002 and is effectiveness in preventing money laundering. The next section 
considers the role of the Central Bank and its part in the prevention of money laundering 
followed by an examination of the NAMLC and its roles. Once these have been established a 
critical appraisal of the impediments to developing a comprehensive system of regulation and 
AML practice is considered with a view of Dubai that it is moving in the right direction, albeit 
slowly, in preventing money laundering in its jurisdiction.               
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6.2. Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Regulation	  of	  2000	  
In response to the increasing international concern regarding money laundering within the 
Middle East, the UAE financial sector embarked on a re-evaluation of their AML strategies as 
well as procedures to ensure that they were compliant with the laws and regulations of the 
Central Bank of the UAE. In line with Article 17 of the Central Bank Circular Number 24/2000, 
the UAEs Central Bank compliance officer was, and still is, expected to monitor and evaluate 
financial transactions carried out by financial sector employees in charge of processing and 
managing accounts.395 It is questionable, however, to what extent the Central Bank wants to 
prevent money laundering. With only one officer (at the time of this research) for an expanding 
financial sector the monitoring of transactions is limited. Those in the financial sector will no 
doubt be aware of this, and therefore perhaps behave in a manner that is unethical. There was no 
evidence in this research to suggest this, but with minimal supervision it is possible that some 
employees might ‘cut corners’ with expected procedures396. This is not to suggest that all 
employees will be unethical in transferring funds but a system of surveillance beyond one person 
is needed to properly monitor and deter those that might be tempted to ‘break the rules’ and 
circumvent money laundering regulations (see chapter six). Furthermore, regulatory documents 
as well as laws make it clear that training is essential for employees of the Central Bank to help 
prevent money laundering. It, however, does not include instructions on what the training ought 
to cover or how it should be implemented. 
 
The main objective of the Money Laundering Regulations is that they are undertaken and the 
appropriate and proportionate measures that can deter, disrupt and detect money laundering are 
implemented. Therefore, all AML regulations apply to those working in the financial sector(s) 
such as practising accountants, consultants and advisors. Based on the Money Laundering 
                                                
395 In the year 2000, the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates established the National Anti-Money 
Laundering Committee, which currently has overall responsibility for ensuring that coordination of anti-money 
laundering policies is well implemented within the country. 
396 However, cultural aspects, such as in Islamic law, may have an influence in this area, but includes a large base 
of social research that is not added to this study. 
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Regulations of 2007 that was explicitly enshrined in the United Kingdom legislation, and on 
which the UAE has drawn (see chapter two), the concept of a risk-based approach to the issues 
of AML is paramount. Businesses are required to establish adequate and appropriate policies as 
well as procedures associated with risk assessment and management as a way of preventing 
money laundering and terrorism by undertaking due diligence assessments397 on new and 
existing customers. This sadly is not always the case regardless of the jurisdiction (see previous 
chapter and examples of the HSBC and Mexican cartels). 
Furthermore, the recording of the processes involved have to be documented or displayed within 
a written policy and the design and implementation of the necessary controls aimed at managing 
and mitigating such risks and the recording of their operations has to be taken into consideration. 
Both individual practitioners and businesses must assess risks associated with money laundering 
on various financial products and services, types of clients, their jurisdictions of origins, 
investment, how they conduct their businesses, funding and sectors. During this risk assessment 
process, the practitioners and businesses must apply a clear risk categorisation of low, normal 
and high. This approach is considered to be valid and, as a result of its rationale, it becomes 
capable of reducing complexity, but with a retained element of discretion as well as flexibility, 
especially in cases where the risk ratings can either be raised or lowered through appropriate 
management as a way of responding to a specific or exceptional circumstance. A risk-based 
approach to customer(s) due diligence will categorise situations which, by their nature, can 
reflect a risk of activity potentially associated with money laundering or terrorism.398 
 
                                                
397  William C. Gilmore, Dirty money: the evolution of international measures to counter money laundering and 
the financing of terrorism (Council of Europe 2011) 
Gilmore, William C. 1999. Dirty Money: The evolution of money laundering Counter-measures. Council of Europe 
Press, Strasbourg, 2nd ed. 
398 William C. Gilmore. 'Dirty Money: The evolution of money laundering counter-measures. Rev. and expanded' 
(2000)  
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AML process and policies, however, can be integrated into the existing risk management 
systems or placed separately and outside business practices. The policies and procedures of AML 
are considered to be important to businesses, if they are contributing to the mitigation of risks of 
financial fraud. Practices should therefore involve the application of a risk-based approach in 
order to allow efforts to be concentrated on the higher risk.399 The UAE, therefore, considers 
AML measures as not only the attempts to control the acts of financial crime, but also a means of 
depriving criminals of the power that enables them to achieve their objectives. They are thus 
considered as important steps for completing as well as modernising AML legislation. 
 
However, due to a review of the current practices by the National Committee, in 2000 the 
Central Bank issued Circular 24/2000, which strengthened and expanded AML requirements for 
the financial sector. This circular covers all the banks, money exchanges and finance institutions 
operating within the UAE. It expects procedures to be followed regarding the identification of 
both natural and the juridical persons, and request and photocopy necessary documents for 
identification, and rules on the type of customer records which ought to be maintained in the files 
at the processing institution.  This expectation, however, is often more in hope than reality, as the 
results (see chapter six) shows, even now many years after is implementation.   
 
However, other conditions of Circular 24/2000 seem to be followed as it was clear from the 
research that customer records were maintained with further periodical updates provided for the 
Central Bank, if requested. 400 These regulations are in need of updating once more with the 
development and expansion of the financial sector in Dubai. Most of all, though, and this is a 
recurring theme in this chapter, the monitoring of the financial system is in need of review; a 
                                                
399 Bell, R. E. 2002. An Introductory Who’s who for Money Laundering Investigators,” Journal of Money 
Laundering Control. Vol. 5, No. 4: pp. 287-295. 
400  James R. Richards, Transnational criminal organizations, cybercrime, and money laundering: a handbook for 
law enforcement officers, auditors, and financial investigators (CRC 1999) 
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policy document, regulation(s), and laws are of little use if there are limited resources (i.e., 
people) to monitor transactions. This is also relevant to the Money Laundering Law of 2002.         
 
6.3. Criminalisation	  of	  Money	  Laundering	  Law	  of	  2002	  
The UAE and Dubai in particular has taken a lead in the Middle East in the criminalisation of 
money laundering under Federal Law No. 4 in specific relation to the financial liberated zones. 
Based on Article 3(1) of the Federal Law 8/2004 AML laws are applicable to all the operations 
of a company, regardless of its business – financial, insurance - in these liberated zones. 
However, in practice many type of FFZ exist in Dubai (i.e. Dubai Gold) and operate in one of the 
free zones in the Dubai Multi-Commodities Centre,401 and as such the practical implication of 
AML laws is that each of the free zones establishes its distinctive rules and procedures in the 
implementation of the law. This is an unnecessary complex system, and as such, contributes to 
potential money laundering. Money laundering was criminalised and implemented under Article 
2 of the Anti-Money Laundering law, which affirms: 
 
“in cases where an individual intentionally becomes involved in the commitment or assistance in 
the transaction of property obtained from such offences that are stated in Article 2, he or she will 
be considered as the perpetrator of a money laundering offence.402  
                                                
401 In particular focusing on the First EU Money Laundering Directive 91/308 and its legislative requirements and 
domestic public policies, Anti-Money Laundering measures have been considered highly important in the UAE. 
401 The origin of money laundering offences was contained within the Drug Trafficking Offences Act of 1986, and 
was later on incorporated into the Drug Trafficking Act 1994. However, initially such offences were confined to the 
laundering of those proceeds involved in drug trafficking criminal acts. The government later on concluded that 
application of such law becomes difficult or appears impractical when it comes to distinguishing drugs from the 
non-drugs proceeds as well as introducing some new offences into the country’s Criminal Justice Act of 1988 that 
was superseded under the leadership of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, which was considered to be applicable to the 
proceeds of any inducible non-drug offences. 
402 Similar focus can be confirmed from Law No. 4/2002. For more detailed explanation refer to Kalid Al-Mhery, 
‘Money Laundering within the United Arab Emirates,’ Dar Al-Kreer, Dubai 2002. 
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The transfer or deposit of proceeds with the intention to conceal the illicit origin of it, the ability 
to conceal its true nature, location, movement rights, source as well as the acquisition, possession 
and use of proceeds of property play a significant part in the laundering of illegal funds.403  
 
However, property obtained from the proceeds of crime in Dubai will not always seek a 
conviction. The public prosecutors’ team is required to prove all the elements of any predicate 
offence that reaches a criminal standard. This as elsewhere is a high threshold, and as such the 
level of evidence needed to secure a conviction is sometimes difficult to reach. In Dubai, 
however, the office of public prosecutor will, and can, provide evidence of a convicted predicate 
offence either from an assertion - obtained from any defendant within the UAE - or from an 
international country 404  willing to supply the relevant evidence and documentation. This 
approach is one familiar with criminal justice systems in democratic nations where a conviction 
is only possible based on evidence and a conviction is sought on the offences that is easiest to 
prove rather than the gamut of possible offences.     
  
This criminalisation of money laundering also involves all forms of money laundering (i.e. 
electronic transfer), and is related to Cyber Crimes Law No. 2 of 2006. Such laws are often used 
in cases where their sources are either concealed or associated with criminal proceeds and 
enforces money laundering in compliance with the Vienna and Palermo regulations under the 
                                                
403 Riccardo Sansonetti. 'Switzerland: Legislation to Combat Money Laundering' (1998) 2(1) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 82 
404 In Article 2 of Anti-Money Laundering Act 2002 defined money laundering as: an act where an individual 
intentionally commits acts related to property derived from the offences stated within the item 2 of in the article, 
such an individual person is considered a perpetrator of money-laundering offences such as in the conversion or 
transferences of money laundering proceeds, aimed at concealing or disguising any illicit origin of these proceeds, 
the true nature of the act, source, origin, disposition movement, rights in relation  to or the ownership of proceeds 
and the acquisition as well as possession or the use of those proceeds.404 
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key Anti-Money Laundering/CFT ordinances. Furthermore, the criminalisation of terrorism is 
achieved through the Federal Law reference No. 1 of 2004 terrorism offences (CFT Law) and the 
Cyber Crimes Law.405  
 
However, as mentioned earlier laws are of little use unless implemented effectively (i.e. there is a 
system of surveillance and punishment if laws are broken) with a system of prevention and 
resources and personnel to monitor and enforce illegal transfer of funds. However, the FATF 
notes the importance of beginning with a legal framework and establishing accountable parties 
for the management and growth of the AML regulations and implementation. Until this is fully 
recognised, the criminalisation of money laundering, will have limited impact on those that seek 
to launder money in Dubai. This is perhaps why Dubai developed an Anti-Money Laundering 
and Suspicious Case Unit (AMLSCU) as early as 2002. 
  
6.4. Role	  of	  the	  AMLSCU-­‐	  Central	  Bank	  of	  the	  UAE	  
Established in 2002, the UAE's financial intelligence unit (FIU) is commonly referred to as the 
AMLSCU.406 It has made progress is some sectors (see below) in preventing money laundering 
but is in need of review (see chapter six) and as stated earlier needs to recruit professional 
personnel. The establishment of AMLSCU was primarily concerned with investigating fraud and 
associated suspicious transactions. It was originally created to support international attempts to 
combat money laundering as well as the financing of terrorism, the fulfilment of the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution referenced No. 1373 of 2001, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Board Decision referenced No. 144-(52/51).407 In 2008 the 
                                                
405 Maria E. de Boyrie, Simon J. Pak* and John S. Zdanowicz. 'The impact of Switzerland's money laundering law 
on capital flows through abnormal pricing in international trade' (2005) 15(4) Appl Financ Econ 217 
406 William Witherell. 'International approaches to combating financial abuse and promoting stable financial 
markets' (2002) 5(4) Journal of Money Laundering Control 257. 257-262. 
407 Maria E. de Boyrie, Simon J. Pak* and John S. Zdanowicz, 'The impact of Switzerland's money laundering law 
on capital flows through abnormal pricing in international trade' , vol 15 (Taylor & Francis 2005) 217 
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IMF acknowledged that the AMLSCU has been involved in substantial outreach programmes 
and events with parts of the Dubai financial sector, but needed to step up its programme(s) of 
involvement with other financial sectors, such as securities and commodities. This is still 
considered an issue in the current climate and one that is in need of attention.  
 
Legislation is required to clarify the powers and responsibilities of FIU, and increase the 
resources needed to prevent money laundering. For example, at present, it lacks resources to 
analyse the majority of the STRs that are sent in from the financial sectors and as such many 
STRs are submitted but not acted on. This is an issue in need of immediate attention. Some STRs 
will be submitted as the financial sector passes on information no matter how vague and 
insignificant to simply protect itself if a transaction is later discovered to be illegal. This is 
understandable but leads to a system that is unable to cope and therefore due to the lack of 
personnel illegal transaction might be discovered but at too late a date or missed as to few people 
process the volume of work. 
 
Even	  with	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	  Banking	  Supervision	  System	  as	  well	  as	  an	  examination	  section,	  which	  
is	  responsible	  for	  off-­‐site	  supervision,	  and	  on-­‐site	  examination	  of	  all	  financial	  institutions,	  which	  
are	   licensed	  by	   the	  UAE	  Central	   Bank	   a	   lack	  of	   resources	  undoubtedly	   affect	   the	  AMLSCU	   to	  
function,	  as	  it	  should. However,	  it	  is	  also	  empowered	  to	  issue	  or	  enable	  freeze	  orders	  on	  such	  
funds	  obtained	  anywhere	  within	  the	  financial	  system	  of	  the	  UAE	  and	  to	  audit	  accounts	  that	  are	  
considered	  to	  enable	  terrorism,	  placing	  obligations	  on	  the	  financial	  institutions	  to	  monitor	  and	  
report	   all	   the	   suspicious	   transactions.	   Yet	   again,	   to	   successfully	  prevent	   and/or	   reduce	   illegal	  
practice(s)	   in	   Dubai	   a	   sufficient	   number	   of	   professional	   personnel	   are	   required.	   Working in 
partnership with the regulatory supervision team(s) therefore requires financial institutions to 
execute full responsibility to ensure that the UAE financial system remains clean and protected 
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from criminal abuses and terrorism408 but such expectations appear to be more about hope in that 
the financial sectors will do as required rather than monitored under a strict and demanding 
system of supervision.   
 
However, this is only one problem; due to the partition of roles, the Central Bank supervises 
banks and exchange bureaus as well409. The Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority 
(ESCA) supervises’ securities brokers; and the country’s Ministry of Economy has to deal with 
the insurance sector. In addition, all the financial sectors within the UAE are divided between 
institutions that operate within its domestic market and those that are licensed to run businesses 
in the International Financial Centre (DIFC) of Dubai, an area identified as a free zone. As a 
result, the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) is considered as the main supervisory 
power of all the financial institutions that operate in the Dubai International Financial Centre, 
regardless of core business.  
 
Furthermore, UAE AML measured issued by the Central Bank are commonly applicable to 
financial sectors that are under its supervision only, which are mostly in Dubai. Circulars issued 
by the Central Bank, requiring the identification of customers and the provision of STR 
commitments, however, apply to this sector. Although suspicious activity is initially recorded 
and then reported from a financial institution, the UAECB is only capable of freezing the 
suspect’s funds, making appropriate inquiries as well as coordinating with law 
enforcement410depending on the sector. Due to this rather complex system of supervision it is 
hardly Dubai decided to establish a National Anti-Money Laundering Committee with an 
overarching and strategic approach to preventing money laundering in Dubai. 
                                                
408 Trifin J. Roule and Jeremy Kinsell. 'Legislative and bureaucratic impediments to suspicious transaction 
reporting regimes' (2003) 6(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 151.151 – 156. 
409 RE Bell. 'An introductory who's who for money laundering investigators' (2002) 5(4)ibid287-295. 
410 Satish M. Kini, 'Recent anti-money laundering enforcement actions: lessons to be learned at others' expense' , 
vol 7 (Emerald Group Publishing Limited 2006) 38 
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6.5. The	  National	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Committee	  (NAMLC)	  
The National Anti-Money Laundering Committee (NAMLC) was established by the Ministry of 
Finance and Industry to develop a clear strategic AML approach, regardless of the sector. This 
committee is established under the chairmanship of the Governor of the UAE Central Bank and 
comprises of various representatives from the judicial as well as ministerial authorities who are 
responsible for the co-ordination and implementation of anti-money laundering policies within 
the UAE. 411In cases where money laundering offences have occurred outside the UAE, it has 
entered into treaties, and provided that the identified act is considered as a criminal offence the 
state can, upon verification of an order, regulate the detection, freezing or temporary attachment 
of property or proceeds used in a money laundering offence. The penalty attributed to an act of 
money laundering is seven or more years of imprisonment with an alternative fine of about AED 
300,000, depending on the act and cooperation of the person(s) involved. These ‘punishments’ – 
prison and/or a fine –can also be imposed on officers, employees and management of the 
financial institutions that fall short of reporting suspected money laundering.  
 
However, the NAMLC has the power to offer immunity from criminal prosecution, civil or 
administrative action to the financial institutions, directors as well as employees, if following set 
rules but were still unable to prevent money laundering. As a result of protecting the integrity of 
the organisation under investigation, the NAMLC can, however, reprimand any individual that 
fails to report a suspicious transaction, or imprison, depending on degree of culpability, for no 
more than one year, or a fine not exceeding AED 50,000, or both. This range of possible 
sanctions should act as a deterrent (see chapter six) but often in practice seems to have little 
impact on those it aims to deter. 
As the overarching body, the NAMLC enables an exchange of information among the various 
authorities and associated financial institutions representing the UAE in regional and 
                                                
411Angela Itzikowitz. 'South Africa: Prevention and control of money laundering' (1998) 2(1) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 74 
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international forums. However, it is still the responsibility of all banks that are operating within 
the UAE to ensure that each of their employees is well trained in AML matters and act according 
to established rules and regulations. For effective and efficient implementation of this policy, 
however, the Central Bank of the UAE is obliged to guide banks on methods of training in order 
to prevent money laundering, though it is the full responsibility of the bank to put this into 
practice as well as monitor the training412of current and newly employed personnel.  
 
To compound matters even further the UAE Insurance Authority, is expected to supervise the 
whole of the insurance sector, mostly located in Dubai. The problem here is that the financial 
sector is not run on a ‘silo system’. Banks have interests across the range of financial services. 
However, the UAE Insurance Authority passes all legislation relevant to its sector, and those in 
the free trade zones. Under this Insurance Authority then AML procedures are subject to 
conform to the Insurance Authority rules and regulations and inspection when requested. 413 
Penalties for the non-compliance are a fine of AED 5,000 to AED 1 million or imprisonment 
depending yet again on the circumstances of the transgression.414 
 
Proposals	  in	  the	  Counter	  Terrorism	  Law	  2004	  provided	  the	  availability	  of	  detailed	  measures	  for	  
the	  confiscation	  of	  property	  obtained	  via	  money	  laundering415.The UAE Federal Law reference 
                                                
412 Mark Pieth. 'Prevention of Money Laundering: A Comparative Analysis' (1998) 6 Eur.J.Crime Crim.L.& 
Crim.Just. 159 p. 159. 
413William Witherell, 'International approaches to combating financial abuse and promoting stable financial 
markets' , vol 5 (MCB UP Ltd 2002) 257, pp. 257-262. 
414 Shaap, C. D. 1998. Money Laundering: A Public Prosecutor View Point. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 
Vol.1, No.3, January. 
415 Section 15 of the Terrorist Act 2000 states that a person commits an offence only if he or she invites another to 
give money or any other property with the intention that such object should be used, or be considered as a 
reasonable cause in suspecting that it can potentially be used for terrorism activities. Furthermore, an individual 
commits an offence in case he or she receives money or any other property and intends that such object must be 
used, or possess a reasonable cause in suspecting that it can be used, for financing terrorism. Additionally, a person 
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number 1 of 2004 also enacted a number of offences referring to personal involvement with or in 
terrorism (stated in articles 3-7, 9-20 and 22-23). In addition it covered the publication of 
material as propaganda416 . Furthermore, the establishment of the National Committee as an 
attempt to combat terrorism as stated in articles 36-37, was focused on expressing political intent 
as well as a reflection of the UAEs ability to withstand the nature of terrorism and potential 
threats417.  
 
Although it appears to be much less of an issue within the UAE than in several other local 
nations, the Dubai put into practice laws in order to prevent illegal funds passing into the hands  
of political and/or criminal organisations.  This is illustrated by the increased cooperation by the 
Dubai/UAE with other states, particularly after the attacks on September 11, 2001. Furthermore, 
the then new legal framework allowed for the seizure and holding of cash on suspicion it is 
intended to be used for terrorism or is considered as part of the sources of a proscribed 
organisation (this is similar to the anti-crime and Terrorism Act 2001 in the United Kingdom).418  
                                                                                                                                                       
is considered to have committed an offence if he or she provides money or any other property and knows very well 
that it has reasonable cause to be suspected of having been used purposely for terrorist acts. Lastly, in the section a 
reference to any provision of money or some other properties is considered as being given, lent or made available, 
whether or not for any consideration. 
416 More reference: the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Terrorism Act 2000, The Money Laundering 
Regulations 2007. 
416 Previous to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 there existed  separate offences associated with drug money 
laundering 
417 Jeffrey Robinson, 'The sink: terror, crime and dirty money in the offshore world' (Constable & Company 
Limited 2003) 
418 The extension of Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 provides room for the seizure as well as 
detention of any cash on suspicion it is intended to be used for terrorist activities or is considered as part of the 
sources of a proscribed organisation to any place within the UK (Section 1). It also contains all the power to order 
any forfeiture of the seized cash based on the civil consideration of proof of balanced probabilities. Further, it 
enhances the disclosure of stored information between the government bodies (Sections 17-20), imposes extra 
stringent demands on such individuals or organisations within the regulated sector in order to report suspicions that 
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The UAE has further extended its full support and cooperation to both the UN and US in their 
attempts to track down the accounts of terrorists. Under the UNSCR 1267/1390, the UAE has 
presently frozen accounts of organisations and individuals identified with amounts that are 
approximately equal to $3 million (US dollars). Additionally, money laundering cases that have 
involved non-emirate nationals have been submitted to courts, and although some cases have 
ended in convictions, this is not always the case. 
6.6. Impediments	  to	  effective	  AML	  practice	  in	  the	  UAE	  
Most of the preventive measures needed to prevent money laundering in the UAE are lacking 
according to the 2008 report presented by the IMF. The report indicated that, "the legal 
framework for the financial sector preventive measures within the domestic sector…provided a 
basic grounding’ but this framework predates the amendments of the FATF Recommendations 
made in 2003, which have currently imposed subsequent detailed requirements. In addition, the 
IMF report make it clear that, even though there are a variety of administrative measures put in 
place to strengthen AML regime by the UAECB, the country requires a more solid, robust  
approach to its legal and regulatory framework in addressing these issues.419 
While the rules and regulations applied to financial institutions that are operating within the 
Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) tends to resemble the FATF regulations it is the 
implementation of them and the supervision and surveillance of these institutions that is in need 
of attention.   This is a common theme in this research; most of the necessary rules, regulations 
and supervisory bodies are in place but it is the lack of enforcement that is a key issue. Based on 
the UAEs STR regime, the IMF assessment was, in particular to money laundering, that it lacks 
clarity and as such the quality of the STR is questionable. It is possible the minimum levels of 
conformity for the UAE, as agreed on by the IMF, are for the Designated Non-Financial 
                                                                                                                                                       
such funds are destined for terrorist acts (Section 3 and Schedule II, Part III), and enables the police to have more 
powers both to ensure that financial institutions monitor their accounts and obtain updated financial information. 
419 William Witherell, 'International approaches to combating financial abuse and promoting stable financial 
markets' , vol 5 (MCB UP Ltd 2002) 257, pp. 257-262. 
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Business and Professions (DNFBP) sector. 420  Despite the assertions made by the UAE 
authorities that most of the DNFBPs are subject to the AML laws, no separate laws have been 
specifically put in place to address such businesses. There are, however, a number of provisions 
for DNFBPs within the Dubai International Financial Centre as the financial free zone i.e., the 
2010 US report identifies several sectors within the UAE, such as the diamond industry, the real 
estate sector as well as the Hawala system, that are considered to be susceptible to money 
laundering and terrorism.421 
 
It is here that - the Hawala system – that is of international concern. The system was originally 
used to avoid robbery and this developed to cover India and parts of Asian. It is thought that it is 
frequently used by those working in Dubai from a poor country as a way to transfer funds based 
on kinship. Hawala offices are unofficial because these offices are not registered or licensed with 
the Central Bank. These Hawala offices are known as ‘hidden banks’ or ‘underground banking 
system’ where there is no record of the client, source of income, papers to document the amount 
of the transfer. In addition there is no doubt that there are some factors seductive that encourage 
the use of Hawala; there are, for example economic factors, social and cultural, including: (1) 
little or no cost transfer fees compared with other bank transfers, (2) speed in the transfer of 
funds is usually from one day to two days; (3) it is based on the element of trust between the 
Hawaladar and the existing conversion, such as kinship; (4) it is a convenient and simple way to 
shorten a lot of banking procedures complicated to some extent and the lack of documents and 
papers required; (5) in addition to the above, it is the preferred method of migrant labourers, 
especially when there are no banks in the cities inhabited by their parents/beneficiaries of the 
transfer. 
 
                                                
420Richards, J. R., 1999. Transnational Criminal Organizations, Cybercrime, and Money Laundering: A Handbook 
for Law Enforcement Officers, Auditors, and Financial Investigators, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL. 
421 Marcel Pheijffer, 'Financial investigations and criminal money' , vol 2 (MCB UP Ltd 1998) 33 
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In order to meet the requirements of the UAECB, the financial sector – mostly banks - should 
take firm and reliable measures to safeguard their funds and those of their customers. However, 
without effective supervision, up-to-date training of personnel and implementing certified Anti-
Money Laundering programmes it appears that little progress will be made. This then, is a 
problem that is one for all involved in AML strategies in Dubai Extensive suggestions are made 
in the final chapter on how to prevent money laundering in the UAE, but worth mentioning here 
is that if the financial sector fails to adhere to legislation the relevant authority in Dubai should 
refuse the company permission to trade in the UAE.   A coherent, strategic approach is thus 
required, which needs to draw the Hawala system under it supervision.   
 
This is reflected in the IMF and US DoS presenting a cautionary statement that “a national, 
organised, and strategic approach to measures of AML/CFT is urgently required.422 Supporting 
and encouraging several intercontinental and bilateral treaties, signed by the UAE in reference to 
AML is a step in the right direction but a more national approach is fundamental to success.  As 
a result of the relative autonomy of individual emirates within the UAE, there are a lot of 
divergent approaches to AML enforcement even within Dubai itself and the different financial 
sectors and FTZ. 
 
In summary, the 2008 IMF report provides the ideal source for the several shortcomings within 
the UAE/Dubai’s AML system, indicating that, although most of the authorities have sought to 
address some of the money laundering issues, reforms should be undertaken so as to bring the 
country in line with FATF requirements. A high level state committee has recently endorsed the 
implementation of a national plan of AML actions that will, it is hoped, eliminate deficiencies 
within the rules and regulations in the UAE attempts to prevent money laundering. It is, 
however, a plan in progress, and will not be completed before this research is finished.    
                                                
422 Riccardo Sansonetti, 'Switzerland: Legislation to Combat Money Laundering' , vol 2 (MCB UP Ltd 1998) 82 
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Under the proposed plan, amendments are considered by working team of relevant bodies to 
enhance its implementation as well as to coordinate with the relevant executive authorities. It is a 
further creation, as the development of ‘bodies’ see above in this chapter, to tackle money 
laundering are nothing new. It appears to be more of an attempt to update legislative and 
bureaucratic systems, particularly in relation to STR, to identify and indict members of organised 
crime and terrorist cells/organisations as well as detecting money laundering trends such as 
abuse of telephones card sales and the money order transmitters established some year earlier.423  
 
However, a comparative analysis of AML efforts in more than 20 jurisdictions indicates that the 
application of SARs is regularly hindered by both legislative and bureaucratic deficiencies. 
Furthermore, and not particular to the UAE, is the absence of a suitable Financial Intelligence 
Unit (FIU) to effectively oversee both the collection and investigation of SARs and the failure to 
share the collected information with international regulators and train the staff of FIUs properly 
In most cases, the FIUs lack the necessary computer systems that can enable effective 
information exchange, while a number of jurisdictions put time and other limits on FIU 
investigation of the increased numbers of SARs that are produced by the banks and other 
institutions.424 
The problem of money laundering is further compounded in Dubai by having no condition for 
the establishment of trusts or related arrangements under UAE federal law, and as a result 
foreign trusts are not yet recognised within the country. However, uniquely trust law has been 
introduced within the DIFC, which results in the creation of express trusts. Therefore, such 
arrangements ought to be administered by trust service providers under the authorisation of the 
DFSA, which are subject to record-keeping requirements. This, however, appear to be an 
                                                
423 Jeffrey Robinson, 'The sink: terror, crime and dirty money in the offshore world' (Constable & Company 
Limited 2003) 
424 Richard Alexander. 'EU: The EC Money Laundering Directive' (1998) 2(1) Journal of Money Laundering 
Control 68 Alexander, Richard. 1998. EU: The EC Money Laundering Directive. Journal of Money Laundering 
Control. Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. Volume Two, Number One, Summer. 
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expectation rather than reality (see results chapter six) as Dubai has a ‘light touch’ approach to 
monitoring the financial sector. 
There have and are a number of proposals made in Dubai regarding money laundering, as 
illustrated. However, one sector that has been neglected by all the laws, conventions and political 
pronouncements is the	   transportation	   of	   cash	   and	   expected	   legal	   declarations	  425,	   and	   the	  
smuggling	  of	   cash	  and/or	   gold	   to	  Dubai.	   	  A substantial amount of money laundering is trade 
based, and this needs to be tackled; this includes the Hawala system of cash transactions, which 
until recently were often downplayed as a potential conduit of money laundering. Although 
Dubai and the UAE have a legislative framework for money laundering, it needs to be 
significantly expanded upon to include all sectors beyond the obvious ‘regulated’ known 
financial sector.  A policy on the forfeiture of assets and punishment for laundering should also 
be devised, with greater cooperation between the relevant law enforcement bodies and the 
government at both the federal and the emirate state level, with more intense prosecution. It 
would be advisable for the list of offenses to be expanded, with the possible criminalisation of 
acts which are not currently classed as criminal in the UAE. Furthermore, the AMLSCU is likely 
to require more funding and supervision, particularly to counter the use of the Hawala system.426 
Whether this will be done, however, depends upon the will of those in a position of power to 
make it so. 
While aware that it is difficult to prevent money laundering and provide customers with a service 
the two are not insurmountable. It is recommended that the following preventive measures, are 
needed to mitigate these risks: 
1. A company must establish and maintain effective internal policies, procedures, and controls 
to prevent opportunities for money laundering.  A money laundering compliance programme 
                                                
425  United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law  Enforcement Affairs 
International  Narcotics Control  Strategy Report Volume II Money Laundering and  Financial Crimes March 2013 
p.205 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204280.pdf> Accessed 17/02/2012 
426 Ibid. p.206 
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should be defined by senior management and/or the board of directors which must consider 
local/emirate regulations prior to adopting a compliance programme. 
2. A company must appoint a compliance officer. When a company appoints a compliance 
officer, it is imperative to verify that the qualifications of that person meet the local 
requirements. The compliance officer should be responsible for the day-to-day compliance of 
the business with the AML laws, and for ensuring the compliance programme is updated as 
needed. The compliance officer should be responsible for overseeing a company’s ongoing 
education and training programme. The compliance officer should also be responsible for 
maintaining records and reporting suspicious cases to the relevant authority. 
3. It is important to obtain details of customers in order to verify their identities, including full 
name and address, passport or identity card (for individuals) and trade. Such information 
must be periodically and regularly updated. The more a company knows about its customers, 
the better can money laundering abuses be prevented. 
4. A company must adopt policies and procedures for the identification and reporting of 
suspicious activity. A company must review UAE regulations for what it considered to be a 
suspicious transaction as well as the allowable time delays to report such activity. 
5. A company must establish an ongoing employee-training programme for all employees. 
Effective training should present real-life money laundering examples, preferably cases that 
have occurred in the company, including how the pattern of activity was first detected and its 
ultimate impact on the company. 
6. A company must conduct an independent audit of its AML compliance programme to ensure 
its adequacy. Such an audit should be conducted periodically based on the risks faced by the 
company and the requirements of the UAE regulations.427 
 
                                                
427 Eleni Tsingou. 'Global Governance and Transnational Financial Crime Opportunitites and Tensions in the 
Global Anti-Money Laundering Regime' (2009)  
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The culture of compliance is considered the key in the effective prevention of money laundering 
and to raise awareness in the community. This is vital as the compliance and commitment in the 
attempts to reduce the incidence of money laundering in Dubai is one of the greatest policing 
challenges that it presently faces. However, it is the duty of the financial sector and to ensure that 
it is familiar with the laws and regulations in Dubai, and if unaware take the advice of legal 
specialists in case of difficulty in understanding money laundering legislation.  
 
6.7. Going	  in	  the	  right	  direction:	  policing	  money	  laundering	  in	  Dubai	  	  	  
The UAE Central Bank has signed a memorandum with the Dubai police on the training and 
sharing of information pertaining to money laundering. The memorandum was signed in 2010 
with the aim to ensure exchange(s) of information between the UAE Central Bank and the Dubai 
police. The two reached an agreement to put in place an electronic link for the purpose of 
exchanging security information about suspicious cases and transaction reports. The Dubai 
police headquarters and Central Bank thus have the role of notifying one another of suspected 
and known cases of money laundering.428 This electronic connectivity system, above and beyond 
a simple computer network, is also applied in financial sector institutions with the same aims as 
law enforcement and the Central Bank.  It is a little too early to claim if this system has been a 
failure or success as of yet; two reasons are put forward. One the system was launched a few 
years ago and needs time for all to become familiar with the system, particularly if personnel 
leave and new people are recruited, and two, (see chapter 6 result chapter) there is little available 
data to make an assessment as to its effectiveness.    
     
The development of this system is primarily due to the influx of labour from neighbouring states 
such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. With many people now working in the UAE, but Dubai 
in particular there is concern about the use of the Hawala system as a conduit to launder illegal 
funds. However, a note of caution is needed here. The Hawala system is long established in the 
                                                
428  Mohammed Al Sadafy. 'UAE Central Bank and Dubai Police sign MoU' Emirates 24/7 (Accessed on 
December 2010 December 2010)  
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UAE but it is not a problem that only those in the Middle East countenance.  Immigrants – legal 
and illegal - in the United Kingdom use a number of channels to send money back home or 
around the world to family members, relatives, and/or for illegal reasons.  Some of the channels 
include: Money-Gram, Western Union, international banks and the Hawala system as all used. 
This is little known at this moment in time but the Hawala system is also operating in the United 
Kingdom. As an informal way to transfer funds it is more challenging to trace the origins of the 
funds making it a preferable system for those wishing to launder money.  It is important to note 
that no actual money crosses borders and no records available to audit, a loophole that make it 
useful for those laundering illegal proceeds. It is challenging for the United Kingdom law 
enforcement bodies to obtain data on the total amount of money transferred using the Hawala 
system, and as such is little different to the problem encounter by law enforcement in the UAE 
and Dubai.  This then, is an international rather than Middle Eastern problem. As indicated by 
the World Bank the remittance outflow increased approximately 4% annually in the United 
Kingdom, approximating to about GBP 2,352 million in the year 2009. The World Bank further 
indicated that developing nations all over the world obtained a high percentage of remittance 
from the UK in the year 2010. However, the value of remittance outflows makes up 
approximately only 0.2% of the UK GDP.  The percentage for Dubai is unknown429. 
Aware of this problem the UAE and the UK cooperate, where possible, with each other to 
overcome this phenomenon. This is, however, early days in such a development.  With 
immigration from south East Asia and immigrants sending money via one of the above systems, 
it is necessary that laws, conventions and systemic cooperation is established to prevent money 
laundering. This development is, however, in progress, even though a panel	  from	  the	  IMF	  came	  
to	  make	   a	   study	   on	   the	   Hawala	   System	  within	   the	   region	   some	   years	   ago.	   Even	   though	   full	  
cooperation	   and	   support	   was	   forthcoming	   in	   the	   UAE	   for	   this	   study	   highlighting	   its	  
collaboration	  with	  the	  UN	  as	  well	  as	  US,	  particularly	  with	  reference	  to	  tracking	  the	  accounts	  of	  
                                                
429   HM Treasury. 'The plan for growth' (2011) The Stationary Office, London, UK.See http://cdn.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_growth.pdf (accessed 29/09/2011)  
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terrorists	  and	  the	   individuals	  who	  enable	  them	  to	  continue	  to	  engage	   in	  such	  activities430	  the	  
actual	   ‘real’	  progress	  made	  on	  this	   issue	   is	  difficult	   to	  assess	  due	  to	  the	  complex	   ‘systems’	  or	  
regulating	  the	  diverse	  financial	  sector	  in	  Dubai.431 
 
6.8. Conclusion	  
In this chapter it was illustrated that there is a difference in policy and political pronouncements 
(see chapter five) and actual practice. This, however, is not unusual in any line of work; it is 
serious, though, because of the financial consequences for business and nations but more so as 
illegal funds are used for organised crime and terrorism.  This chapter focus mostly on Dubai but 
highlighted its links with the UK, which were established in chapter two. There are a number of 
differences between AML legislation in Dubai and the UK, and neither are free from the threat 
of organised crime and terrorism.  
 
However, Dubai is vulnerable to money laundering for a variety of reasons; for its geographical 
location, for its use as a port, its proximity to Africa, and its offshore status. Its lack of stringent, 
comprehensive, integrated legislation also makes its financial institutions susceptible and 
vulnerable to criminal enterprises. This has been recognised in the UAE and Dubai; there are 
international suspicions that in some ways Dubai thrives on this enterprise that exists just outside 
the limits of the law, yet there is evidence too, that the UKs role as a global financial centre has 
also resulted in it use as a conduit for money laundering by criminals seeking to wash their 
money of its illegitimate origins. Even a sufficiently regulated system then has it faults. There 
faults, however, are similar to those of Dubai; laws and systems are in place, it is the regulation 
that is inadequate, and as such organised criminal elements and terrorism is able to infiltrate 
international financial systems, in any jurisdiction. 
                                                
430Elizabeth Montano. 'Wealth Hidden, Tax Evaded: Strategies for Revelation' (2002) 5(4) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control 263263-265. 
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Chapter	  Seven	  
FATF	  Recommendations	  Quasi-­‐Assessment	  of	  UAE	  
7.1. Introduction	  
This chapter includes basic data on the requirements of the methodology for determining the 
recommendations for a country which should be familiar with the current situation and on the 
phenomenon of money laundering in the country , and express this as a starting point to see the 
current situation of the United Arab Emirates , through the analysis of the data by comparing 
them with the United Kingdom . It was chosen as the United Kingdom for the existence of some 
similarity in the background data of the demographic character and the similarity of images 
economic system in the international financial sector in Dubai. 
 
Countries are rated on the implementation and success of implementation of AML regulations 
and standards that reduce money laundering and improve the ability of countries to effectively 
cooperate and reduce the ability of illegal activities, particularly in regards to money exchanges 
and uses, from occurring internationally. A specific methodology was created by the FATF, to 
ensure that assessments of countries were standardized and established key indicators that allow 
for the assessments to be effective in delivering recommendations432.  
 
The methodology of determining recommendations for a country require that assessors be 
familiar with the country’s current conditions, including but not limited to the assessments 
completed by the country, current socio-economic and cultural considerations, cash-based 
society, likelihood of money laundering and terrorism financing, and the importance of the 
                                                
432  FATF Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the 
Effectiveness of AML/CTF Systems. (2013). Retrieved from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013.pdf 
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financial sector in that specific area433. In addition, assessors should analyse the effectiveness of 
the strategies in place within the country, identifying how the effectiveness could be improved 
upon. Assessments consider the 40 + 9, most recently used in assessments of the OECD 
countries in the 2014 assessment, identified below. Recommendations established from these 
outcomes should include identification of high-level objectives, intermediate outcomes, and 
immediate outcomes. 
As comparison, the most current statistics for the UK were obtained for the current 40 + 9. In the 
OECD FATF ratings, the United Kingdom was found to be compliant in the areas of 1 – 4, 8, 10, 
13 - 14, 19 - 20, 25, 27 – 28, 31, 35, and 37 – 45. Largely compliant, for the UK, was noted for 
15 – 17, 23, 26, 29 – 30, 32, 36, 46, 48, and 49. In addition, the UK was found to be partially 
complaint in the areas of 5, 9, 11 – 12, 18, 21, 24, 33, 34, and 47. The only areas noted as 
noncompliant included 6, 7, and 22.   
 
According to the International Monetary Fund in 2008434, UAE basic legal framework was 
established and consisted of the requirements for preventing money laundering and terrorist 
financing; however, the laws did not provide sufficient powers to the FIU and did not include the 
full “range of predicate offences”435 that could occur or may occur in the region. In addition, the 
second finding of the IMF included that preventive measures established in legal framework for 
the financial sector did not include the most current FATF recommendations and noted that the 
central bank was establishing strong frameworks to bring the country into compliance, but these 
were not supportive by legislation. This was particularly noted that Dubai was currently 
operating most closely to the FATF standards and regulations, as compared to the rest of UAE.  
 
                                                
433 Ibid 
434 ‘United Arab Emirates: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing 
of Terrorism. International Monetary Fund’, (2008), retrieved from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08305.pdf 
435 Ibid p. 8 
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These findings were consistent with the current research, which suggested that while legislation 
was created and in place for use by the regulatory forces of Dubai, their implementation and the 
understanding of legislation was lacking. Respondents in the study did not find that 
communication was supportive of the needs of strong regulatory environments; however, the 
respondents also noted that the needs of Dubai were different from the needs of other countries, 
such as Western countries. This is in part due to the difference in how the government operates, 
the culture of the area, and the location being perceived as “convenient” for criminal activities 
and money laundering.  
 
In the third key finding of the report, the IMF noted that the “suspicious transactions reporting 
system” did not demonstrate the expected number of reports for a “financial market of the size 
and nature of that within the UAE” and suggested that clarity regarding reporting transactions 
may improve on the compliance of this aspect of the regulation436. Additionally, UAE was 
commended on activities in addressing Hawala dealers and developing the voluntary system 
requiring these dealers to register and report financial transactions, as well as report suspicious 
activities. Finally, the IMF suggested that the AML legislation of UAE did not address all of the 
DNFBP sectors and that customer due diligence was largely missing or improperly addressed. 
However, in this same instance, Dubai was recognized for drafting these measures and working 
to achieve these goals individually.  
 
However, respondents to the primary research suggested that the existence of cash-based 
transactions creates difficulty in managing the requirements of money laundering regulation. 
Particularly noted was the difficulty in determining where the money came from, or legitimizing 
the funds without actual documentation due to limited tracking done by Hawala dealers and the 
difficulty in obtaining verification from other countries. This additionally suggests that while the 
FATF strongly promotes communication between countries, the lack of standardization in 
communication creates conflicts in regards to obtaining these types of information on an 
                                                
436 Ibid p. 8 
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international level. MENAFATF is strictly focused on reducing this problem in the primary areas 
of concern for the UAE, which includes North Africa.  
 
While overall, the IMF credited both Dubai and the UAE in legislation and regulation work as of 
the date of the report, it was noted that communication and awareness was lacking in many of the 
areas. In addition, the preventive measures suggested for the financial institutions and non-
financial businesses and professions were numerous, and consisted of consistent 
recommendations for increased awareness, coordination between strategic goals and objectives, 
improved legislation, communication between organisations within the country and international 
bodies, clarity in requirements of reporting, and further adherence to FATF standards and 
regulations437. Finally, the IMF cited that difficulty occurred in making assessments due to a 
lack of available or “meaningful” statistics, which prevented the ability of the assessment to 
determine the effectiveness of the AML/CFT measures used by the UAE438.  
 
This finding of the IMF and FATF is consistent with the findings from the primary research, in 
that communication was difficult and did not always support the needs of the FIUs along with 
the needs of the organisations expected to implement the legislation into their organisation. 
Respondents, including law enforcement, stressed that communication and access to information 
was largely restricted or difficult to obtain. These factors are important to the success of meeting 
FATF recommendations in the future.  
 
The Dubai Financial Services Authority has since established a number of communications, 
regulations, and a DFSA Rulebook, which is designed as an anti-money laundering module439. 
This documentation refers back to the guiding federal laws of UAE, including the definition of 
                                                
437 Ibid 
438 Ibid p. 11 
439 Retrieved from http://dfsa.complinet.com/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/d/f/DFSA1547_4489_VER7.pdf 
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money laundering and includes additional regulation for Authorised Firm and Money 
Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO) of the firms in Dubai. All of the applicable individuals 
are required to comply with the UAE federal laws, create methods for recognizing customers and 
transactions that represent illegal activities, develop policies within organisations and firms, 
establish duties and obligations of the MLRO, methods for recognizing criminal elements within 
the firm, and understand the risks of criminal liability. In addition, this document stresses the 
importance of these activities and reports by making responsibility for management of these 
situations immediate.  
 
While new regulations are in place, there was no consensus from respondents in this research 
that demonstrated that improvements were as effective as they could be in regards to 
communication and data access. These types of improvements may involve the implementation 
of either increased training or improved databases, but must also involve improved 
communication channels and cooperation between different levels of criminal investigation. This 
is addressed in the models review as a potential solution for improvement in these areas.  
 
In the requirements of the DFSA, the AML regulations include the requirement that all 
authorized firms must comply with the regulations of customer information, as presented in 
FATF requirements of “Know Your Customer”, and conduct due diligence in business 
relationships. This includes in scrutiny of transactions and reporting when information is 
insufficient or lacking of required documentation for the customer. The requirements include the 
change of ownership and exceptions where the AML regulations may not apply. In addition, 
these requirements include that authorized firms must not be involved in relationships with shell 
banks, keep anonymous accounts, allow accounts to be formed under false names, or controlled 
by individuals whose names are not on the accounts.  
 
The DFSA has regulations for the majority of the requirements of the FATF recommendations; 
however, statistical evidence of their effectiveness is not widely available. In addition, 
respondents to the primary research developed found that not all respondents were in complete 
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understanding of the compliance requirements of these documents, or able to meet the needs 
required due to the difficulties in obtaining the proper information required by these regulations. 
The recommendations set forth in this document are substantial, and are reasonably enforceable, 
in the case where organisations are concerned; however, in law enforcement, Dubai may be 
restricted in meeting the needs of these requirements.  
 
In an examination of AML systems of UAE, UK, Australia, and the USA, cultural considerations 
were evaluated for the compliance and communication of the FATF recommendations440. This 
work argues that the compliance difficulties of the UAE are both cultural and economic related, 
which influences the success rate of implementation of these recommendations. According to the 
2007 FATF compliance assessment, the UAE was compliant with only two of the legal system 
requirements of the current assessment recommendations. Lack of complete compliance was 
found in the criminalization of money laundering, which did not indicate serious offences, 
specifically those of corruption and drug trafficking441. While the recent documentation of the 
DFSA has established the customer due diligence requirements and suspicious transaction 
reporting, these are current since the FATF recommendations, as UAE was found to be lacking 
in compliance in this area at that time. While the UK was found to be largely compliant in these 
areas, in 2007, and more so today, these are in contrast to the UAE, where it is likely that the 
results of these preventative measures may be even less successful due to the lack of substantial 
statistical evidence to support compliance by the UAE in this area. The lack of FIU reporting is 
noted as a non-compliance factor, and demonstrates a problem that has not been successfully 
resolved in regards to FATF recommendations for the UAE. In addition, the UAE was found, in 
                                                
440 Alkaabi, A, Mohay, G, McCullagh, A, & Chantler, N, (2010), ‘Money Laundering and FATF compliance by the 
international community’, IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, Brisbane, Australia. 
Retrieved from http://eprints.qut.edu.au/37846/2/37846.pdf 
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2007, to be least compliant and effective in the areas of international cooperation, there was no 
legal requirements of these activities to support compliance with the FATF standards442. 
In the research regarding cultural aspects of compliance, Hawala is a significant factor 
influencing FATF compliance success for the UAE, due to the lack of documentation that is 
typical of this type of financial transaction. This is harsh contrast to the difficulties facing many 
Western countries, which typically are relative to the degree of privacy and anonymity that the 
culture requires for independence or democracy. Such as in Australia, UK, or USA, where 
individuals prefer that some degree of privacy be maintained to establish individuality and this 
practice interferes with the ability to gather customer data and store this information for further 
evaluation. As the Hawala system consists of this same privacy, through lack of documentation, 
it is reasonable to suggest that the measures required to overcome the challenges of Hawala lack 
of conformity will involve similar difficulties in the UAE as lack of privacy and additional 
accountability for the funds is required.  
 
UAE regulations are supported by Islamic laws, which do not encourage illegal activities or 
transference of monies. In this way, the culture itself is supportive of the FATF regulations; 
however, this does not prevent the illegal activities and must be supported by legislation in order 
to be in compliance with the FATF443. Illegal activities, according to Islamic laws include the 
proceeds of gambling and bank interest, and additional strictly prohibits the use of illegal money 
for charities444. In addition, while the FATF requires that charities are monitored for the 
transference of illegal funds, there are complications in the UAE legislation to manage this 
requirement, as Islamic law requires that Muslims contribute to charities, and charities are 
recognized as high value to citizens of the UAE445. However, the UAE has required that all 
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charities wishing to contribute funds to charities outside of the UAE only do so through state run 
charities that are strictly monitored, in order to comply with the regulations of the FATF. 
The importance of charities and the inability to monitor them as effectively in the UAE as FATF 
standards might otherwise require, was not noted in the primary research developed for this 
study. While this appears to be an obvious consideration, it may be related to the lack of 
knowledge or documentation of this particular aspect or risk of AML, and may become more 
important as other factors of FATF compliance become resolved. Additionally, the UAE has 
worked diligently since the 2007 assessment to increase compliance, including through 
legislation and development of federal organisations to improve upon compliance with the 
legislation. These improvements have not been assessed since their implementation. However, 
based on this information, a generalized assessment was created for the FATF assessment 
evaluation in this study. The following table was developed to rate the current UAE FATF 
compliance, using the literature and access as available to evaluate the UAE legislation, with a 
focus on Dubai and the additional compliance requirements of the DFSA. This data was included 
with the ratings of the UK for comparison. 
The key for the following table includes: 
*= lacks sufficient new information for rating, 0 = noncompliant, 1 = partially compliant, 2 = 
largely compliant, 3 = compliant, NC = noncompliant, PC = partially compliant, LC = largely 
compliant, and C = compliant. 
Table	  4:	  FATF	  Recommendations	  -­‐	  UAE	  and	  UK	  
 
FATF Recommendation UAE 
(2008) 
UAE 
(quasi) 
UK  
(2014) 
1. Money laundering offense PC 3 3 
2. Money laundering offense – mental element 
and corporate liability 
LC * 3 
3. Confiscation and provisional measures LC * 3 
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4. Secrecy laws consistent with then 
recommendations 
LC 2 3 
5. Customer due diligence NC 2 1 
6. Politically exposed persons NC 2 0 
7. Correspondent banking NC 2 0 
8. New technologies & non face-to-face business LC 2 3 
9. Third parties and introducers LC 2 1 
10. Record-Keeping LC 2 3 
11. Unusual transactions LC 2 1 
12. DNFBP – R.5, 6, 8 – 11 NC 2 1 
13. Suspicious transaction reporting NC 1 3 
14. Protection & no tipping-off PC 2 3 
15. Internal controls, compliance, & audit PC 1 2 
16. DNFBP – R.13 – 15 & 21 NC 2 2 
17. Sanctions PC 2 2 
18. Shell banks PC 2 1 
19. Other forms of reporting C 3 3 
20. Other NFBP & secure transaction techniques PC 1 3 
21. Special attention for higher risk countries PC 2 1 
22. Foreign branches & subsidiaries LC 2 0 
23. Regulation, supervision & monitoring PC 2 2 
24. DNFBP – regulation, supervision and 
monitoring 
NC 2 1 
25. Guidelines & feedback PC * 3 
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26. The Financial Intelligence Unit PC 2 2 
27. Law enforcement authorities C 3 3 
28. Powers of competent authorities C 3 3 
29. Supervisors PC 2 2 
30. Resources, integrity and training PC 2 2 
31. National co-operation LC 3 3 
32. Statistics PC 1 2 
33. Legal persons – beneficial owners PC 2 1 
34. Legal arrangements – beneficial owners C 3 1 
35. Conventions C 3 3 
36. Mutual legal assistance (MLA) LC 2 2 
37. Dual criminality LC 3 3 
38. MLA on confiscation and freezing PC 2 3 
39. Extradition LC 2 3 
40. Other forms of co-operation PC 2 3 
41. Implement UN instruments PC * 3 
42. Criminalize terrorist financing LC 3 3 
43. Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets PC 2 3 
44. Suspicious transaction reporting NC 2 3 
45. International co-operation LC 2 3 
46. AML/CFT requirements for money/value 
transfer services 
NC 2 2 
47. Wire transfer rules NC 2 1 
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48. Non-profit organisations LC 2 2 
49. Cross-border declaration & disclosure   NC 1 2 
 
The UAE ratings are based on both Dubai and UAE legislation and regulations, as currently 
published and available to the public, which demonstrates communication and increases 
awareness of these requirements. While the UK rating is current as of 2014, UAE ratings 
assessments are not available after the data found for 2008. No statistics were available from 
UAE resources, such as government websites, regarding percentage of cases found to involve 
money laundering or prevalence of compliance issues in local organisations. Measurements of 
statistical evidence would be needed to confirm compliance, specifically in the areas of non-
profit organisations, confiscation, freezing, and other areas. The use of statistics allows 
comparison to other countries and may identify if any areas are perceived to be unusually low, 
such as was identified in the 2007 assessment. In addition, some information available for this 
assessment was only available in Arabic, which did not assist in the evaluation due to the 
inability for professional translation, which is required for this type of documentation.  
 
In addition, the FATF and MENAFATF provide information regarding the international 
standards and regulations of AML requirements. The MENAFATF provides a 2008, version of 
Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) in Relation to AML/CFT, 
which identifies the risks to each group, the related FATF recommendation, international 
requirements, and definition of recommendations446. The goal of this section is to recognize the 
changes that have occurred since the 2008 assessment, and to determine values for each of these 
sections, based on current knowledge of legislation and literature in these areas. However, the 
most difficult aspect of this assessment is that no assessor permission was granted and access to 
records from the country are limited or unavailable. The following sections are identified in the 
                                                
446 Retrieved from http://www.menafatf.org/images/UploadFiles/DNFBPs_in_relation_to_AMLCFT.pdf 
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table above and defined based on the standards, with an assessment value assigned based on the 
criteria identified.  
Money	  Laundering	  Offense	   	  
Money laundering offense has been criminalized in the UAE laws, and currently the offence is 
identified as carrying serious penalties. However, unlike the definition and legislation of the UK, 
the UAE does not cover all of the possible conditions or circumstances where money laundering 
can occur. The UAE does provide for the different requirements using FIUs and the AMLSCU to 
identify when registration and reporting should occur. Based on the requirements that were found 
in the 2008 assessment, the UAE is considered compliant in this recommendation, as recent 
legislation includes punishment of money laundering crimes that specify that terrorism funding is 
also a crime. In addition, the Central Bank requires mandatory registration of Hawala dealers, as 
of 2012. 
 
Money	  Laundering	  Offense	  –	  Mental	  Element	  and	  Corporate	  Liability	  
Money laundering offense – mental element and corporate liability are identified to some degree 
in both the UAE legislation and in DFSA Codebook. In addition, the Central Bank provides 
firms with the information needed to remain compliant with the regulations that are necessary for 
preventing money laundering. These have no measurements for review on their success in 
maintaining compliance from the organisations located in the UAE. According to the 2008 
assessment, there was limited implementation of the requirements in this area. This evaluation 
does not have sufficient evidence to make further determination in this area due to the necessity 
to identify corporate liability and statistics regarding compliance. 
Confiscation	  and	  Provisional	  Measures	  
Confiscation and provisional measures are identified in the UAE and DFSA regulations, and 
further identified in the documentation from the Central Bank. According to the FATF, countries 
should provide authorities with the ability to “freeze or seize and confiscate” property, proceeds, 
and instrumentalities intended for money laundering, “without prejudice” and without criminal 
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conviction, where necessary447. However, statistical evidence of these are less available and are 
not consistent with the clarity and transparency found in the UK. During the 2008 assessment, 
assessors noted that there was no evidence to support the effectiveness of these laws in the UAE, 
at this time the research does not identify any change and this area could not be measured. This 
area was not assigned a measurement and is assumed to require full FATF Recommendations 
assessment for completion.  
 
Secrecy	  Laws	  Consistent	  with	  the	  Recommendations	  
Secrecy laws consistent with the recommendations are not readily identifiable in the 
documentation of regulation and legislation of the UAE; however, some reference is made to 
these aspects. The FATF requires that countries implement laws that prevent financial 
institutions from using secrecy laws to inhibit the investigation or uncovering of illegal activities, 
particularly money laundering. This factor is not readily available to evaluate through statistical 
evidence, and the primary research suggests that secrecy may be a problem, due to the reluctance 
of respondents to commit to the current conditions and the cultural values of privacy that restrict 
sharing of information that may be perceived as negative to outsiders. According to the 2008 
assessment, this area was lacking in compliance, due to the “lack of clear statutory gateways 
through which the regulatory authorities may exchange confidential information with domestic 
authorities and foreign counterparts” 448 . According to the DFSA Codebook, 3.4.12 (2), 
Authorized firms “must verify if there are secrecy or data protection legislation that would 
restrict access without delay to such data by the Authorized Firm, the DFSA or the law 
enforcement agencies of the UAE” 449 . In addition, the UAE considered the 2008 
recommendations and later changes to the FATF Recommendations, which occurred in 2012, 
                                                
447 Ibid p. 12. 
448 Mutual Evaluation Report, p. 151.  
449 DFSA Codebook, p. 13. 
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when developing draft law amends in April of 2014, noted here in the conclusion of the FATF 
Recommendations450. 
 
Customer	  Due	  Diligence	  
Customer due diligence is well documented in the DFSA and Central Bank, and is supported by 
federal legislation to some degree. This particular element is similar to the others in that access 
to statistical data is not available and the respondents in the primary research identified the 
success of customer due diligence as lacking due to the inability to obtain information from other 
countries, agencies, or firms, in regards to the needs of this requirement. The FATF requires that 
due diligence occur by restricting the financial institutions from “keeping anonymous accounts 
or accounts in obviously fictitious names”451. In addition, countries should have required 
policies for investigating and reporting suspicious activities, and these are defined by the Central 
Bank and DFSA and are in compliance in legislation for the country. Based on the 2008 
assessment, UAE was not in compliance with this requirement, specifically noting that no 
legislation was supporting these needs and risks were beyond expected thresholds for this area. 
However, changes to these needs were made following this assessment, which include the DFSA 
Codebook changes to include all of the “Know Your Customer” requirements, and these same 
aspects were identified as current requirements of the Central Bank. While no statistical evidence 
of the success was noted, this was considered to be in compliance at the current recognition of 
legislation and support required by the DFSA and Central Bank. This resulted in the score of 
largely compliant, because legislation exists, but some consideration must be given to the 
primary research, which suggests access is difficult.  
 
                                                
450 Al Hamrani, K, & Omar Khattab, ‘UAE Enhances Battle Against Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism’,  May 2014, Retrieved from http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-8/may-7/uae-
enhances-battle-against-money-laundering-and-the-financing-of-terrorism.html 
451 Ibid p. 14. 
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Politically	  Exposed	  Persons	  
Politically exposed persons (PEP) is difficult to address in any country, and in the UAE this is no 
different. The laws and regulations regarding this particular aspect are not different from the 
initial assessment conducted in 2008 and could use improvement; which found that the UAE was 
not compliant with the requirements of this area. According to the FATF, PEP should be 
addressed using risk management systems designed to determine if the customer is a politically 
exposed person and regulations for approval of establishing business relationships with 
individuals appearing to fit within this definition. In addition, the FATF notes that financial 
institutions should increase investigative processes for the determination of funds for the PEP 
individual as well as increase monitoring of the continued relationship during the duration of the 
relationship with the individual. This area is noted as largely complaint, in that legislation exists 
to support the FATF recommendations, but no evidence to the amount of success is available to 
the research.  
 
Correspondent	  Banking	  
Correspondent banking is addressed by the UAE, Dubai, and the Central Bank. This also does 
not have statistical evidence but is perceived to be in the control of the regulations that support 
anti-money laundering initiatives. FATF requirements for this item include that cross-border 
correspondent banking, in the case of both financial institutions and “other similar 
relationships”452 be subject to AML/CFT controls, senior management approval, transparency by 
each institution involved, include detailed information regarding the arrangement and the 
institutions, and that the appropriate customer due diligence measures be completed by both 
institutions. In the 2008 assessment, correspondent banking was found to be not in compliance 
with the FATF Recommendations in domestic banking; however, since that time the DFSA 
Codebook has added these in all areas regarding Authorized firms, and defined the same 
requirements of the FATF recommendations. In addition, the CBUAE, created a Correspondence 
                                                
452 Ibid p. 16. 
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Banking Division, designed to assess risks and reduce the number of risks occurring with 
correspondent banking453. 
 
New	  Technologies	  &	  Non	  Face-­‐To-­‐Face	  Business	  
New technologies & non face-to-face business includes money or value transfer services, new 
technologies, wire transfers, and all other transactions, including Hawala, that may typically not 
include the required documentation or traditional regulation and legislation of traditional money 
transactions. The FATF rates these as higher risk, due to the inability to properly document these 
transactions and the ease at which money laundering may occur through these options. 
Legislation of UAE and Dubai are limited in addressing these particular aspects, though changes 
have occurred in 2014, and Hawala dealers are regulated and required to report, though primarily 
on a voluntary basis. This area is a large risk to the UAE because it has a large population of 
internet users and these figures are growing rapidly. While Hawala may be currently receiving 
requirements for documentation and legitimization, this form of transactions is still a continued 
risk within the country. While the 2008 assessment found this area to be largely compliant, the 
primary research suggests that this area needs improvement. Legislation is found to be 
compliant, but implementation requires additional improvement, therefore the rating has been 
given as largely compliant.   
 
Third	  Parties	  and	  Introducers	  
Third parties and introducers the Central Bank and the DFSA Codebook address the reliance on 
their parties elements in the FATF recommendations; however, the ability to ensure that these 
elements are complete are not available. The UAE should more clearly define the legislation and 
regulation in these areas in order to create conformity throughout the emirates, as the use of third 
parties for customer due diligence may not only increase risk of money laundering but also of 
                                                
453 ‘Organization & Development’, Central Bank of the U.A.E., Updated on 29, December 2014, retrieved from 
http://www.centralbank.ae/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=147&Itemid=109 
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security for individuals. The “internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries” 
requirements are not clear in the current the regulations and require that more work is done to 
develop clear requirements of financial institutions, which will reduce confusion in the 
development of these specific aspects. According to the 2008 assessment, the UAE was found to 
be largely compliant. Third parties are addressed in much of the DFSA Codebook and the 
Central Bank documentation, which enabled the rating to remain at largely complaint, and takes 
into account that this requires additional evaluation at the agency level to ensure that compliance 
occurs outside of documentation.   
 
Record-­‐Keeping	  
Record-Keeping is a necessary aspect of money laundering prevention, due to the ability of this 
aspect to assist in investigations that will uncover criminal activities. The FATF requires that 
financial institutions “be required to maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records on 
transactions, both domestic and international”454, which will increase the ease of compliance in 
the case of investigation and prevent the firm from interrupting legal processes. The UAE 
requires that all financial institutions are licensed and conform to these requirements, as noted in 
the Central Bank and in DFSA. However, this was noted in the primary research as an area that 
was complicated due to the lack of information or access to the required information. In the 2008 
assessment, the UAE was found to be largely compliant, and based on regulation and legislation, 
this is true; however, due to the primary research indicating a lack of access or knowledge to 
access this type of information, largely complaint was retained for this assessment.  
 
Unusual	  Transactions	  
Unusual transactions are found to be aspects of record-keeping, risk management, complex 
relationships or transactions, large transactions, or patterns of transactions. These measurements 
are more difficult to assess without statistical values, and the respondents to the primary research 
                                                
454 Ibid p. 15 
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noted that communication and documentation were the most difficult aspects in adhering to the 
requirements of AML. In this way, it does not appear that the UAE is strictly in compliance with 
this recommendation, though the Central Bank and DFSA have noted these items as a 
requirement of all firms. However, the 2008 assessment found this to be largely compliant, and 
due to this, the same rating has been applied in this assessment.  
 
DNFBP	  –	  R.5,	  6,	  8	  –	  11	  
DNFBP – R.5, 6, 8 – 11 include the actions of designated non-financial businesses and 
professions in regards to the same recommendations for financial institutions but not requiring 
the same degree of regulation. In the UAE, casinos and proceeds from gambling are not legal in 
any manner. However, the ability to use professionals, including accountants, lawyers, real estate 
agents, and other professionals as resources for money laundering are a risk that the UAE is 
challenged in regulating. According to the 2008 assessment, these were noted in legislation and 
regulation, but not to the degree of which is considered in complete compliance. However, the 
DIFC has since developed communications identifying these problems and requiring that 
DNFBPs identify the regulations of the DFSA, and in accordance with the UAE legislation and 
DFSA Codebook, include fines for DNFBPs failing to comply with regulations455. 
 
 
Suspicious	  Transaction	  Reporting	  
Suspicious transaction reporting is a requirement of the FATF in that any financial institution or 
DNFBP is required to report any suspect of funds or individuals that may be associated with 
criminal activity or terrorist financing. This requirement is also found in the UAE, DFSA, and 
the Central Bank. However, this is another area where statistics are not available and the primary 
research indicated that additional work must be done to increase the success of this particular 
                                                
455  ‘Regulation DNFBPs operating in or from the DIFC’, DFSA, (2013), Retrieved from 
http://www.dfsa.ae/Documents/Leaflets%202013/DNFBP%20Leaflet%2020%20October%202013.pdf 
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aspect of AML. This area was found to be non-compliant in the 2008 assessment, and while 
much of the suspicious transaction reporting has been modified and updated, the area of 
“attempted transactions” has not been addressed in the DFSA Codebook, where the only 
adherence directly is describing attempts to money launder, and identifying customers and 
transactions where if either occur there must be a report. In addition, reporting appeared to be 
extremely low, as compared to the size of the financial market being supported. In this way, this 
area has been changed to partially compliant, but may be largely compliant in that no data 
currently exists as to the effectiveness in this area, and the legal documentations fails to address 
attempts to money launder clearly.  
 
Protection	  &	  No	  Tipping-­‐Off	  
Protection and tipping-off are addressed by the UAE and Dubai as well. In this case, the FATF 
recommends that countries focus on creating protection for institutions, employees, and 
individuals in situations where reporting may cause undue harm to the individual or the firm, and 
that reporting of suspicious activities are protected if they are reported immediately to the proper 
authorities for further investigation. The ability to report these activities enables the increase 
access to the information by the FIUs and increases safety for individuals that may have become 
inadvertently connected to criminal activity. One goal is that information obtained will be 
transferred promptly to the authorities, even if this information occurs after the incident of 
money laundering. While no statistical evidence is available regarding this in the UAE, the 
support of these processes is noted and does require additional attention due to the primary 
research regarding the need of improved communication and access to documentation.  In the 
2008 assessment, this area was identified as partially compliant. The DFSA notes that this area is 
covered in Article 16, Law No. 4, which states that any person who informs a person that their 
individual transactions are under investigation or being evaluated for possible suspicious 
activities, is committing a crime which is punishable by fine or imprisonment. In addition, the 
DFSA notes that in such cases where an Authorized Firm is uncertain regarding their obligations 
of ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC) and these requirements, should file a Suspicious Transaction 
Report and inform employees of the sensitivity of the matter and issues when considering the 
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KYC processes456. This area is considered to be largely compliant, due to the regulations 
supporting this, but no statistics are found to demonstrate its effectiveness.  
 
Internal	  Controls,	  Compliance,	  &	  Audit	  
Internal controls, compliance, and audit include the controls of foreign branches and subsidiaries 
but most not exclude the application of documentation in internal financial institutions. While 
legislation regarding these needs are limited, some of the provisions have not been implemented 
since the 2008 assessment. As it was rated with partially compliant in the 2008 assessment, this 
same assessment was applied here, noting that this area may be largely compliant due to the 
changes instituted by the Central Bank and the DFSA Codebook, which requires that Authorized 
Firms complete additional requirements than those that were found to be applied in the 2008 
assessment. However, no statistical evidence of compliance and auditing have been 
demonstrated in areas that were available for the research.  
 
DNFBP	  –	  R.13	  –	  15	  &	  21	  
DNFBP – R.13 – 15 & 21 is similar in consideration as the previous DNFBP requirements and 
must be considered more significantly by the legislation of the UAE and the requirements listed 
by both the DFSA and the Central Bank. While DNFBPs are required to be registered and 
typically licensed in particular areas or professions, the accountability in this area is limited due 
to the lack of statistics identifying the percentage of these and their adherence to the 
requirements of the AML regulations. This area was considered to be not in compliance in the 
2008 assessment; however, many of these requirements are now in place in both the UAE and in 
the DFSA Codebook. There are no statistical values that demonstrate how many of these 
organizations are currently compliant with the new regulations, and no evidence of how the 
country is currently monitoring compliance with these requirements. In this way, it was listed as 
                                                
456 DFSA Codebook, p. 17 – 18.  
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largely compliant in this assessment, acknowledging that the regulations are in effect but that 
currently more work needs to be completed to demonstrate effectiveness or compliance.  
 
Sanctions	  
Sanctions are in place in the UAE, DFSA, and Central Bank, which are designed to increase 
compliance with the AML regulations. While statistical data was not available in this area either, 
the 2008 assessment found that compliance in legislation was mostly sufficient and recently the 
UAE increased the punishment for involvement in money laundering and its related criminal 
offenses to include the death sentence. In this way, it is perceived that the UAE is in compliance 
with this recommendation. However, similar to the other items listed in the recommendations, 
there are no statistical values to associate the effectiveness of this area, and the rating in this 
assessment is given to largely compliant in acknowledgement of the changes in requirements but 
lacking of evidence of effectiveness.  
 
Shell	  Banks	  
Shell banks are prohibited for financial institutions to create or develop relationships with, 
according the recommendations of the FATF. According to the 2008 assessment of the UAE, 
there were no laws prohibiting this activity; however, the DFSA specifically states that shell 
banks are not permitted, according to Rule 3.4.14. “An authorised Firm must not:” “establish a 
correspondent banking relationship with a Shell Bank;” “establish or keep anonymous accounts 
or accounts in false names; or” “maintain a nominee account which is held in the name of one 
Person but controlled by or held for the benefit of another Person whose identity has not been 
disclosed to the Authorised Firm”457. This area was considered partially compliant in the 2008 
assessment, and was changed to largely compliant as a result of changes in legislation and 
requirements outlined in the DFSA Codebook and Central Bank.  
                                                
457 DFSA Codebook, p. 15, retrieved from 
http://dfsa.complinet.com/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/d/f/DFSA1547_4489_VER7.pdf 
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Other	  Forms	  of	  Reporting	  
Other forms of reporting are not specified by the FATF but encouraged for countries to adapt 
measures of reporting that best suit their individual needs for complying with the regulations and 
recommendations of the FATF standards. In the 2008 assessment of the UAE, it was found that 
reporting was not clearly defined by the UAE or the Central Bank; however, since this time those 
reporting requirements have been increased. While this area is now mostly compliant, the 
primary research suggests that more work could be done to improve in this area. This area 
remained at compliant, due to the rating applied in the 2008 assessment. 
 
Other	  NFBP	  &	  Secure	  Transaction	  Techniques	  
Other NFBP and secure transaction techniques are covered by UAE legislation; however, the 
access to statistics regarding these measures are not available for review. In addition, the 
completeness of these regulations and legislation require additional work to be thorough and 
complete in assisting in meeting AML requirements of the FATF recommendations and has not 
changed largely since the 2008 assessment. Much of the difficulty in this area is a direct 
relationship with the cash-based aspects of the society. While legislation continues to improve, 
this area was not moved from the 2008 assessment due to the lack of attention it is paid in the 
regulations and legislation that is associated with these areas. However, the 2014 changes to 
legislation may influence this and increase the rating.  
 
Special	  Attention	  for	  Higher	  Risk	  Countries	  
Special attention for higher risk countries is more complicated for the legislation and regulation 
of AML because of the difficulty in assessing the changes that occur between nations and the 
lack of standardization of regulations. According to the 2008 assessment, the UAE was rated 
only partially compliant with this requirement; however, recent changes to the regulations of the 
Central Bank and the DFSA have placed stricter requirements on financial institutions to obtain 
documentation and maintain records regarding higher risk relationships and sources of 
questionable funds, were reporting takes place for all suspicious activities. In this way, the rating 
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established here is the largely compliant rating; however, a lack of statistics to support the 
effectiveness of the requirements prevents further assessment.  
 
Foreign	  Branches	  &	  Subsidiaries	  
Foreign branches and subsidiaries is noted as including the need for all subsidiaries and branches 
to adhere to the same standards of AML/CFT as the main office, and that the failure of the 
branches or subsidiaries to be able to implement these standards and regulations, or the failure of 
the branch to successfully implement these requirements must notify the central bank. These 
requirements also do not have statistical evidence available. In addition, Dubai does not address 
subsidiaries or foreign branches. However, the DFSA does recommend that firms do not 
exclusively rely on the Codebook but also refer to the “the consolidated list of financial sanctions 
in the European Union Office, HM Treasury (United Kingdom) lists, and the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of Treasury”458. The 2008 assessment 
noted this area as largely compliant, and this rating is applied again, though fully compliant 
would require that further assessment of effectiveness be evaluated.  
 
Regulation,	  Supervision	  &	  Monitoring	  
Regulation, supervision and monitoring specifically address the need of FIUs, Financial 
Institutions, and AMLSCU to establish regulation, ensure compliance, access necessary 
information to remain compliant and monitor for non-compliance or illegal activities. The 2008 
assessment rated this area as partially compliant, focusing on the aspects of voluntary registration 
processes for hawala dealers, no board member requirements, lack of AML/CFT inspections in 
the securities sector, and the lack of supervision in the insurance sector. However, since this time 
some legislation has been developed in these areas, and improved regulation has been published 
in both the Central Bank and the DFSA Codebook. Additionally, hawala dealers are now 
required to register and comply with all reporting and STR as other financial institutes, where 
                                                
458 Ibid p. 19. 
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failure to comply results in sanctions 459 . No current statistics were available regarding 
compliance, and the application in the area of the board members and managing directors was 
not clearly defined, which resulted in a score of largely compliant.  
 
DNFBP	  –	  Regulation,	  Supervision	  and	  Monitoring	  
DNFBP – regulation, supervision and monitoring is similar to the above item, and includes 
strictly DNFBPs. The licensing of DNFBPs occurs at the emirate levels in the UAE, and 
compliance is monitored at the levels of emirate and the federal level; however, regulation is not 
always similar or including the same scope between different emirates. The measurement of this 
success in the 2008 assessment found that, in regards to DNFBPs, there were no provisions for 
DNFBPs; however, some changes have occurred in these areas since that time. Due to the 
increase in legislation and regulation, the score for this area was identified as largely compliant, 
only because no supporting data could be obtained to verify compliance nor are there statistics 
regarding the numbers of DNFBPs and standardization between emirates.  
 
Guidelines	  &	  Feedback	  
Guidelines and feedback are referred to as the enforceable means of the country and include the 
instructions, documentation, mechanisms, and sanctions for non-compliance. These factors were 
found to only be partially compliant in the 2008 assessment, and based on the primary research 
regarding knowledge and communication, it is likely that this is a challenge area for the UAE. 
This research was not able to make a complete assessment in this area due to lack of literature; 
however, the primary research did not support the enforceable aspects that would be expected 
based on the legislation and regulation implemented. No score is given in this area.  
 
                                                
459  'All Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Countries/Jurisdictions: United Arab Emirates', 2014, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, pp. 439-441. 
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The	  Financial	  Intelligence	  Unit	  
The Financial Intelligence Unit is defined as the investigative department of the AML/CFT 
regulation that a country must implement to be successful in the recommendations of the FATF. 
The 2008 recommendations included amendment to the AML law to increase national FIU use 
and access for gathering information and conducting investigations, improve the power of the 
FIUs, confidentiality clause to protect employees of the FIU and information held by the FIU, 
training and development, databases with access to the FIU, law enforcement involvement in 
FIUs, and public awareness campaigns460. These have been an objective in Dubai; however, the 
success has only been in the increased legislation and regulation in regards to the FIU. No 
documentation exists to support the success of the FIU in the country, and the research 
conducted in the primary research suggests that difficulties still exist in this area. Largely 
compliant was selected to acknowledge the newest regulations and legislation.  
 
Law	  Enforcement	  Authorities	  
Law enforcement authorities were one of the focal points of the primary research, and the law 
enforcement agency of Dubai was largely dissatisfied with the ability to control or investigate 
money laundering in the their areas. These were a direct result of failure in communication and 
access to the appropriate information. However, respondents did note that the FIUs preferred to 
take experienced law enforcement officers as additional employees for their units. This type of 
collaborative effort is not the intention of the law enforcement recommendation of the FATF, 
which suggests that law enforcement agencies should have the ability to investigate money 
laundering and terrorist financing through the “framework of national AML/CFT policies”461. 
                                                
460 ‘Mutual Evaluation Report. Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, United Arab 
Emirates’, MENAFATF, 9 April 2008, p. 159, retrieved from 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20UAE%20full.pdf 
461 ‘International Standards on Combatting Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, 
FATF Recommendations’, FATF, February 2012, Retrieved from 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf 
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During the 2008 assessment, this area was rated as compliant, and while the issue of 
effectiveness is a concern, the rating was not downgraded due to the legal framework in place for 
this area.  
 
Powers	  of	  Competent	  Authorities	  
Powers of competent authorities is another area that is essential to the success of the AML/CFT 
policies in that it enables the investigation of suspicious activities and gathering of necessary 
information or evidence for prosecution or for confiscation of the suspected property or money, 
where these are found to be the result of criminal activity – money laundering or terrorism 
funding. In the case of the UAE, authority in this area exists at the federal and the emirate levels, 
including the authority granted to the Federal Customs Authority (FCA), public prosecutor’s 
office, federal attorney-general, and is not consistent in responsibility between emirates. This is a 
concern that was noted in the 2008 assessment, which remains a concern due to the inability to 
develop strict standardization between emirates in the UAE. While it is likely that the success of 
these types of authority would be benefit from existing on the emirate level, it is likely that the 
UAE would benefit from increasing the requirements of the emirates to adhere to these 
requirements and to establish a federal unit specifically designed to work with emirates in 
complying with these specific recommendations. The rating of compliant was not changed.  
 
Supervisors	  
Supervisors are necessary in managing the information that is required to establish the existence 
of money laundering offences or to manage the risks associated with transactions that are 
considered to be “high risk” as in occurring under that definition. Supervisors must have the 
same protection as the FIU, in order to ensure that the supervisor is able to perform their duties 
successfully. The UAE, DFSA, and the Central Bank have established regulation regarding the 
requirements of firms to have AML/CFT supervisors to evaluate the adherence to standards, 
regulations, and legislation by the firm. Included in the recommendations is that firms establish 
clear training programs and standards for their organisation, which will guide supervisors when 
they are responsible for difficult decisions or monitoring suspicious activities. This area had a 
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partially compliant rating in the 2008 assessment, which was upgraded to largely compliant due 
to regulation and legislation; however, it cannot be supported at the compliant level due to the 
lack of evidence to support effectiveness. 
 
Resources,	  Integrity	  and	  Training	  
Resources, integrity and training are viewed as key needs of successfully implementing FATF 
recommendations and providing the ability for firms and agencies to adhere to the legislation of 
AML/CFT created by the country. According to the findings of the 2008 assessment, the Abu 
Dhabi Police established a “specialist economic crime unit”, and initiated training from resources 
of the “GCC, the US and British Commonwealth countries” in order to improve upon the ability 
to investigate criminal activities particularly related to financial crimes462. However, the primary 
research indicated that the Dubai police force did not have the training necessary for many of the 
needs identified in the financial crimes area, specifically in knowing how to access or obtain the 
necessary information during an investigation. However, in Dubai, it was noted that specialty 
forces did receive training, and that specific officers were given the training required to do these 
investigations, and they may not have been included in the population studied. In the 2008 
assessment this area was noted as partially compliant, and this same rating was given, based on 
the results of the primary research.  
 
National	  Co-­‐Operation	  
National co-operation and coordination is important to success of AML/CFT regulation because 
money laundering does not strictly occur in a single area but typically occurs over a number of 
areas. As stated by the FATF recommendations, all countries should have national policies that 
address the risks and requirements of AML/CFT, which are reviewed regularly for improvement 
of enhancement to remain current and effective in their goals. In addition, the UAE was noted in 
the 2008 assessment to have established a National Anti-Money Laundering Committee, which 
                                                
462 Ibid p. 46. 
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includes membership of the “foreign ministry, the ministries of interior, justice, finance and 
industry, economy and commerce, agencies concerned with issuing trade and industrial licenses, 
the central bank and the UAE Customs Board (disbanded and the functions are now performed 
by the Federal Customs Authority – FCA)”463. The objectives of this area was to develop 
relationships and cooperation, which through MENAFATF, and training collaborations with 
countries such as the UK, have been developed. If these areas are completely effective is beyond 
the scope of this research; however, based on the necessary elements and attempts, the rating was 
improved to compliant, which is also supportive of recent reports regarding the UAE.  
 
Statistics	  
Statistics of the UAE were mostly not available in the 2008 assessment, nor available in the 
research gathered from this study. The FATF suggests that all countries should use statistics to 
measure the “effectiveness and efficiency of their AML/CFT systems” and that these statistics 
should be made available to the assessments and authorities for measuring their individual 
success and areas in need of improvement464. However, it is important to note that the Central 
Bank agreed to working on a method for developing statistics for assessment of wire transfers 
and would make this type of information available to the FIU. In addition, the Dubai Police were 
able to provide assessors in the 2008 report with statistics and documentation on 224 cases 
investigated regarding money laundering, which demonstrated that the majority of money 
laundering incidents investigated occurred from areas outside of the UAE/Dubai. The 
recommendation for the UAE is increased resources for the FIUs and authorities to use in 
investigations and monitoring the success of the activities of these agencies. As no new statistics 
were available to this research the rating was not changed.  
 
 
                                                
463 Mutual Evaluation Report, p. 130. 
464 FATF Recommendations, p. 26. 
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Legal	  Persons	  –	  Beneficial	  Owners	  
Legal persons – beneficial owners are the responsibility of record-keeping and transparency 
efforts of firms in managing customer bases and information. The ability to prevent money 
laundering requires that the necessary documentation always exist where money or assets are 
found to present opportunities for illegal and criminal activities to occur. FATF 
recommendations include that all relevant information be complete, adequate, and available in a 
timely and accurate manner to authorities in the case of investigation. In addition, all firms and 
professionals are required to report suspicious information or documentation to the FIU or other 
AML authorities. While the compliance of this issue is mostly covered in the UAE, some 
difficulty remains with standardization between emirates. However, the DFSA has established 
clear requirements in all of these areas of need and these requirements are located in the DFSA 
Codebook. In addition, the Central Bank has worked to improve upon these regulations, which 
has resulted in a change to largely compliant based on this improvement.  
 
Legal	  Arrangements	  –	  Beneficial	  Owners	  
Legal arrangements – beneficial owners is similar to the above, where it is required that the 
beneficial owners and other legal arrangements are documented and identified. Similar to the 
above, these regulations and recommendations are considered in the DFSA and further work 
should be done to standardize these aspects in all of the emirates. This rating was found to be 
compliant in the 2008 assessment, and additional regulation and legislation supports this issue, 
and the rating was applied again as compliant in this area.  
 
Conventions	  
Conventions are necessary for remaining up-to-date on the necessary policies on AML/CFT 
regulations and associated needs such as cybercrime or international policy changes that can 
directly influence the country. In the case of the UAE, remaining current with the policy of other 
countries has not been the primary objective; however, pressure from the international 
organisations the UAE currently belongs to, and in order to increase the viability of the country, 
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the UAE has taken notice of ongoing legal changes in the international organisations and other 
countries. The 2008 assessment recognized the ongoing changes to the legal regulations of the 
UAE in response to the conventions described by the FATF, and notes that the largest 
recommendation is the dissemination of this information to businesses and individuals. Since the 
time of this assessment, information has become more widely available, including in English and 
in Arabic, for use by the businesses or businesses wishing to do business in the country. In 
addition, many emirates have begun publishing to their citizens the relevant changes that occur 
in the legislation. Overall, this particular aspect of the FATF recommendations is considered to 
be compliant and remained so in this research.  
 
Mutual	  Legal	  Assistance	  (MLA)	  
Mutual legal assistance (MLA) was rated in the 2008 assessment as demonstrating limited 
compliance with this aspect, though different areas have worked to improve upon this section of 
the FATF recommendations, there is still work that must be done to improve upon this area. The 
proposals for different models, including the intelligence-led policing and the National 
Intelligence model are specifically identified for increasing the communication and the success 
of cooperation between agencies, both nationally and internationally. This improvement would 
benefit the UAE by establishing clear channels for communication, access to databases, authority 
and levels of responsibility, and to create opportunities for the agencies to identify gaps in the 
investigative processes and in the sharing of information. Due to the needs of improvement, 
which was also identified in the primary research, this area was not changed from the 2008 
assessment.  
 
Dual	  Criminality	  
Dual criminality is covered by the FATF recommendations is recognized as a requirement of 
mutual legal assistance. In the case of international mutual legal assistance it is determined that 
this includes that terminology must be developed to provide countries the ability to ensure that 
investigative techniques promote cooperation. In the case of the 2008 assessment, it was found 
that Article 7(4) “of the judicial cooperation law effectively dispenses with the need for dual 
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criminality in extradition and mutual legal assistance matters”465. This is only contradicted by 
the ability of the UAE to refuse on the basis of lack of dual criminality, but typically does not 
result from the offense having no offense in the UAE or being in an different denomination or 
other related issues. Due to changes in the laws and improvement of the UAE in cooperation, this 
rating was changed to compliant during this quasi-assessment.  
 
MLA	  on	  Confiscation	  and	  Freezing	  
MLA on confiscation and freezing is related to the legislation of a country to “take expeditious 
action” when another country requests the identification, freezing, seizure, and confiscation of 
property laundered or the proceeds from money laundering in offences or in the case of terrorist 
financing466. This includes that all instrumentalities be considered where they are in direct 
relationship to the incident or perceived to have been a result of the crime. In the case of the 
UAE, the 2008 assessment found that Article 21 supported this recommendation but did not 
“cover all of the predicate offenses outlined in the FATF Recommendations”467. As changes 
have occurred in the legislation in this area, it was changed to largely compliant, where the 
primary difficulty is in statistics supporting the effectiveness of the implementations.  
 
Extradition	  
Extradition is also evaluated by the FATF Recommendations and is considered the ensuring that 
the country will not provide safe haven to money launderers and that requests for extradition will 
be managed without obstruction and in a timely manner. This aspect of the recommendations 
was found to be in need of standardization and requiring that the UAE develop target dates for 
training and enforcement of this legislation. While this information was not developed in the 
primary research for this study, it was noted that this was projected as being part of the goals of 
                                                
465 Mutual Evaluation Report, p. 141. 
466 FATF Recommendations, p. 28. 
467 Mutual Evaluation Report, p. 141. 
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the UAE generally, and no reports were found to contradict the success of this implementation. 
This area has been largely effective based on the 2008 assessment, and this same rating was 
applied in this assessment due in part to the statistics being unavailable to support the 
effectiveness of this legislation in the UAE.  
 
Other	  Forms	  of	  Co-­‐Operation	  
Other forms of co-operation are defined as competence in authorities to “rapidly, constructively 
and effectively provide the widest range of international cooperation in relation to money 
laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing”468, where the country can act 
both instantly and after request in a lawful manner demonstrating cooperation. In the 2008, 
assessment, the NAMLC was noted as being established in accordance with Article 9 of the 
AML Law, and in Article 10, addresses the requirement that the NAMLC will work 
cooperatively with other countries in addressing the needs of investigation and requests for 
extradition or other money laundering requests. However, the assessment was unable to 
determine the full extent of this application and the research here was not conclusive or 
providing any evidence to the effectiveness of this particular role of the NAMLC. While the 
2008 assessment found the area to be partially compliant, a report in 2014 noted that record 
exchange mechanisms are in place469, and that the UAE works with other governments and 
jurisdictions, suggesting that the improvements in regulations and legislation are assisting in this 
area, which demonstrates that this area has become largely compliant.  
 
Implement	  UN	  Instruments	  
Implement UN instruments is an important aspect of the ability of the country to act upon 
information regarding AML/CFT regulations. This particular item was found to be in partial 
                                                
468 FATF Recommendations, p. 29. 
469  'All Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Countries/Jurisdictions: United Arab Emirates', 2014, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, pp. 439-441. 
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compliance, according to the 2008 assessment of the UAE. Since that time, the changes in the 
UAE have increased the policies and procedures recommended by the UN and other AML/CFT 
requirements internationally, therefore, this area is considered be improving. This area was 
beyond the scope of this research to assess fully.   
 
Criminalize	  Terrorist	  Financing	  
Criminalize terrorist financing is the legal regulations that specifically address the financing of 
terrorist activities, making them criminal activities punishable as such. While the 2008 
assessment did not find this to be completely in compliance with the requirements, recent 
legislation has brought the UAE into compliance by clearly identifying any form of terrorism or 
actions that enable and fund terrorism are criminal acts that are punishable, including by death 
sentence. While the 2008 assessment determined that legislation was only largely compliant, the 
UAE has since implemented changes to these laws that demonstrate a much more specific 
identification in regards to these requirements,  
 
Freeze	  and	  Confiscate	  Terrorist	  Assets	  
Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets is considered part of the money laundering and confiscation 
recommendations that specifically require that countries adopt measures that were identified in 
the Vienna Convention as necessary legislative measures, where the responsible authorities have 
the power to “freeze or seize and confiscate the following without prejudicing the rights of bona 
fide third parties: (a) property laundered, (b) proceeds from, or instrumentalities used in or 
intended for use in money laundering or predicate offences, (c) property that is the proceeds of, 
or used in, or intended or allocated for use in, the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist 
organisations, or (d) property of corresponding value”470. In the 2008 assessment, the UAE was 
found to be in partial compliance with this measure. With the exception of uncovering the 
information regarding these assets, the respondents in the primary study supported that 
                                                
470 FATF Recommendations, p. 12.  
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confiscation would occur in the case of criminal activities. In addition, since the 2008 
assessment, the UAE has worked to use legislation to close this gap, and is found to be mostly 
compliant where the primary needs are in dissemination of the information and standardization 
between emirates.  
 
Suspicious	  Transaction	  Reporting	  
Suspicious transaction reporting has also been previously identified in the research, and was 
found to be a struggle for the primary research, which both complained of difficulty in accessing 
databases or achieving communication goals, but also noted that the majority of transaction 
reporting was successfully reported as suspicious where applicable and could easily be referred 
to the related investigative authorities. While the 2008 assessment identified this aspect as non-
compliant, the more recent requirements of the Central Bank, UAE legislation, and DFSA 
Codebook, suggest that this area is likely to be at least partially compliant and in need of 
increased training programs to improve upon the implementation of the regulations and 
legislation designed to address this gap.  
 
International	  Co-­‐Operation	  
International co-operation suffered a limited compliance rating in the 2008 assessment largely 
due to the lack of statistical evidence available to the assessors to determine the rate of 
compliance in this area. In addition, lack of statistical evidence is still a problem in determining 
what success or improvements have occurred in this area. While the results of the primary 
research indicate that cooperation is generally not as strong as would be expected for success in 
AML/CFT regulation, it is likely that the compliance issues are primarily in application rather 
than in legality. In this way, the recommendation remains that the UAE must institute better 
record keeping and databases that can be used to create statistical evidence of the country’s 
success in achieving the goals set forth by the FATF Recommendations.  
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AML/CFT	  Requirements	  for	  Money/Value	  Transfer	  Services	  
AML/CFT requirements for money/value transfer services was rated as non-compliant in the 
2008 assessment, reasons were cited as the “voluntary system of registration for Hawala 
dealers”, “no formal, legally enforceable obligations imposed on Hawaladars”, “no legal powers 
to oversee the activities of Hawaladars to ensure compliance with standards of CDD, record-
keeping, etc.”, “potential scope for abuse through use of registration certificate to access formal 
financial system”, and “limitations on standards applied to remitters in the formal sector as 
reflected in analysis of relevant Recommendations covering the financial sector”471. This is a 
challenge for all areas with Hawala dealers as the cultural aspects of this type of financial 
activity is not actively or easily monitored and controlled. In addition, it is not an aspect of 
Western banking systems, which causes more concern for the lack of monitoring that occurs with 
this type of money transfer. Finally, the MENAFATF is working closely with the countries to 
determine how to better manage Hawala without causing unnecessary disruption for money 
transfer that is legitimate with Hawala dealers. While this area is still not resolved in the case of 
the UAE, the country has worked with the MENAFATF, and continues to involve the local 
Hawala dealers in by creating requirements and regulations that will decrease the risks of this 
type of money transfer for abuse by money launderers or terrorist financing.  
 
Wire	  Transfer	  Rules	  
Wire transfer rules are focus of the Central Bank since the 2008 assessment of the UAE. This 
focus was designed to have a complete database to increase awareness and accountability of 
funds obtained in this manner. This is in compliance with the requirements of the FATF 
Recommendations in that the assessment found that domestic banks did not currently have rules 
regarding originator information, incoming transfers lack of information, or sanctions in regards 
to failure to comply with the requirements of this information. The DFSA addresses this issue by 
stating that the payment information must remain with the “payment instruction through the 
                                                
471 Mutual Evaluation Report, p. 157-158. 
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payment chain”, specifically in regards to the originator but also in regards to the recipient472. In 
addition, the Central Bank has also begun require this same information to be maintained in case 
of need or for further investigation in the case of AML/CFT needs.  
 
Non-­‐Profit	  Organisations	  
Non-profit organisations (NPO) are a complicated aspect for most countries, due to the 
international transfer of money with many of these types of organisations. According to the 2008 
assessment, the application of FATF Recommendations in this area was lacking compliance in 
many areas; however, the changes in legislation regarding NPOs has changed, and while there 
are some changes that must still occur, the UAE does not permit NPOs to send money 
international except through three approved government controlled entities: the Red Crescent 
Authority, the Zayed Charitable Foundation, and the Muhammad Bin Rashid Charitable Trust.  
Cross-­‐Border	  Declaration	  &	  Disclosure	  
Cross-border declaration & disclosure was found by the 2008 assessment to be not in compliance 
with the FATF Recommendations. The specific items cited included “inconsistent enforcement 
of reporting system”, “no system for the reporting the transportation of bearer negotiable 
instruments, either inbound or outbound”, “no system for the reporting of outbound cross-border 
transportation of cash”, and “no sanctions or restraint powers for failure to disclose/declare or 
false disclosure/declaration of bearer negotiable instruments”473. The requirements that are 
currently in-place in the UAE have not met the requirements of the FATF Recommendations in 
full. 
 
7.2. Summary	  
While the FATF Recommendations results demonstrate improvement of the UAE in meeting the 
AML/CFT regulations, there are still many areas that need improvement in the legislation and 
                                                
472 DFSA Codebook, p. 21 
473 Mutual Evaluation Report, p. 158. 
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implementation of regulation. The UK has challenges in areas that are different from the UAE, 
such as politically exposed persons and correspondent banking, which the 2013 findings state 
that the UK is not compliant in these areas. In addition, the UK received only a score, which 
denotes partial compliance with customer due diligence, third parties and introducers, and other 
areas that may need addressed in the near future. While overall the UK scores higher than the 
UAE in most areas, the areas that need addressed are important for both countries and should be 
considered in the coming year to improve upon the success of AML/CFT initiatives. In addition, 
the UAE is evolving and changing rapidly, for example, in an assessment conducted in June of 
2014, based on the FATF Recommendations, a report was developed that demonstrated that 
numerous implementations had already begun taking place; however, again, there was limited 
statistical evidence regarding success474. 
                                                
474  'All Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Countries/Jurisdictions: United Arab Emirates', 2014, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, pp. 439-441. 
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  Chapter	  Eight	  
Conclusion	  and	  Recommendations	  
8.1. Introduction	  
 
The aims of this research were to analyse the current regulatory structure of AML in Dubai. It 
further sought to identify best practice to prevent money laundering, and to look at the potential 
practices which could be implemented in Dubai to strengthen the AML legislative framework. 
Though there was some criticism in the previous chapter highlighting key issues, this brief final 
chapter focuses more on contemporary recommendations that need immediate attention.  
 
However, a brief review of each chapter would be useful here. Chapter one explained and set out 
the aim, objectives, the problem statement, but mostly highlighted the complex nature of AML in 
Dubai with the development of FTZs and different bodies ‘regulating’ different financial sectors.  
 
In chapter two the literature relevant to this thesis, concepts and legal terminology were 
discussed. It noted the explanatory limitations of stages of money laundering, and highlighted the 
often impenetrable, vague legal documentation on AML, and mostly that the UAE and Dubai 
have drawn on the laws and systems by ‘copying’ or ‘aping’ of legislation, (mostly United 
Kingdom laws) and that is perhaps inappropriate for its own experience of money laundering.  
 
In chapter three the focus was on the political context in which AML legislation has developed in 
the UAE and assessed the legislation presently available to prevent money laundering. The 
debate focused on the political and legal structure and reputational risk of poor AML practice in 
UAE. It suggested that the UAE and Dubai was in the position of reputational risk unless it 
developed comprehensive AML practices instead of relying on a signatory of legal international 
conventions.    
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In chapter four the focus was specifically on specific AML measures and the importance of 
developing strategies in preventing money laundering in Dubai. This chapter highlighted that a 
lack of communication between law enforcement bodies and the private sector needs to be 
addressed if AML strategies and practice is to prevent money laundering. Data and information 
on suspected individuals and organisations is the basis on which to build case, and as such a clear 
system of communication and combination of civil and criminal sanctions are needed.    
 
In chapter five an explanation of the research methods used and the advantages and 
disadvantages of these in this thesis was discussed. As with all research, regardless of the 
methods employed, there are advantages and disadvantages to the approaches used. Securing 
access to those working in law enforcement was straightforward; access to those in the 
international financial sector and Central Bank, however, was problematic.  
 
In chapter six the results of the research were analysed. The background data obtained from the 
interviews highlighted the male dominated sphere of business, even in the private sector and lack 
of AML knowledge from senior executives and law enforcement bodies in Dubai. The interviews 
further highlight the lack of coordination between the Central Bank, the private financial sector 
and law enforcement, and as such AML practice is dis-jointed, and that law enforcements bodies 
need skilled practitioners with a background in AML practice and/or education on how best to 
prevent this complex crime.  
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8.2. Summary	  of	  Findings	  
Dubai is significant in the Middle East due to its location, economic development, political 
stability, growth of business and centralization in the financial world to the areas of both 
legitimate business and organized crime475. The challenges of reducing money laundering in 
Dubai are directly related to the surrounding area, which includes the surrounding political 
instability and criminal elements, and the aspects of the financial environment in Dubai, which is 
still focused on largely cash transactions, noted for the larger difficulty in controlling or 
monitoring476. In addition, Dubai, as a financial centre with extensive access to all individual 
through legal points of entry into the city, has the challenge of meeting the requirements of 
money laundering international regulations, without the power for banks and financial 
institutions to effectively track transactions in their cash-based economy. These challenges are 
further compounded by a very strong Hawala system in Dubai, and most of the Middle East, 
which is perceived to be directly related to criminal activities, from drug and human trafficking 
to terrorism activities477. 
Anti-money laundering (AML) systems are valued for the ability to reduce criminal activities 
internationally and locally478. The UAE, along with most countries in the world, have worked to 
develop legislation and regulation that prevents these activities from occurring in their countries. 
In the case of the Dubai, themes were found in the interviews that demonstrated a need for policy 
to include more technology to enable enforcement of anti-money laundering initiatives; training 
and access to data transactions that occur through banks and financial institutes; and increased 
authority to act in applying sanctions in cases where illegal activities are occurring. In addition, 
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the respondents noted that AML policies did not always result in the ability of police to act in an 
AML capacity.  
 
During the research, it was evident that longer terms in their profession typically indicated more 
belief that the system worked, or that the system worked sufficiently as compared to other 
countries internationally; however, the UAE is not considered to be completely compliant or 
successfully based on FATF ratings. Respondents to this study also found that the policies in 
place needed further support and required additional training and authority to properly address 
the issues challenging UAE regulations and compliance.    
 
As part of the FATF end-of-year activities within their research, developed OECD FATF ratings 
by country for 40 indicators, these indicators evaluated a number of countries, including the UK 
ranked, which was found to be compliant in 24 areas and noncompliant in the areas of only 
politically exposed persons, correspondent banking, and foreign branches and subsidiaries479. 
This country rating does not include the UAE; however, the Basel AML Index of country risk 
rating also identifies the differences between the UAE and the UK. The Basel AML Index, 
comprised of the results of adherence to AML/CTF standards, rates the UK at 4.75 and the UAE 
at 6.33480. However, UAE data regarding compliance with FATF indicators may be outdated, as 
no published resources are found since the 2008 publication by MENAFATF, the Mutual 
Evaluation Report, which utilized data from 2007 in its assessment481.  
 
                                                
479  End of year gift to readers: OECD FATF country ratings as an excel file. Retrieved from 
https://financialsecrecymediamonitor.wordpress.com/2013/12/30/end-of-year-gift-to-readers-oecd-fatf-country-
ratings-as-an-excel-file/ 
480 The Basel AML Index retrieved from http://index.baselgovernance.org/index/Index.html#ranking 
481 Retrieved from http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20UAE%20full.pdf 
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The UAE has been a member of MENAFATF since 2002, and is expected in 2014 to contribute 
to the program through workshops on assessors training and on FATF and MENAFATF 
currently revised recommendations and assessment methodologies482. The first workshops are 
expected to include information on “various functions levels of employees working in the 
regulatory area over the financial and banking sector and other professions or in the 
implementation of law rules or in financial investigation”483 . The second workshops are 
expected to include “various functional levels: LEAs (Law Enforcement Agencies), FIUs 
(Financial Intelligence Units), legal, financial/regulatory decision makers and those who take 
part in the changes of AML/CFT regulations”484. However, this study indicates that these 
challenges are still in need within Dubai itself, such as indicated in the interviews with law 
enforcement, which suggested that access to information and knowledge to manage information 
for AML policies were limited.  
 
In addition, respondents found it difficult to assess the movement of money through Dubai, due 
to the issues of determining legitimacy based on the current ease of movement through the 
region. The importance of Dubai as a financial centre places additional challenges on regulation, 
as the increase in difficulty to conduct business could disrupt the current success of Dubai 
overall. Respondents admitted that the ability of AML to occur is directly related to the ease of 
access and difficulty in monitoring if the money will be laundered through the banking or 
Hawala systems currently in place in Dubai. Some of the difficulty occurring is a direct result of 
political instability or lack of banking controls in the host countries of the individuals, and these 
are not measures that can be easily addressed by the UAE, but may be addressed through further 
activities with the MENAFATF. 
 
                                                
482 Middle East & North Africa Financial Action Task Force Ninth Annual Report 2013. p. 30. Retrieved from 
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Money laundering is an international problem focused on by a number of international 
organisations designed to develop regulations and standards that countries can implement to 
reduce the presence of the problem in their individual country. However, the difficulties of 
implementing these policies is the inconsistency of the financial systems, both within the UAE 
and in nearby countries. This was particularly present in the results that were found in opinions 
regarding the AML structures and in the intent of financial organisations to create consistency 
between countries, including in the FATF regulations and standards, which have the direct intent 
of creating regulations that prevent complications of financial transaction legitimacy resulting 
from differences in the systems. Respondents in the study largely perceived the difficulties 
facing Dubai as a being the direct result of outside influences and sources of incoming money.  
 
The UAE has developed policies and procedures for money transaction requirements and 
oversight of these transactions, including laws and procedures that have been developing and 
expanding since 2002, particularly as the involvement of the UAE in FATF has grown485. In an 
assessment by the IMF, the UAE was recognized for the creation of legal framework for 
addressing AML and reducing terrorist financing. However, the IMF found that the design was 
in need of improvement, specifically in that the laws did not include the full range of offences 
that may be identified as money laundering predictors and that the UAE FIU was not sufficiently 
staffed to support the ability to “operate as an autonomous unit” that would not be restricted to 
“relying on the resources of the Central Bank’s Supervision Department” or “other regulatory 
agencies”486.  This sentiment was supported by respondents, in that nearly all respondents felt 
that uncovering money strictly required a large amount of research overwhelming amounts of 
information, which were only reasonable when the AMLSCU referred cases to be investigated or 
where obvious criminal activity occurred by the individual that was suspect. Based on the results, 
                                                
485 Demonstrated in United Arab Emirates Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism, International Monetary Fund Legal Department, (2008). Retrieved from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08305.pdf 
486 Ibid. p. 8 
 227 
the recommendation from the IMF is still applicable to the current circumstances influencing 
Dubai as of 2013.  
 
Problems of cash-based transactions, such as occur in the Hawala system or occur with sale and 
purchase of gold and diamonds, are higher risk for Dubai, and consequently more difficult to 
manage in money laundering prevention. The processes utilized by the UAE to reduce these risks 
to the AML initiatives include the KPCS, which is instituted at the federal level as State Cabinet 
120/11, 2003 and is the “Union Law No (13) of 2004” and is designed to supervise the import, 
export, and movement of rough diamonds487. However, in the 2011 Annual Report from 
Kimberley Process there were four specific incidences that had occurred, which demonstrated 
clear understanding of the requirements of the regulations and while infringements were 
reported, the recommendations for UAE were not attached for review. This supported the 
complaints from respondents to the study, which included the difficulty in managing information 
from multiple countries, particularly in the case where standardization was not found or where 
compliance with AML was lacking.  
 
Another consideration for the management of AML, in the UAE, was the focus on charitable 
organisations, which may become directly responsible for the funding of terrorist organisations 
and drug trafficking by enabling the movement of money between countries. While many 
charities are legal entities with legal activities, Levitt (2011) noted that charities are “attractive 
covers for illicit acts” and money laundering activities have occurred through charities for many 
years due to the ease of moving or hiding money in the organisations488. Since 2001, numerous 
countries have implemented stronger control over charities, including Saudi Arabia, where 
control was strictly enforced following the discovery of charities funding terrorism within Saudi 
                                                
487 U.A.E. Kimberley Process 2011 Annual Report. Retrieved from http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/uae-
annual-report-2011 
488 Levitt, M 2010, 'Tightened Security', Chronicle of Philanthropy, vol. 22, no. 14, p. 6. 
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Arabia489. Furthermore, the UAE issued a cautionary Notice to all people of the UAE, in Arabic, 
advising UAE residents of the risks associated with donations and to be wary of who donations 
are given. The message included that not only the residents should be wary, but also that they 
understand that lack of caution could result in legal questioning due to the law stating that it is 
illegal for residents to complete “transactions with unknown parties abroad”490. Respondents in 
this study did not specify charitable organisations as part of the problem. However, it is 
important to note that respondents did feel that it was most difficult to know if money laundering 
were occurring from individuals recognized as being part of developed states around the world, 
versus those of undeveloped states. This perception causes difficulty of legitimacy of 
transactions, including for residents with no experience regarding the legality or international 
implications of money transference.  
 
Respondents of AMLSCU in Dubai noted that responsiveness to money laundering only occurs 
when suspicious cases are referred to them, where they will then begin to evaluate the incident to 
determine if it is legitimate business or personal activity or if it denotes further investigation due 
to its appearance as an illegal activity. Following discovery that the transaction may be money 
laundering, the AMLSCU notifies the bank, prosecutors, and police to develop further inquiry 
and begin seeking evidence regarding the case. 
 
While much of the most recent content has focused on UAE, rather than exclusively Dubai, it is 
important to reiterate that Dubai is a Financial Free Zone. According the UAE constitution, 
Article 121, Dubai is able to “have exclusive legislative jurisdiction” in many areas, including 
those of courts, labour relations, banks, insurance, and more, where these controls enable the 
                                                
489 Prados, AB, & Blanchard, CM 2005, 'Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues: RL32499', Congressional 
Research Service: Report, pp. 1-26. 
490 Laws, Regulations, and procedures Implemented in the United Arab Emirates for Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combatting Terrorism Financing. (2005). Retrieved from 
http://www.centralbank.ae/en/pdf/amlscu/RegulationSummary-2005.pdf 
 229 
emirate to establish the rules of their individual area, with the exception of criminal law, as noted 
by Federal Law no. 8, of 2004491. In 2007, the UAE constitution was updated to include that all 
Financial Free Zones would be required to comply with all federal laws of money laundering and 
anti-terrorism, and all federal laws generally where they do not include civil or commercial 
federal laws492. In addition, all Financial Free Zones were also required to comply with licensing 
of financial institutions, development of standards, and required that all Financial Free Zones are 
both familiar with and compliant with the treaties and agreements of the state (UAE)493. 
Dubai has the ability to more strictly regulate transactions, but must at least comply with the 
regulations and requirements of UAE, which works to remain compliant with international 
standards as developed by organisations such as the AMF and MENAFATF. In regards to the 
ability to develop regulations and standards, Dubai, established “The Law of the Dubai 
International Financial Centre, No. (9) for the year 2004”, which created the bodies of Dubai 
International Financial Centre Authority (DIFCA), Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA), 
and Dubai International Financial Centre Judicial Authority494. One example of additional 
legislature at the Dubai level is the 2014 implementation of the Netting Law, which is based on 
the close-out netting in case of insolvency, as developed by the model law of the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)495. This particular law is not currently a UAE law. In 
addition, Dubai has established General Regulation and Anti-Money Laundering Provisions in 
                                                
491 As demonstrated and found in the documents available from the Dubai Financial Services Authority. Retrieved 
from http://www.dfsa.ae/Pages/LegalFramework/LegalFramework.aspx 
492    Cabinet Resolution No. 28 of 2007. Retrieved from 
http://www.dfsa.ae/Documents/Cabinet%20Resolution%20No%2028%20of%202007.pdf 
493 Ibid 
494   Retrieved from : 
http://www.dfsa.ae/Documents/Legal%20framework/Dubai%20Law%20no%209%20English%20and%20Arabic.pdf 
495 As noted in DIFC Posts Consultation Papers for Public Comment on DIFC Netting Law, (2014). Retrieved from 
http://www.difc.ae/news/difc-posts-consultation-papers-public-comment-difc-netting-law 
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Part 4, of Regulatory Law496. Dubai laws are defaulted to the UAE laws, and the UK and UAE 
laws in the following section. 
8.2. Similarities	  &	  Differences	  between	  UK	  and	  UAE	  Regulations	  
Dubai laws are defaulted to the UAE regulations of Anti-Money Laundering policies and 
regulations, in that the law specifically states that no part of the law “affects the operation of” 
“Federal Law No. 4 of 2002”, “Federal Law No. 1 of 2004”, “the Penal Code of the United Arab 
Emirates”, or “any other Federal Law that is applicable in the DIFC in relation to money 
laundering”497. Furthermore, the obligations of this law state that all persons are required to 
comply with “any provision of Federal Law relating to money laundering”, and “any duty 
requirement, prohibition, obligation or responsibility”498. In addition, “where the DFSA detects 
conduct which it suspects may relate to money laundering, it shall advise the relevant authority 
exercising powers and performing functions under Federal Law No. 4 of 2002 without undue 
delay” and these obligations finish with “a person who is subject to Rules made pursuant to 
Article 72 shall conduct customer due diligence in the circumstances prescribed by the 
Rules”499. Due to these legal requirements of Dubai, the remainder of this section will focus on 
current UAE, DFSA, and UK AML regulations and legislation, to determine the success of these 
on Dubai money laundering policy. Furthermore, publications throughout 2014 have 
demonstrated increased work to meet the FATF Recommendations and demonstrate complete 
compliance with these assessment results, which improves on the success of the UAE overall. 
Dubai has been focusing on meeting these challenges in each year of changes or assessments 
from the FATF, and while some of the changes are led by Dubai, federal changes are the most 
necessary for meeting the needs of the UAE, because it results in standardization and stronger 
compliance ratings.  
                                                
496 DFSA Laws, Retrieved from http://dfsa.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=1547&element_id=7445 
497  Regulatory Law DIFC Law No.1 of 2004, p. 44, Retrieved from 
http://dfsa.complinet.com/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/d/f/DFSA1547_7446_VER170.pdf 
498 Ibid 
499 Ibid 
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There are a number of similarities and differences between the legal regulations and standards 
for AML control and FATF compliance between the UK and UAE. While the primary focus here 
is to determine the legislation differences, it is important to note the government agencies also 
consistent with the management of criminal activities and investigations, which will be included. 
Finally, the ability of the UAE to operate effectively in the same manner of as the UK is not the 
goal of this section, as it is not reasonable to suggest that one entity should behave as another 
entity. The goal of this work is to demonstrate key working elements of the legislation and 
methodology that may benefit Dubai and the UAE in achieving their individual goals for 
compliance and improved FATF rating and assessments in the future. In addition, the UAE 
represents a unique and different culture from the UK, which was not measured in this work, and 
denotes differences to management of internal affairs that require individual considerations 
during the design of legal environments for its citizens. 
 
UK AML regulations are documented on the legislation government site of the United 
Kingdoms500 . In addition, UK regulations are published by The Law Society and other 
government bodies in order to provide citizens with guidelines to the implications and 
implementations created by these laws. DFSA AML regulations are documented at the DFSA 
website, where authorized firms can view current laws, and changes, to the regulations, which 
are also published using the government publications for Dubai501. UAE AML regulations are 
documented at the Central Bank website, and are updated as needed for organisations and public 
view in the UAE502. The laws most responsible for meeting the needs of AML regulation are 
Regulation No. 24/2000, Federal Law No. 4 of 2002, Federal Law No. 1 of 2004, and Federal 
Law No 2 of 2006503.  
                                                
500 Located at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/2157/contents/made 
501 Located at http://dfsa.complinet.com/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/d/f/DFSA1547_4489_VER7.pdf 
502 Located at http://www.centralbank.ae/en/pdf/amlscu/RegulationSummary-2005.pdf 
503 Retrieved from http://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/middleeast/United_Arab_Emirates.aspx 
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In these laws, for the UAE, the definition of money laundering is consistent with that of the 
FATF requirements and is not as thorough as the documentation defining Money Laundering 
found in the UK legislation, which is specifically well defined in Part 7, Money Laundering, 
2002, c. 20, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002504. Dubai does not further define money laundering, 
and in the DFSA rulebook, the definition is referred back to the UAE federal definition of money 
laundering. However, the UAE does criminalize the act of money laundering.  
 
Viewing of the legislation in effect in the UAE and the DFSA Codebook demonstrates that many 
of the required laws are in place; however, they are not as completely or wholly defined in the 
same manner as the UK, particularly in addressing obscure aspects, measurements of behaviour, 
or defining the consequences of actions. While it is true that the UAE and UK do not share a 
commonality in the court systems or the punishment of criminals, the understanding of what 
happens when the crimes occur, and at what degree, could be further incentive for individuals to 
assist the law enforcement by providing information that may not be deemed valuable if the 
crime is not perceived to have dire consequences.  
 
Another consideration is the design of managing the activities that occur regarding money 
laundering. In the case of the UK and the UAE, specialized departments for FIUs and AML 
teams have been created and given authority to act in the capacity of reducing and investigating 
money laundering within the country. However, the UK has also empowered other taskforces 
and agencies with the powers to investigate money laundering in the case of criminal networks, 
drug trafficking, and terrorism (as well as others). The teams that have access are not limited to 
agency, but instead limited to need or by sensitivity of the information. For example, UK law 
enforcement has access to databases of criminals and their prior activities, including that of 
money laundering, which enables the unit to quickly identify new criminal elements in their 
                                                
504 Retrieved from http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/part/7 
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specific area. In addition, the UK utilizes Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA); police 
services from England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland; Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC); and the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA). All of 
these agencies are able to work with each other when inside the country and with international 
organisations, such as the European Union’s law enforcement agency (Europol).  
 
The UAE, and Dubai included, have been working to reduce the instances of drug transportation 
in the UAE, and many illegal substances have been found within the country. In order to combat 
drugs, which carry a very serious sentence in the UAE, the authorities have enlisted the 
assistance of the UN and USA, and currently provide funding for the UN Office of Drug and 
Crime (UNODC) to operate a semi-regional office within the country. However, due to the lower 
prevalence of drug use by UAE citizens this type of organisation had not been a focal point of 
government until international pressure increased this interest; however, the UAE does utilize 
anti-narcotics teams to address other issues within the country.  
 
The UAE works diligently to demonstrate growth in achieving the goals of a responsible country 
and improving world ratings, partly in the fact that this improves the ability to gain funding for 
the country and provides the country with a more appealing safety and legal framework for 
inviting business to grow, and partly in response of growing pressures from international 
agencies for all countries to dedicate themselves to eliminating risks to citizens through the 
reduction of trafficking in illegal substances or people, and the reduction of funding to terrorist 
groups. According to news reported in August of 2014, the UAE further “toughened anti-
terrorism laws”505 by implementing clear legislation that planning, attempting, or assisting in 
acts of terrorism are punishable by “death sentence, life imprisonment, and fines up to 100 
                                                
505 ‘UAE toughens anti-terrorism laws’, AFP, Abu Dhabi, Al Arabiya News. 21 August 2014, Retrieved from 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/08/21/UAE-toughen-anti-terrorism-laws-.html 
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million dirhams”506 if found guilty. The list of crimes considered in this offense includes that of 
hostages, financing of terrorism, money laundering, and human trafficking.  
 
While the UAE does not have strong, well-developed, independent departments or structures 
established for managing crimes, such as terrorism and drug enforcement, the government does 
utilize these functions and involves itself in close contact with international agencies and US 
agencies to achieve goals that assist in building relationships with other countries worldwide. 
The ability to provide international organisations with access to the criminal networks using the 
UAE as a trade or stock area, are more quickly found when international evidence and support is 
granted to the UAE, due to the lack of these products or items being transferred within the state 
itself.  
 
Another process that the UK is considering using to improve upon accountability of 
organisations is implementation of a U.S.A. model that allows organisations to settle fraud 
investigations through the payment of fines, which reduces the incidents and may encourage 
organisations to seek out crimes within the firm prior to the point where criminal investigation 
must occur507. For example, an organisation noticing that reporting errors have occurred as a 
direct result of a single employee acting fraudulently, but demonstrates a failure on the part of 
the organisation to maintain the appropriate controls, could reduce the number of criminal 
charges to the individual directly responsible and pay only the fine that this type of activity has 
occurred rather than to be directly responsible for the actions of the individual. This may prevent 
organisations from protecting the members of the organisation that are most likely to engage in 
criminal activities. This type of incentive has not been used before in the UK; however, the 
                                                
506 Ibid 
507 Coyle, M 2013, 'Financial Crime in the UK', Risk Management (00355593), vol. 60, no. 5, p. 14. 
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country will be considering using this with the oversight of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and 
the Crown Prosecution Service, in order to promote “self-cleansing”508 by organisations. 
Finally, Dubai defaults primarily to the UAE laws, which are substantially different in clarity and 
thoroughness as compared to the UK. While Dubai creating regulations and standards in the 
Codebook, and these do clarify more requirements that are similar to that of the UK legislation, 
continued work on clarity and improvement is necessary to create clear legislation that is beyond 
reproach and able to be followed by law enforcement agencies. In addition, the implementation 
of stronger departmental cooperation and increased government agencies could substantially 
work to improve success in meeting the needs of uncovering criminal networks that may be 
directly responsible for the money laundering that creates problems for the UAE, specifically 
when the money laundering is in support of illegal activities that threaten populations. 
This section identified a number of key elements in the success of UAE to achieve FATF 
recommendations and goals. These elements are also essential in achieving stronger international 
recognition, and improving the interest in organisations to develop within the country. While 
development may not be a singular reason for increased money laundering regulation, the ability 
of the country to trade, obtain funding, and work cooperatively with other countries is dependent 
on the ability of the country to be consistent with the needs of all countries, in preventing and 
reducing the prevalence of crime networks and the illegal activities that occur within those 
networks. 
8.3. Recommendations	  
Unlike many countries around the world, the Dubai method of combatting money laundering is 
reactive in nature, occurring after the problem has occurred and does not consider proactive 
methods of addressing this problem. In addition, law enforcement agencies and AML 
organisations within Dubai do not have a collaborative environment, which is a requirement of 
the FATF, and necessary for success in reducing these types of criminal activities. As identified 
previously, the missing aspects of Dubai success can be found in UK implementations such as 
The Law Society and the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA). The recommendations to assist 
                                                
508 Ibid 
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Dubai include the following items, which are considered based on the previous chapters of 
primary research and the literature review, with strong focus on the aspects of UK. UK, as 
mentioned above, has been largely successful in achieving AML goals. These recommendations 
conclude with specific models to guide implementation that will support the goals of Dubai and 
the UAE, which includes the Intelligence Led Policing (ILP), problem-orientated, and 
community policing models. Finally, the National Intelligence Model (NIM) is considered as a 
recommendation due to its successful use in the UK.  
 
A number of key issues arise from this research; these are presented in a separated way below 
but are all interconnected. The general needs of the system are recognized below, and include the 
primary recognized areas of difficulty facing the UAE. Many of the government bodies in the 
UAE are identified as separate and completely able to establish laws and regulations, so long as 
these laws and regulations are in accordance with federal requirements, particularly in regards to 
areas of AML; however, the differences between these areas, FTZs and FFZs, are create 
difficulties in clarifying regulation, addressing the Political Expose Persons (PEP) requirements, 
recovery of assets, communication and cooperation, and the creation and utilization of a national 
database.  
 
(1) Simplify the national UAE legal system   
 
The UAE legal system would benefit from federal legislation that clearly defines money 
laundering, requirements of reporting, establishes governmental agencies, and determines strict 
punishments for the different types of offences that may occur. While the ability of the emirates 
to develop their own laws is significant in maintaining separation and independence between the 
emirates, the inability to establish the strict federal laws that protect UAE does not benefit any of 
the emirates.  
The contradiction in the AML laws between international jurisdictions is in need of review. 
Money is laundered in jurisdictions were regulation is weak and/or ineffective. The complex and 
ineffectiveness of AML laws in Dubai, however, needs to be address.  The development of Free 
 237 
Trade Zones (FTZs) and Financial Free Zones (FFZs) in the UAE compounds the problem of 
AML. With 17 FTZ already in operation and plans to establish eleven more (in 2013), the 
potential for money laundering is high. Every emirate except Abu Dhabi has at least one 
functioning FTZ and these zones are monitored at emirate, as opposed to federal-level. However, 
there are over a hundred multinationals located in these FTZs, with thousands of individual 
trading organisations. The FTZs permit 100 percent foreign ownership, no import duties, full 
repatriation of capital and profits, no taxation, and easily obtainable licenses.  Those located in 
the FTZ are treated as offshore or outside the UAE for legal purposes and the law prohibits the 
establishments of a shell company and/or trusts, and does not permit non-residents to open bank 
accounts in the UAE509. The financial free zones (FFZ) are under the control of the Dubai 
International Financial Center (DIFC and exempt UAE federal civil and commercial laws. They 
are still, however, subject to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Laws. The 
DIFC established an independent regulatory body - the Dubai Financial Services Authority 
(DFSA), which reports to the office of Dubai Crown Prince and an independent Commercial 
Court. The DFSA, however, is the only authority responsible for licensing firms providing 
financial services in the DIFC. The DFSA has licensed 21 financial institutions and 13 ancillary 
services within the DIFC. The DFSA's rules prohibit offshore casinos or Internet gaming sites in 
the UAE, and require all firms to send STR to the AMLSCU (along with a copy to the DFSA). 
Although firms operating in the DIFC are subject to AML laws, the DFSA issued its own AML 
regulations and supervisory regime, creating some ambiguity as to the authority of the Central 
Bank and AMLSCU within the DIFC. One regulatory body is needed regardless of the sector to 
supervise AML strategy and development of practice.     
 
(2) Expand AML Rules to include Political Expose Persons (PEP) in Dubai 
 
                                                
509 Belaisha Bin Belaisha and Graham Brooks, 'Money laundering in Dubai: Strategies and future directions' , vol 
17 (Emerald Group Publishing Limited 2014) 8 
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Whilst the UAE has moved towards challenging PEPs it needs to expose them as well. 
Challenging PEPs is commendable but exposure holds a two-fold advantage for Dubai; it will 
increase its international reputation as a safe haven for business and highlight that it has a 
comprehensive system of regulation in place to deter money laundering. Located in a 
geographical region surrounded by oil producing nations, civil war, and political instability510, 
and expanding trade with Balkan states, the UAE has the potential to be a major conduit for 
money laundering511. Furthermore, due to its close proximity to Afghanistan, where most of the 
world's opium is produced, the UAE is vulnerable to organised crime and terrorism and the 
narcotics trade. All of these criminal elements are attracted to the UAE liberal business 
environment as a place to launder illegal funds512. In many of these locations there are PEP, and 
‘relationships’ with such people are a reputational risk.  It has been indicated that criminal 
organisations, terrorist cells, money launderers and those involved in trafficking illegal 
substances/narcotics and people make use of Dubai’s liberal financial system with the UAE a 
key centre for Hawala networks that are closely linked to Pakistan and India513. In this context 
Dubai needed to be completely transparent with those its financial sector does business with.  
 
(3) Recovering Assets 
 
The United Kingdom Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 enables, even without prior conviction, the 
Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) to initiate civil proceedings, ‘civil recovery’, through the High 
Court, against any person that it thinks holds proceeds of unlawful conduct in the form of 
                                                
510  EUGENE L. ROGAN, 'The Emergence of the Middle East into the' (Oxford University Press 2013) 37 
511 Henry G. Overman, Stephen Redding and Anthony Venables, 'The economic geography of trade, production 
and income: a survey of empirics' (Blackwell Publishing 2003) 
512 Olivier J. Blanchard, 'The crisis: basic mechanisms and appropriate policies' (International Monetary Fund 
2009) 
513  Ali Alkaabi and others, 'Money Laundering and FATF Compliance by the International Community' , What 
Kind of Information Society? Governance, Virtuality, Surveillance, Sustainability, Resilience (Springer 2010) 86 
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‘recoverable property’. This is absent from UAE law and in need of attention. There is a clause 
in AML legislation, which can only be found in unusual circumstances, but the absence of civil 
confiscation or forfeiture legislation is important in preventing money laundering. Such specific 
legislation will increase the power and reach of money laundering measures, which has been 
discovered in many developed jurisdictions (see United Kingdom above) as it aims to address the 
phenomenon of organised crime and terrorism through the elimination of revenue and 
confiscation514. With detailed and specific civil legislation property can be confiscated if 
obtained via criminal/terrorist activity based on a lower burden of proof.  Therefore, if proven 
property based on the civil standard (the probability), rather than the criminal standard (beyond 
reasonable doubt) can prevent illegal acts by the elimination of needed revenue.   
 
However, the civil recovery or forfeiture should be confined to very strict circumstances, and 
through the court only, which will examine the circumstances, and base its judgement on the 
available evidence. Furthermore, it is recommended that the UAE consider establishing a 
freestanding body to investigate and initiate a civil proceeding to recover any suspected 
proceeds, like the UK Assets Recovery Agency (ARA), which was established under the PCA 
2002. 
 
(4) Clear Channels of Communication  
 
One of the main obstacles that have undermined the effort in preventing money laundering in the 
UAE is the absence of direct communication between the banks, financial institutions and the 
                                                
514 JD Agarwal and Aman Agarwal. 'Money Laundering: New Forms of Crime Victimisation (Current Trends and 
Modus Operandi)' (2006) 20(4) Finance India 1257;Clive Coleman and Jenny Moynihan, 'Understanding crime data: 
Haunted by the dark figure' , vol 120 (Open University Press Buckingham 1996);Michael Levi and Peter Reuter, 
'Money laundering' , vol 34 (JSTOR 2006) 289;William Witherell. 'Combating financial crime through international 
standards and cooperation' (FRAUD2004: The Fifth IFex International Fraud & Financial Crime Convention, 
November 2004) 1 
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professionals and investigative body. Law enforcement bodies in the UAE are still unable to take 
information directly from the financial sector concerning any accounts. Therefore, it is highly 
recommended to have one law enforcement body that is invested with such power which can 
disseminate information needed to expedite a case(s).  
 
 
 
 
 
(5) Establish a National Database of STR 
 
The establishment of a national database to collect STR, Currency Transaction Reports (CTR), 
and international transactions (especially the Hawala) are needed. Further resources, primarily 
trained personnel are needed to sift and file STR/CTR. Such information is a basis on which to 
build a case/profile of the financial sectors passing of information but also on PEP and 
‘wayward’ customers.  The information could be a good point from which to deter crimes, 
especially money laundering, by monitoring these reports, such data could be useful for 
combating the financing of terrorism and crime and internal acquisitive crimes. 
 
In addition to these needs, specific implementations of UAE regulation should focus on 
Intelligence Led Policing (ILP), Problem-Orientated Policing (POP), and Community Policing 
models (COP), which are recognized as models that increase the success of managing crimes in 
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various areas, particularly those wishing to decrease the incidents of crime and is recognized as 
“The Best of Three Worlds”515. 
 
8.4. Intelligence	  Led	  Policing	  (ILP)	  	  
Intelligence Led Policing is defined by Ratcliffe (2008) as “a business model and managerial 
philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-
making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention 
through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and 
serious offenders”516. This model is found to consist of four specific aspects: “information 
availability”, “actionable information”, “swiftness of reaction”, and “feedback and learning”517. 
Implementation of ILP is intended to improve upon the success of the police force by creating a 
focus on information that improves proactive rather than reactive approaches to law enforcement 
at all levels of the government, and this particularly model was the focus of the British National 
Intelligence Model (NIM).  
 
Use of the ILP model is designed to focus on the fact that information occurs quickly and 
degrades in validity over time, specifically information designed to provide police with evidence 
of current events or evidence of upcoming events. In this way, the IPL model can be described as 
a “rigorous treatment of information and the rapidity of its dissemination”, which is essential to 
the ability of law enforcement to proactively engage in control of criminal forces and 
                                                
515 Versteegh, P, Van Der Plas, T, & Nieuwstraten, H 2013, 'The Best of Three Worlds: more effective policing by 
a problem-oriented approach of hot crimes, hot spots, hot shots, and hot groups', Police Practice & Research, vol. 
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517 Viaene, S, De Hertogh, S, Lutin, L, Maandag, A, Den Hengst, S, & Doeleman, R 2009, 'Intelligence-led 
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activities518. Benefits of this model are the ability for police to establish policies, acquire 
databases for developing decision-making tools, and increase the ability of law enforcement to 
grow with changes in their areas of operation. 
 
Reforming police power does not require that the country necessarily change the roles of the 
police. However, due to the large population of expatriates in the UAE, contributing to more than 
80% of the population in 2010519, the method for policing the country may require different 
considerations in the past, particularly in considering that non-nationals may not have the same 
cultural values or similar legal systems in their home countries. However, the security risk 
published in 2011, noted that the highly Muslim populations were not “attractive” targets for 
criminal groups, and that the groups identified as “attractive” were European or Western 
populations, who are well guarded in the country520 . In 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood 
threatened to destabilize all of the Middle East, in an attempt that was perceived as exploitation 
of the UAE, and which resulted in disruptions in the emirates521. These changes in the UAE 
require that consideration be given to the current policies and roles of police officers, such as by 
model implementation.  
The Ratcliffe model of ILP consists of the continuous cycle of environment, decision-maker, 
intelligence, which is acted upon by influence, interpretation, and impact, as demonstrated in 
figure 1. This expanded model of the ILP includes the continuous cycle of information, required 
to be successful in achieving goals, such as communication with informed populations for 
identifying criminal activities, and the identification of organisations – such as security – in 
providing information for investigation or assisting with investigations.  
                                                
518 Morelato, M, Beavis, A, Tahtouh, M, Ribaux, O, Kirkbride, P, & Roux, C 2013, 'The use of forensic case data 
in intelligence-led policing: The example of drug profiling', Forensic Science International, vol. 226, no. 1-3, pp. 1-
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520 Ibid 
521 'UAE official: Muslim Brotherhood is targeting Gulf after Egypt defeat', 2013, Geo-Strategy Direct, p. 16. 
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Figure	  2:	  A	  VP3-­‐Enhanced	  Intelligence-­‐Led	  Policing	  Model	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Intelligence-Led Policing’. Proceedings of the 2008 Center for Homeland Defense and Security Annual Conference. 
Retrieved from http://www.hsaj.org/?special:fullarticle=supplement.2.8 
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Dubai laws require that citizens provide information of any knowledge of illegal activities within 
the region or that they may become familiar with in other regions that may involve business 
activities or money laundering conditions. However, clear engagement with ILP has not been 
developed in either Dubai or UAE, where these requirements include more than just the 
development of additional organisations within the areas. While Dubai cannot create laws that 
conflict with the UAE federal laws regarding AML, Dubai can increase the ILP aspects of the 
legal system within the emirate, particularly by designing and implementing levels of law 
enforcement, with strong communication channels.  
 
Respondents in this research identified lack of information as a key element in failures in Dubai. 
This could be improved upon through the use of ILP methods, including those of technology 
implementation (as previously mentioned) and the use of community and problem-solving 
programs. In addition, Dubai and all of UAE would benefit from a strong culture of compliance 
and promoting these through the channels of communications to citizens. The UK has focused on 
how intelligence strategies improve upon safety to UK cities and citizens. In this way, the ILP 
represents opportunities for increased access to intelligence regarding illegal activities, by 
presenting citizens an opportunity to assist in the collection of evidence and reducing the 
criminal activities in their localities.  
 
Implementation of this model of policing includes a focus on effective methods of policing, 
which include the use of technology and information gathering. Some of these implementations, 
such as in the UK and in other Western countries, has included increased cameras in public 
places, thermal imagers, camera trailers 523 , crime mapping, computer networking, and 
partnerships with communities. Crime mapping is essential to the success of law enforcement 
because it brings awareness of crime levels to the community and permits access to all 
authorities regarding statistics and current needs in different areas524. While the different 
                                                
523 'Surveillance on the Strip', 2014, Law Enforcement Technology, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 26-27. 
524 Savvas, A 2008, 'Londoners get crime mapping website', Computer Weekly, p. 21. 
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emirates of the UAE do use different police forces, it is a benefit to the country to have 
knowledge regarding different community needs, particularly in addressing new risks to the 
police, such as the case of terrorism cells, drug trafficking, or unusual crime patterns. The ILP 
implementation would address concerns, such as identified in literature, requiring that law 
enforcement, as well as customs officials, have a more proactive approach to crime, especially in 
the areas of money laundering and terrorism financing525. This requires that the UAE officials 
apply “greater scrutiny” to activities, including those of trade in gold and precious gems, and the 
transactions of hawala dealers526. However, the additional need is that law enforcement have the 
capacity to achieve these goals through both technology and models that improve upon 
communication in order to work prior to the recommendations or referrals from other agencies.  
 
8.5. Problem-­‐Orientated	  Policing	  (POP)	  
As part of the three working policies recommended for addressing difficult crime situations, 
problem-orientated policing is a focus that includes a number of specific methods for pro-active 
or reactive methods. Successful use of the problem-orientated policing requires that the approach 
be based on “in-depth problem analysis in which the role played by the offenders, victims, and 
environmental factors in creating the problem is examined”527.  
 
It is suggested that POP must focus on sociological aspects of organised crime, specifically in 
involving the community, which is an aspect of community engagement or community 
policing528. As a focus on organised crime, the definition includes “conspiracy of two or more 
                                                
525  'All Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Countries/Jurisdictions: United Arab Emirates', 2014, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, pp. 439-441. 
526 Ibid 
527 Versteegh, P, Van Der Plas, T, & Nieuwstraten, H (2013), p. 67. 
528 Clark, M 2005, 'Organised crime: redefined for social policy', International Journal of Police Science & 
Management, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 96-109. 
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persons, an engagement in illegal activities or the infiltration of legitimate business by 
illegitimate means; formed for the acquisition of profit; corruption of government officials; risk 
averse methodologies; [and] constructed on a self-perpetuating basis”529.  
 
Respondents in this research demonstrated the reactive methods for identifying criminal 
activities, which is common practice for many countries without a focus on ILP or POP. 
Reactive behaviours do not promote strong problem-solving techniques, due to the fact that they 
occur after the crime and have no measures for preventing the crimes from occurring or reducing 
the access to criminals to the areas with current difficulties in addressing criminal activities in 
their localities. The UK implemented methods of POP in the NIM, which is a combined method 
consisting of levels of law enforcement, including at the community level. These introduce the 
need to be proactive and problem-solving in increasing safety to citizens and visitors.  
 
8.6. Community	  Orientated	  Policing	  (COP)	  
The community policing, also referred to as neighbourhood policing, model is specifically 
focused on “visibility”, “accessibility”, and ‘familiarity” of policing services available to the 
community, where cooperation exists between law enforcement agencies, communities, and 
partner agencies530. A focus is placed on removing the aspect of reactive policing and to create 
opportunities to reduce criminal activities and improve safety in the neighbourhoods, through use 
of investigative qualities and knowledge-sharing practices. Community focused policing is 
perceived as effective when the safety management of the population involves the gathering of 
information regarding specific local problems and needs, where residents in those areas are 
directly or partly involved with the priorities developed for their individual localities531. This 
                                                
529 Ibid. p. 99. 
530 Bullock, K 2013, 'Community, intelligence-led policing and crime control', Policing & Society, vol. 23, no. 2, 
pp. 125-144. 
531 Versteegh, P, Van Der Plas, T, & Nieuwstraten, H 2013 
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type of policing is effective when implemented with the ILP and the POP, due to the ability of it 
to enhance the success of both methods, and is recognized as an aspect of law enforcement that 
may embrace locality culture to increase success at all levels within the design.  
 
The fact that communities provide a source  
 
8.7. National	  Intelligence	  Model	  (NIM)	  
Finally, the National Intelligence Model would be beneficial to Dubai, due to the fact that it 
implements “core business” policing532, including “managing crime”, “managing criminals”, 
“managing localised disorder”, “managing enforcement and community issues” and “reducing 
opportunities for crime”533. NIM was developed by Britain to standardise the policing practices 
and address the needs of police to accomplish goals, meet proactive policing needs through 
intelligence gathering and the use of informants, create disruption in criminal networks, and to 
establish and use the technological advances available for investigation of crimes and gathering 
evidence534. The NIM is most successful when implemented with specific groups designed to 
manage the different levels of crime or criminal activities, including at the local, regional, and 
national levels, because this improves upon the ability of the organisations to focus on the tasks 
most important to their individual departments rather than a wide-range of criminal activities. 
 
                                                
532 Maguire, M, & John, T 2006, 'Intelligence Led Policing, Managerialism and Community Engagement: 
Competing Priorities and the Role of the National Intelligence Model in the UK', Policing & Society, vol. 16, no. 1, 
pp. 67-85. 
533  Flood, B, ‘Strategic elements of the National Intelligence Model’, in ‘Strategic Thinking in Criminal 
Intelligence’, Ratcliffe, J. The Federation Press, Leichardt. 
534 Maguire & John, 2006. 
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NIM is currently utilized around the world by police forces, including the UK, parts of Europe 
and the USA535. It is recognized as increasing the success of police in becoming aware of 
criminal networks, and works on identifying the criminal elements for further investigation, 
using technology and communication as the focus of reaching the criminals and of gathering 
necessary evidence to support the removal of these elements from the society. Four primary 
intelligence focuses are used in the NIM, “strategic assessments – long-term planning, strategies 
and policies;” “tactical assessments – short-term and operational planning;” “target profiles – 
profiles of offenders;” and “problem profiles – profiles of series of offences or offenders”536.  
 
This model includes three different levels, local area policing, force or regional issues, and 
national or international threats537. However, all three levels can work together to accomplish 
goals and establish order that effectively reduces crime. According to Maguire and John (2006), 
the “driver of business at each level is the Tasking and Coordinating Group (TCG)” which 
includes the heads of departments, with a focus on allocating resources and managing necessary 
communications and creating efficiency between the groups538. TCG is specifically designed to 
address current needs, problems or threats, and planned responses to those threats. In addition, 
the four intelligence focuses of the NIM are also addressed by focusing on strategic assessments 
created approximately every six months, and focusing on priorities of internal and external 
bodies, which must meet specific goals for each assessment. These targets improve upon the 
ability of the model to adapt to changes in the needs of the area, as well as focus on growing or 
additional threats through proactive methods.  
                                                
535 Seidler, P, & Adderley, R 2013, 'Criminal network analysis inside law enforcement agencies: a data-mining 
system approach under the National Intelligence Model', International Journal of Police Science & Management, 
vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 323-337. 
536 Kleiven, ME 2007, 'Where's the intelligence in the National Intelligence Model?', International Journal of Police 
Science & Management, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 259. 
537 Maquire & John, (2006). 
538 Ibid. p. 72. 
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The intelligence products used in the NIM utilize “nine analytical techniques” including “results 
analysis, crime pattern analysis, market profile, demographic/social trend analysis, criminal 
business profiles, network analysis, risk analysis, target profile analysis, [and] operational 
intelligence assessment539.  
 
Disadvantages and criticism of the NIM include implementation without a lack of perceivable 
“intelligence culture”, as identified by John and Maquire (2004), and the focus on evidence 
rather than other forms of intelligence – such as the knowledge base, a lack of a complete 
definition for intelligence, and failure to define the evaluation of risk assessment processes and 
to create processes and policies for police decision making540. In addition, it is considered a 
disadvantage the amount of information collected from the community and the ease at which 
decisions are made with missing or “confined” data, which is can “hinder the police from 
identifying new criminal threats”541. Other problems is the validity of information gathered from 
sources such as the community, which may be acting on fears that such events or circumstances 
will or have occurred, or by unreliable individuals that may distract the investigation through the 
falsification of evidence542. Finally, implementation of the NIM, in the UK, was done prior to 
the proper training of the requirements and policy changes, which created confusion and lack of 
compliance upon the implementation of the new model, and reduced the ability of the police to 
function within the parameters of the model543.  
 
                                                
539 Ibid. p. 73. 
540 Kleiven, (2007), p. 260. 
541 Ibid. 
542 Keane, N, & Kleiven, ME 2009, 'Risky Intelligence', International Journal of Police Science & Management, 
vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 324-333. 
543 Ibid. 
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The ability of law enforcement agencies to conduct investigations requires that information be 
gathered, and while these agencies can investigate crimes in a reactive manner, success of 
proactive methods can reduce the instances in which crimes occur. Investigation of criminal 
activities includes the use of information from different areas where criminal activity may occur, 
including information from communities, organisations, and governments, both nationally and 
internationally. While the intelligence led policing model appears to already utilize problem-
solving and community engagement, literature exists on both models in addition to the ILP, as 
intricate models, that are not consistently applied the ILP model during use by law enforcement 
agencies. In addition, the availability of information may be limited to law enforcement in 
different areas, particularly when there is a failure to comply with regulations or a failure to 
remain consistent in data storage. The UK has strict data storage requirements, and while both 
the UAE federal laws and Dubai (DFSA) regulations require that data be maintained regarding 
the regulatory requirements of AML, availability of this data or awareness of how to obtain this 
information may not be available to law enforcement agencies in Dubai as completely as they are 
to the law enforcement agencies of the UK. 
 
Another consideration of these models is the cultural and socio-economic factors that differ 
between the UK and Dubai. The UK and Dubai share in financial responsibility and have placed 
strategic policies into effect to prevent money laundering occurring from outside entry into each 
country; however, the ability to determine intricate details of transactions may be more effective 
in the UK where substantial training programs are established for customs officials, designed to 
prevent failures in monitoring the movement of money as well as precious gems and metals. 
These aspects are not completely evaluated in the primary or secondary research, as access to 
training programs is difficult to obtain and may change with changes in legislation or in 
application of employee use of these programs. 
 
As the ILP model is reliant on information to be successful, it is extremely important that 
regulations and legal environments of the area be complete and clear in the requirements of 
organisations and individuals. Law enforcement agencies are challenged by incomplete 
definitions of illegal activities, in that deriving evidence requires that the evidence is of the crime 
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in question, obtained legally according to that specific legislation requirements, and admissible 
in the courts established. Currently, the UAE, Dubai, and the UK have worked diligently to 
clarify the legality of the different types of transactions and to define what money laundering or 
terrorism financing entails; however, the UAE does not specifically address definitions in the 
access provided in the Central Bank website. Dubai does stress that all occurrences that do not 
represent clear legal or transparent transactions must be investigated, but do not address specific 
indications of all activities that may be designated as illegal. In the case of the UK, and the work 
being established in Dubai, authoritative departments are required to establish training programs 
and define the legal aspects of AML for law enforcement agencies and financial institutions. In 
addition, the UK, UAE, and Dubai have established FIUs to further designate responsibility of 
these aspects of investigation.  
 
While punishment may be determined by individuals unrelated to the investigative processes, 
punishment should also be clear, to assist in deterring individuals from taking actions that are 
deemed illegal. Dubai and UAE has designed clear regulations; however, the information 
regarding punishment for these crimes or the taking part in illegal activities that could promote 
money laundering, are less clear. While the UK has many clearly documented requirements of 
AML failures, including fines and penalties, where the legislation supports these penalties, as 
stated in Part 6, 48, “Any charge or penalty imposed on a person by a supervisory authority 
under regulation 35(1) or 42(1) is a debt due from that person to the authority and is recoverable 
accordingly”544. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
544 Retrieved from http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/2157/regulation/48/made 
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8.8. Results	  of	  Research	  Objectives	  
Five research objectives were identified to guide the research and these are evaluated to 
demonstrate the findings of those objectives. The objectives defined were established to give 
structure to the research and guidance in the information gathered. Each of the five objectives are 
listed below with their results. 
 
The first objective of the research was to assess the present legal strategies in preventing and/or 
reducing money laundering in Dubai in order to establish a base and identify amendments 
needed. According to the current legislation, UAE is working to establish federal guidelines and 
laws that will reduce the ability for criminal networks to use the UAE as a source of money 
laundering and other criminal activities. These laws are implemented throughout the country, but 
suffer from reduced success in implementation, as demonstrated by the Dubai primary research 
and the FATF assessments. The ability for the UAE to be successful begins with legal 
requirements of organisations and individuals, as they enter the country in customs or when 
money is transferred to individuals within the country.  
 
Dubai has taken a strong approach to managing the issues related to the AML requirements for 
the UAE and has dedicated specific organisations to the purpose of creating an undesirable and 
difficult environment in Dubai for money laundering purposes. In addition, the Dubai 
government has worked to impose regulation on both the financial and the non-financial business 
industry within the area, which includes the requirement of personnel dedicated to monitoring for 
unusual activities and legislation that requires reporting and tipping off measures by 
organisations and individuals.  
 
The FATF and the IMF have credited Dubai for many of the initiatives and legislation in place 
regarding AML; however, it is also noted that failures or improper measures have restricted the 
assessment. These include failures in customs and failures in documentation of incidents that can 
enable the FATF to measure the success of the Dubai activities. While the Dubai requirements 
and regulation is more suiting to the FATF recommendations, there is more work required for 
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Dubai to be completely successful in meeting the goals and achieving a reduction of money 
laundering. This is not impossible, the foundation is developed in most of the legislation, which 
continues to be improved with the FATF Recommendations and risk assessments for the country. 
However, the most effective implementation will require that the government focus on 
implementing models of law enforcement that will improve upon the implementation of the 
goals.  
 
Examine the current policing strategies in preventing and/or reducing money laundering in Dubai 
to establish where amendments are required was the second objective. Currently, Dubai must 
begin to focus on creating better policing strategies, such as utilizing the intelligence-led policing 
model or the National Intelligence Model, which will improve upon the ability of authorities to 
access information and reduce the prevalence of money laundering throughout the area. 
However, this is also true of UAE overall, where increased government agencies, databases, and 
policing will improve upon the ability of the country to achieve the goals of compliance with 
FATF standards and improve upon relations and communication with international agencies and 
other countries.  
 
It is perceived that the primary concerns of money laundering in the UAE are a direct result of 
the aspects of financial hub that are noted, specifically in Dubai, where international activities 
occur due to the need to conduct business in the city. While the customs department has greatly 
improved over the past decade, the ability to monitor and control organisational funds is more 
limited and has had more difficulty in achieving these same successes. In this way, Dubai and the 
UAE are more successfully committed to reducing the amount of illegal or undocumented goods 
into the city, but less successful in managing the necessary precautions for laundering purposes.  
 
However, the UAE and Dubai would benefit from review and implementation of the policies, 
legislation, and models used by the UK. The UK has strong compliance ratings with the FATF, 
and use of these items could improve the ratings of the UAE overall. While Dubai is not rated 
individually of the UAE, the actions of Dubai are credited during the assessment process when 
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they are demonstrated to be more compliant than that of the rest of the UAE. In this way, 
improved models and legislation could occur at the Dubai level to set examples for other 
emirates in the UAE or to demonstrate how these changes could be successful at the federal 
level. Additionally, Dubai has developed clear communications for organizations and DNFBPs, 
to improve upon understanding of both federal and Dubai specific regulations regarding anti-
money laundering legislation and regulations, which improves upon the ability of both to achieve 
the goals identified by the FATF.  
 
In the third objective, it was determined that an assessment of possible future directions in 
preventing and/or reducing money laundering in Dubai would be conducted using interviews and 
the recommendations from respondents. This area was evaluated using the literature, FATF 
Recommendations, and responses from the primary research, which demonstrated that 
improvements are necessary for the continued success of Dubai and in remaining viable 
internationally in the future. As AML/CFT regulations continue to be an important element of 
international activities, the further support in the areas of reducing money laundering will 
become critical in all countries, including in the UAE. However, while the interviews found that 
the communication, training, and access to databases were the most problematic, overall 
respondents did not feel that there was any increase in the criminal elements, and literature 
suggests that the improvements that have occurred have been mostly positive in reducing the 
risks of money laundering and terrorism financing.  
 
The fourth objective was to expose the limits to international AML practice to establish whether 
UAE/Dubai needs to alter some of its current practices. An FATF Recommendations Assessment 
was developed to determine how the AML regulations were currently implemented in the UAE 
and Dubai. The FATF Recommendations demonstrated that improvement has occurred the 
legislation and regulations that were required, as compared to the 2008 assessment published for 
UAE. Specifically improvements were found to exist in the areas of criminalization of money 
laundering offences, clarification of requirements for both Authorized Firms and DNFBPs, and 
all areas found to be noncompliant. However, similar to the 2008 assessment, the challenge was 
to discover how effective these implementations of legislation had been, as there were no 
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statistics regarding these areas available in either literature or in regards to publications from the 
DFSA or Central Bank. In addition, based on the primary research, some of the changes did not 
appear to have been successful when considering application by the respondents. These areas 
that needed improvement were found to be in communication and collaboration between law 
enforcement and other agencies, and the lack of usable databases to access necessary 
information.  
 
Finally, the last objective was to establish whether there is a need for a political and cultural shift 
in attitude to prevent and/or reduce money laundering in Dubai. This area was most difficult to 
assess using the research gathered. While a shift from cash-based to cash-less society would 
clearly eliminate issues found with documentation and remove the difficulties associated with 
regulating Hawala, the political goals of the area do appear to focus on creating federal 
regulations that will assist in bring UAE into compliance with the goals of international 
organizations in creating solid foundations for reducing money laundering and terrorism 
financing around the world. However, difficulties remain in areas of inter-agency 
communications, and while these require that a cultural shift occur within the agencies to 
improve upon these relationships, it does not have a direct relationship with the culture of 
organizations and individuals. In addition, political issues that have a negative influence on the 
success are the lack of standardization between emirates, where Dubai may focus on meeting the 
requirements of the FATF Recommendations, other emirates, particularly in areas where the new 
FTZs are being developed, may not have managed the same amount of regulations and may be 
dependent on federal laws and federal agencies to assist in managing these aspects. In this way, it 
is most likely that the success will come from the increased focus on empowering federal 
agencies to be available to emirates in need, and increasing overall communication between the 
agencies, such as through the development of the models identified in this research.  
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8.9. Conclusion	  	  
This thesis started off by explaining the context in which money laundering takes place in Dubai. 
It highlighted that since 2001, the UAE, at Federal and emirate-level has put in place a 
comprehensive system to prevent and reduce money laundering with two acts that serve as the 
foundation for anti-money laundering (AML) in the UAE; these are the Anti-Money Laundering 
Law (2002) and Counter Terrorism Law (2004). There was little or no assessment, until now, of 
these acts, laws, procedures and processes effectiveness in preventing and reducing money 
laundering in the UAE.  What was discovered was a system that is in need of attention on a 
number of levels. However, the research also demonstrated that Dubai was found to be working 
diligently to meet the needs of FATF regulation, in addition to the federal laws of UAE. These 
increases in legislation are widely available to the public, both in English and in Arabic and 
demonstrate a commitment to both ethical practices and legal regulation.  
 
The past few decades have resulted in many changes worldwide, in regards to how money 
laundering is addressed, and this includes changes to FATF recommendations and assessment 
processes. These changes contribute to the success of AML objectives, particularly in that the 
goal is to establish legislation and international cooperation in resolving these issues; however, 
enforcement of the legislation is more complicated. Dubai and the UAE as a whole would benefit 
from the use of a model, such as NIM or ILP, in order to create more successful communication 
channels and establish the necessary needs in all areas for technology for data gathering. In 
addition, due to the increase in technology worldwide, the use of technology should be more 
widely used in the UAE to determine the compliance of individuals and organisations.  
 
The FATF Recommendations of 2008 have been being implemented in the UAE, and while 
improvement has occurred based on the results of the literature review and in regards to 
legislation, there are still many areas in which the UAE must improve to become compliant with 
all the recommendations found in need. In the primary research, it was identified that the most 
difficult aspects of this compliance were both in cooperation and in communication, which 
would be greatly improved by the application of the ILP model or the NIM. These models enable 
the law enforcement agencies to work together productively and build databases of information 
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that will increase the effectiveness of investigations. In addition, the use of training programmes 
and increased cross-training could benefit law enforcement and increase compliance with mutual 
legal assistance, both nationally and internationally. However, one of the greatest difficulties the 
UAE faces in regards to compliance is the differences in control, such as the implementation of 
laws at the federal and the emirate level. Dubai has developed strong regulations to address the 
needs of the AML/CFT regulations and works to increase these due to the active financial hub 
status it maintains, which includes international recognition. Improvement benefits Dubai and 
the UAE on an international level and adds credibility to the financial institutions within the 
country.  
 
In addition to investigating the UAE and Dubai in regards to FATF recommendations, the work 
was designed to compare the UAE and the UK, with a focus on the success of Dubai in 
compliments from the FATF for legislation requirements meeting the FATF standards. These 
exceptions that are demonstrated by Dubai are substantial, as Dubai is a financial hub within this 
region and represents many opportunities for legal activities. However, Dubai works to establish 
clear requirements of organisations and individuals, monitors transactions, and requires that 
individuals involved in suspicious activity report these activities to the authorities. While there 
were no current statistics on the number of reports received over the past few years, the legal 
regulation is very important to the success of the country as a whole, and increase the ability for 
the country to remain competitive with the rest of the world. Risks of money laundering can 
decrease outside interest in investing or supporting organisations within the country.  
 
The key elements have been addressed above but further issues that require analysis were raised 
in this thesis but not part of its remit. One of these issues is deterrence. There is little or no 
deterrence in Dubai. This is due to a number of factors; a poor regulatory regime, lack of law 
enforcements resources, lack of skilled personnel in law enforcement, poor channels of 
communication (see above) diverse financial sectors (i.e., gold market with close links to India 
and Pakistan, the Hawala system, which is in need of doctorial research on its own, and the 
‘black economy’ that exist everywhere but more so in cash-based nations). 
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To design and implement a comprehensive system is an incremental and slow process. It is 
suggested here that Dubai has achieved many key steps; it has passed laws to counter the threat 
of money laundering which was needed; it has put in place a regulatory regime, which needs 
developing. In this thesis it became evident that the AML strategy and practice in the UAE and 
Dubai in particular was limited, but was supported by legislation designed to improve the 
success within the country and within Dubai specifically by the DFSA Codebook. Signing 
international conventions, passing national laws, establishing a regulatory regime are all to be 
commended but as noted at the start of this thesis by Levi 1996:3) finding an effective regulatory 
regime for the financial world is problematic. ‘The trick of regulation is to minimise the 
illegitimate exploitation without wrecking economic dynamism’.  
 
Finally, the UAE and Dubai specifically would benefit from an updated FATF assessment that 
works with the government and regulatory bodies to determine the success of current 
implementations. Following the 2007 FATF assessment, the UAE made many changes to 
legislation and worked to close gaps in the legislation and regulation established by the FATF for 
AML management. These successes were a direct result of the recommendations, and evaluating 
the effectiveness of these changes would enable the country to determine how further to continue 
to grow compliance, and to support the needs of people in the country, including those using the 
Hawala system. As the culture is strongly supportive of charities and a cash-based system, it is 
likely that some changes to the money laundering risks of the UAE will require time to be 
successful in creating change and embracing new concepts of documentation and customer 
inquiries. However, the newest designs have much potential for the success in the UAE, if they 
were further supported by models such as the intelligence led policing and supported by POP and 
COP. 
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http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20UAE%20full.pdf
 301 
Appendix	  G. Prompt	  interviews	  
1. Prompt interviews AMLSCU 
2. Prompt interviews Banker 
3. Prompt interviews Police 
 302 
• Prompt interviews AMLSCU 
 
 
First of all tell me about you job in this organization? 
 
 
How this organization works to fight Money Laundering? 
 
 
From where do you get authority to do your work? 
 
 
there is any fear of these crises? 
 
 
What is your organization role in the face of money laundering? 
 
 
What are the bodies that you receive from them suspicious cases? 
 
 
Is there any law and regulation guideline to receive the suspicious cases of companies operating 
in the country? 
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What is suspicion report mean to AMLSCU? 
 
 
What is a transaction would you say is it suspicious? 
 
 
Do you have constantly monitored all medium and large scale to and for transactions? 
 
 
 
What you say about Hawala and it's used in money laundering? 
 
 
 
Do you think transaction amount will be enough to identify suspicious transaction? 
 
 
 
Do you think Hawala regularized enough? 
 
 
What do you thing about current law of anti money laundering? 
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• Prompt interviews Banker 
 
 
First of all tell me about you job in this organization? 
 
 
How this organization works to fight Money Laundering? 
 
 
 
What you say about Hawala and it's used in money laundering? 
 
 
 
Do you think Hawala regularized enough? 
 
 
 
Do you think Hawala has loophole it been used by criminal to do Money Laundering and 
terrorism? 
 
 
Do you find Hawala easy to discover? 
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Do you think that Dubai can fight money laundering? 
 
 
 
What is the procedure on going with Know Your customer? 
 
 
 
Where do you send suspicion report? 
 
 
Do you face any problem with them? 
 
 
Do you have any issues regarding share information? 
 
 
Do we need to have new regulation or law into financial system? 
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• Prompt interviews Police 
 
 
First of all tell me about you job in this organization? 
 
 
 
How this organization works to fight Money Laundering? 
 
 
 
From where do you get authority to do your work? 
 
 
 
What is your organization role in the face of money laundering?  
 
 
 
What are the bodies that you receive from them suspicious cases? 
 
 
How do you go about arresting someone who is to be investigated for money laundering? 
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How do you start investigation? 
 
 
Do you face any distribution in your investigation? 
 
 
 
Do you have any issues regarding share information? 
 
 
 
There is any cooperation overseas to fight money laundering? 
 
 
 
Factors that you believe that Encouraging Money Laundering in the UAE? 
 
 
 
Do we need to have new regulation or law into financial? 
